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Abstract. 
This thesis investigates the methodological narrowness used to interpret social license 
failure in the mining sector. Using a mixture of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), Poststructuralist 
theory, Political Settlement theory and knowledge from the mining industry, it investigates the 
core premises of existing models of social license, finding them lacking. It details challenges 
facing the mining sector, highlighting a disjoint operationally at a temporal level and spatial 
level between communities and industry. Representing the inability of the sector to address 
social licence failure as evidence of ontological narrowness in assessments of local community 
consent, it demonstrates it is the totality of relationships around the mine project that is critical. 
A new model predicated on a Political Settlement framework at a meso level, is created and 
populated as a visual model with icons. These icons, make up within the Social License 
Settlement Model (SLSM), a representation of the dynamic balancing act of relationships 
defining social license. The model is set in Thirdspace, reflecting that different participants 
have different perceptions of space, time and symbolism. The model was tested by showing 
how a social license was not solely about the mine and local communities but wider 
relationships. An examination of Rosa Montana mine project failure in Romania as it joined 
the EU, demonstrated that the process of ascension caused aspects of civil society to change, 
making securing a social license more difficult. Field research in Serbia, in a similar position 
in 2018 to Romania in terms of EU membership when Rosa Montana failed, with State mine 
regulator officials, private sector mine development actors and people living adjacent to mining 
projects. Similar issues with civil society appear likely to develop in Serbia, driven by the 
introduction of transnational environmental regulation. The SLSM captures how this might be 
avoided and mitigated. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction.   
1.1  Rationale for the Research.  
This chapter outlines what, where and why research was undertaken to support the 
creation of a new model of social licence.  The term Social Licence to Operate was first coined 
by a Canadian mining executive, Jim Cooney, more than 30 years ago (Cooney, 2017).  Its 
definition and purpose, while still debated, relate back to the work of Joyce and Thomson 
(2000) as being “when a mineral exploration or mining project is seen as having the approval, 
the broad acceptance of society to conduct its activities” Boutilier (2017:2).  The notion of 
‘broad acceptance’ is reliant on normative, or positional terms such as fairness, trust, and 
shared value, the corporation may think it is fair, but the community may not.   The result is a 
concept that is ambiguous and a “tendency for the mining sector to routinely talk in terms of 
gaining, and retaining, a ‘social licence to operate’” Kemp and Owen (2020:3) associated such 
attainment with a lack of protests or negative perceptions about a project.  As Kemp and Owen 
(2020) go on to suggest, such an approach removes the need to develop a strategic approach or 
incentive for understanding of community values, priorities or any of the potential drivers of 
acceptance that a mining project would depend upon to achieve a social licence.   
In reviewing and critiquing existing theoretical models of social licence I argue that, in 
addition to a range of inadequate or flawed ontologically approaches regarding the anticipating 
and mitigating of mining impacts on host communities, there is another critical factor 
promoting social licence failure.  That is the lack of a coherent “development” framework by 
corporations that inevitably directs them to erroneously, to pursuing social licence with 
communities, through a focus on philanthropy.  In a sense, when compared to the international 
development aid sector, with relation to host communities, the mining sector is ideologically 
stuck in the 1970’s.    
Over recent years social licence failure, meaning the withdrawal of consent by the host 
community, forcing, through a variety of possible processes, the stopping of mining operations, 
has become the number one risk facing the mining sector globally (EY 2019, 2020).  As such, 
it is logical to assume that either the existing theoretical models for social licence are either 
inadequate in supporting the mining industry to identify how to frame their risk operationally 
or these models could be effective but are not utilised.  The assumptions are that no mining 
corporation wants to lose its ability to operate as a business and those providing the finance for 
mining operations will not want to invest in businesses which are a hostage to fortune.    
Broadly, a theoretical pluralism approach has been used to position this new model.   
Such a theoretical pluralism approach has been used before to explore project failures, notably 
documented in the work of Sage, Dainty and Brookes (2014).   As illustrated in the ‘Pyramid 
of Theories’ in  Figure 1-1, the model is located within a catholic interpretation of Actor 
Network Theory, Poststructuralist Theory, Political Settlement Theory and current academic 
framings of a social licence to operate.    
 
Figure 1-1 Pyramid of Theories 
1.2 Where and Why? 
A major driver for undertaking the research was the desire to drive change within the 
extraction industry, to lessen the intensity of conflict between corporations and communities.  
It was felt that a visual model would be useful to engage those with limited interest in social 
theory but concerned at conceptualising the underlying tensions of a social licence in real world 
application.  The resultant new model for a social licence seeks to represent social licence to 
operate in the mining sector, and has been developed through both a desk case study and field 
research in Serbia.    
The theoretical starting point for the development of this model was MacCallum’s (2017) 
work on social licence to operate.  In contrast to Thomson, Joyce and Boutilier, she emphasises 
the critical role of the governance structures (the State) in achieving a social licence, through 
their role as controllers and sometimes owners of the natural resources and their relationships 
with all of the users.  MacCallum defined the relationship between the State and the 
communities that host mining projects as essential for social licence creation and maintenance 
in a mining context.  The model being conceptualised goes further, illustrating State 
involvement in mining company relationships with communities is in fact pivotal, through the 
ongoing modulating of regional or local institutions, to ensure that a social licence becomes 
and stays a reality.  In this thesis, social licence is one product from an ever changing and 
evolving set of relationships, assemblage in Actor Network Theory terminology and is not 
solely within the gift of the corporation, although mining corporations can certainly facilitate 
its creation and maintenance through their actions and engagement with host populations and 
the State.  This “Social Contract” or Contractualism basis for social licence results in my model 
for a social licence, characterised broadly as a balancing act, representing a series of trade-offs 
between necessarily included actors.   
Such a proposition for a model of social licence must therefore be premised as much on 
the formal relationships between the citizen and the state (host communities to mining 
projects), as between the mining corporation and the citizen (mining project to a host 
community).  In the developing and testing of this new theoretical model premised on that 
citizen state relationship, it was necessary to explore how a change to that relationship could 
impact on mining social Licences in a real-world context.  Similarly, there was a need within 
this thesis to define a theoretical framework capable of capturing the multiple and dynamic 
nature of society to illustrate social contractual relationships and having it produce visual 
products that can support analyse of Social Licence for those with little interest in the social 
theory.   
1.3 Experiences Supporting the Research.    
1.3.1 Roots of a Professional 
Discussing with fellow Ph.D. candidates it appears that it is never easy to outline how 
one’s personal experiences are definitive to their doctoral research.  Is some sense, my journey 
is the one aspect of my doctoral research I have been reluctant to openup.  I have moved through 
many careers; social worker, drug abuse specialist, youth worker, community development 
specialist, project manager, director of NGO’s, livelihood expert, entrepreneur, civil servant, 
social forester and finally, consultant to the infrastructure/extraction sector (whilst running a 
not-for-profit NGO with strong ethical drivers).  What got me to undertake a relatively 
theoretical doctoral research thesis?  Investigating notions of community acceptability and 
legitimacy, I need to nail my colours to the mast and illustrate that some of the analyses I bring 
to bear in later chapters, has been underpinned or coloured by considerable experience and 
constant reflection over many years, on the relationship between authority and communities.  
Writing from a perspective aimed at supporting the extraction sector to more effectively deal 
with potential and actual conflict, might offer up the allegation as you will see, that I am in 
fact, a poacher turned gamekeeper.  I have never subscribed to either perspective but have 
always had both a burning sense of social injustice and a pragmatic streak.  I would argue that 
both these traits emerge from the personal experiences of powerless and exclusion.   The 
journey to my doctoral research has been a rather long one compared to most PhD  candidates, 
given that I started my candidature in the same institution I took my undergraduate degree, 
some thirty years ago.  Having said that, I think I must go back even further to indicate were 
my notions of community, legitimacy, exclusions, class, and identity were first forged.  The 
intellectual conceptualisation of those terms is one thing, knowing how they can be and are 
operationalised, what they feel like or might be expressed from a community perspective and 
ultimately how they drive community members’ responses to authority, is where my childhood 
provided my career an enabling shove.  That is what has formed the basis of my reflexivity in 
this thesis.    
    Growing up as a working-class boy in Portadown, County Armagh, Northern Ireland 
(UK), the emotional dissonance I experienced with regards to politics, safety, violence, trust, 
legitimacy, and social justice, all seemed to relate to what is euphemistically known as “the 
Troubles”.  It took me some time to realise that my experiences were not just related to the 
conflict but that my experience of the conflict was underpinned by what I now recognise as 
poverty.  The '70s and early '80s were challenging times for working-class people anywhere in 
the British Isles.  I would contend that it was a significantly different experience where there 
was a seemingly intractable conflict tying up one-third of the British army on the Rhine.  
Reiterating episodes of my childhood now, as a qualified social worker, I find it hard to argue 
I was not neglected, yet I was not.  I lived in a different time, with different expectations and 
different perspectives of freedom, childcare and violence.   Having already heavily sanitized 
this chapter before running it past my supervisors, I am chopping it yet again.  Perhaps best to 
say it was a childhood that although situated in what was a drab mid-Ulster town, delivered a 
range of experience more akin to a ghetto.  Growing up immersed in the “troubles”; 
checkpoints, gunfire, searches, and bombing, desensitized a young man to violence and 
sensitized me to the fragility and limitations of the State, concerning control and violence, as 
well as human life.  Lord Wigg was one of the few to stand out from Hansard UK parliament 
records of the mid-70s, as someone with extensive military experience, including in Ireland, 
yet who was not an ardent militarist said that “in Ireland, the extremist always wins” (Hansard 
1974).  The news on TV brought nightly exposure to burning buildings, sometimes ones we 
knew, and the radio was hourly everywhere, detailing bombings, shooting and strange received 
pronunciation (RP) voices from somewhere else, like on Blue Peter (BBC Children’s 
programme).  Both growing up in a close community and understanding how that operated and 
having directly and vicariously experienced marginalisation reflecting on my parents’ years 
living in Wolverhampton before returning to their home town, was a powerful force in 
delivering an ability to empathise with powerless communities affected by the mining sector.    
     The period up to 1981 when I became 15 years old was littered with family members 
and family associates being murdered, bomb attacks in my small town, oppressive security, 
greyness, and puberty.  This and the exposure to media management of realities packaged for 
an apparently largely gullible GB audience, by what was locally dubbed the Biased 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) gave one a sense of reflectiveness on society in general.  As 
a young child, I had felt and seen protests that closed Northern Ireland down for 13 days in 
1974 (Boyce and O’Day 2001:255).  The State lost control and it happened again in 1986.  In 
1986 the UK government considered the protests to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (November 
1985) as a possible precursor to Northern Ireland’s succession and the Irish republic had troops 
poised on the border to race to the defence of the nationalist/Catholic community in Northern 
Ireland (BBC.   1).  The agreement was seen by the Protestant community as ushering in  de-
facto joint authority over Northern Ireland, the UK sharing responsibility with the Republic of 
Ireland government for the internal affairs of Northern Ireland through an inter-governmental 
body.  Orange marches and band parades became the focus of conflict between the State on 
one side represented by the largely Protestant police, Royal Ulster Constabulary or RUC 
(Source RUC 1) supported by the British Army and on the other, that significant part of the 
population that wanted to remain British.  That same population that had been fighting and 
dying to preserve its British identity.  I understood the not unexpected betrayal and what it 
meant to rural Protestants who were exposed to the campaign by the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) based in east Tyrone and South Armagh areas.  These rural areas 
provided the catchment for my school and some of the highest death tolls in the trouble 
occurred here when measured by the percentage of electoral ward population (Source Cain 1).  
Border farms, some owned by protestant families for many hundreds of years, had family 
members working the fields, guarded by other family members with automatic weapons.  They 
had the weaponry because they were "part-time" Ulster Defence Regiments (UDR) British 
soldiers (Source UDR 1).  Without the weaponry, they felt they would have been exterminated, 
yet by joining the UDR they became legitimate targets for the IRA.  A total of 258 Ulster 
Defence Regiments (UDR) soldiers died during the troubles and 300 police officers, with some 
9000 injured in the conflict (Source Cain 1) The conflict was nightly and brutal.   
There was an excitement to the violent tension, tinged with an awareness not that the 
State had been usurped but rather was impotent and those that were not, had little or no sense 
of liberalism.  This was critical in developing my awareness of how power operates in 
communities where the State does not have a monopoly on violence and the attendant risks.    
1.3.2 Dissonance.  
 As a young man, I had friends, family and associates scattered across the spectrum of 
Northern Irish society, some in the police, some connected with fundamentalist churches, some 
linked to international conflict and others having served time in prison for terrorist offenses, 
all more confusing in that the categories often merged.  Everyday life gave the opportunity to 
both develop the conversational practices that are needed to negotiate the intellectual and social 
tank traps of religious fundamentalism and develop an awareness that there are different 
realities that we all share.  It was a land of highly charged symbols and signifiers, linguistic, 
colour, space, music and dress, perfect priming for a university sociology student! This 
experience and awareness of the diversity of what to many externally and internally would 
conceptualise as a homogenous society was significant in shaping an understand of community 
complexity.  That the community was portrayed as a homogenous entity politically as a device 
by Unionist politicians, was highly informative in demonstrating the utilisation of narratives 
and their power in replicating themselves.  Recognising how myths and external narratives are 
created and utilised as political capital, has informed my professional career and the 
dismantling of those monoliths in the pursuit of conflict resolution.   
      Arriving at university I was fortunately appointed a personal tutor who understood 
the community from whence I had come.  Richard Jenkins, then as now a hard-working 
academic, was kind enough to be a touchstone for my interpretation of middle-class university 
life, straight from my building site summer job in Northern Ireland, with evenings of 
kickboxing and drinking.  The work of Richard Jenkins, from Larne in Northern Ireland, who 
had worked as a youth worker in a large Protestant housing complex outside Belfast, rang so 
true to me that I found it hard to consider it “academic”.  Blackman (1987) reviewed Jenkins’ 
1982 and 1983 research having spent time working in that same locality and appear to have 
understood some of the tensions represented by that body of work dealing with the stratification 
of youth in what was a very troubled period.  Later when I started a Ph.   D.  programme in the 
Politics department at Swansea under the late Prof George Boyce, which I was subsequently 
unable to fund, Jenkins was supportive in terms of access to contacts with the community in 
Northern Ireland.  Prof Boyce was an eminent political historian who like myself originated 
from mid-Ulster (Lurgan) and one of his areas of specialisms was Irish politics in the period 
up to the start of the most recent “Troubles’.  Meeting academics who understood the levels of 
complexity of the Northern Irish security apparatus and how they impacted on communities, 
gave relevance and saliency to my early machinations on legitimacy, political history and how 
communities relate to state and non-state actors.  Dealing with powerlessness is what drives 
communities in conflict.    
    During and following my degree I ended up arguing with “key players” in the very 
working-class, Ulster Loyalist movement, that I should be facilitated by them to enable 
Protestant communities to have a voice.  I recognised that the poorest cohort of the Protestant 
community was patronised by their political representative, safe in the knowledge they had no 
one else to vote for within the "Orange and Green' dichotomy of nearly every aspect of 
Northern Irish society.  I verbally wrestled with those well known as, senior loyalist terrorists, 
engaged in what they saw as fighting the IRA, in arguments about legitimacy, the State and 
forms of democracy.  State legitimacy, the “movement’s” legitimacy, the legitimacy of 
violence, real tangible violence, nothing was entirely in the abstract, it was all very palpable.  
“Legitimacy” was viewed as a real currency of consent or support and determined the viability 
of “military” actions, or terrorist atrocities depending on one's perspective.  My arguments, 
when addressed to those engaged with political violence, were often met with, "The community 
doesn’t know what is good for them”.    
This was to be a recurrent theme in my later professional life.  Professionally, the 
community, that amorphous entity lacking a single voice if indeed any voice at all, are 
euphorically embraced if they agree with those that want to use them to legitimise established 
courses of action.  If they disagree with the powerful, they are either not representative or 
deemed ill-equipped to make a sensible choice.    
Moving into the “end game” of the “peace process”, opportunities for meeting and 
arguing with a range of new actors didn’t always go so well.  Understanding the limits of and 
opportunities for affiliation, how that can give licence to action, was a significant plank in 
understanding how non-state violence is often self-regulated.  In my experience, non-state 
violence is rarely mindless, often poorly directed and limited by a range of social factors.  
Violence is a form of communication as much as an expression of power.  Knowing how to 
calibrate and sequence engagement with violent people is a useful tool in engaging 
communities.  Knowing the anatomy of constraints, they might face in operationalising 
violence, is critical to bringing non-violent change in any given locality.  Those individuals 
that can mobilise violence which can be successfully portrayed as legitimate, can create a 
gravity that helps those mobilising further violence, to promote their own personal or political 
interests.  As a social practitioner, one has had to be careful not to become the proxy target, 
violence requires a perpetrator and a victim.  The last category is to be avoided.    
     By 1995 I was employed running a large EU programme on the Belfast Peace-line, 
the interface between Protestants and Catholics marked by a Berlin type “Peace-wall”.  On an 
EU exchange visit, guests from east Berlin were shocked to hear residents shouting at their 
comments to remove the peace wall, calls of “no don’t pull it down, we want it higher!” By 
then I was a qualified UK social worker, specialising in community development and drug 
misuse, had met President Clinton’s advance party in covert meetings, mapping potential risks 
from Loyalist terrorists to the then US president on his visit.  I was pulled into the Clinton 
meeting with no warning to make local working-class Loyalist’s sound coherent (I had a 
university degree!) and met with several US officials.  That road of meeting governments ended 
up with my brokering discussions in the peace process with the UK and meeting the secretary 
of State Northern Ireland, the late Mo Mowlan and her entourage.  My ongoing argument about 
working with communities had been won and I was “authorised” by senior Loyalists to work 
in rural Protestant areas organising communities.  This was in no small part due to the 
successful weaponizing of communities’ resident’s groups by the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA) and their political wing, Sein Fein.  PIRA used/equipped or motivated these 
groups in the preceding 10 years, ostensibly to protest, against Orange marches/parades that 
touched or passed through what had now become, with changing demographics, 
republican/Catholic areas.  For militant republicanism, this was a strategy that enabled the next 
generation of young people to be engaged in conflict, feeding off in some cases real grievances.   
The patchwork of space; Protestant or Catholic, Orange and Green, Loyalist and 
Republican, it was impossible to escape the almost universal dichotomy of social life in 
Northern Ireland.  Arguably the setting up of these groups was a clever tool for widening the 
potential of their political wing’s, Sein Fein, development and deepening the links of their 
military movement into the community.   My view is that it also tapped into wider discontent 
by working-class Catholics about the lack of effectiveness of their politicians in delivering 
positive social and economic change.   
     As an Alinskian (Alinsky,1971) trained community worker, I scoured hard-line 
Loyalist communities in three rural counties, setting up resident groups and equipping them to 
organise and construct arguments to try and get them to look at what their communities needed.  
Bus stops, youth provision, development funds, rural Protestant areas had even less access to 
these European Structural funds than their Catholic counterparts.  Many of these Loyalist areas 
were poorly served by their unionist local councillors, who often blamed allocation of resources 
to Catholic areas not on the presence of well organised articulate groups, working with their 
elected Sein Fein representatives but on a notion that resources were somehow freely given to 
them and Protestants were ineligible or discriminated against.   I met with the Orange Order 
and much as my father predicted, their inability to either envisage or consider change was awe-
inspiring. Their sense of entitlement and lack of appetite for change, and a hunger for 
entrenchment, meant I quickly realised my further engagement was pointless.  Today I still 
argue that communities need to both build social capital and develop the capacity to articulate 
a perspective, otherwise they simple follow leadership, however poor.  Poor leadership is 
threatened by community development as it brings challenge and change.   
Engaging and equipping Ulster Loyalist communities to have an internal debate, to be 
able to rehearse and develop their arguments to challenge very coherent, well-practiced and 
highly skilled Catholic republican community representatives, was less about preparing them 
to engage in conflict, than preparing them to engage with conflict.  Sophistry and an ability to 
negotiate are learned as are refined behaviours and skills.  Representatives, political, or 
otherwise retain currency by being able to bring people with them.  That requires both a 
physical and social space for discussion and trust-building.    
1.3.3 Developing professional credentials 
In Northern Ireland, by 1997 it was obvious that the conflict resolution process was one 
where violent actors would take ownership of delivering peace.  Conflict, as an asset was 
wholly owned by them and the State approved a chosen few of which I was not one, to operate 
in this space as brokers.  Supporting the release of former combatants from prison required 
mechanisms for ensuring they stayed “on board” with the peace process.  Community 
development person become a euphemism for – just out of gaol.   It gave often poorly educated, 
unemployed former combatants (new designation for convicted terrorists) value and that value 
could potentially be extracted financially at some point from the process, either through 
employment or grant aid.  This was my first realisation that conflict capital had a financial 
value.  Holding on to conflict as a capital asset that can be financialised with violent people 
tugging at it, is a risky business.  The risk is intensified when a panoply of interested national 
states buy into a process that wants violent actors to own the capital as part of the political 
engagement process.  I had organised a charitable entity and secured some EU funding to 
develop a programme to work with former combatants who wanted to free themselves from 
the controlling ropes of their former terror organisations.  This did not play well and eventually, 
I returned to Wales, essentially traumatised without knowing it.    
  The squandering of the thirty years of relative peace in Northern Ireland since the 
Belfast/Good Friday agreement by the British government, in terms of failing to be interested 
in addressing the isolation of poor rural and urban communities was to be expected.  As urban 
centre transformed with a mixture of state and private capital, the people who had neither the 
skills or assets to participate in that development, clung to what they knew.   
       My professional work took me to Zanzibar where I have had the privilege of working 
with communities, again in a complex and oppressive political setting.  I have been involved 
in several publications on community, education, and participation the most recent on a global 
learning project (MacCallum, Proctor and Hoad.  2020).   Everything I encountered whilst 
working with communities in east or west Africa, Wales, or eastern Europe, resonates clearly 
with my Ulster quickening.  In 2005 I was studying for an MSc in Planning and Regeneration 
at Cardiff University.  I had a local town centre manager reject my participatory research 
approach to my project in his small Welsh town as flawed.  His argument was, “Local people 
don’t know what is good for them”.  He assured me, as only an English professional in a cheap 
shiny suit in Wales could, that when I “worked in the real world” I would see that local people 
had nothing to offer on strategies for regenerating their towns.  I have heard this type of 
statement being made in Northern Ireland by local counsellors, by Bulgarian, Romanian and 
Slovakian State officials about the Roma, hotel complex owners about the rural coastal poor in 
Zanzibar, town mayors in Serbia, representatives of large industry in Wales, politicians in 
Wales and mining company officials in Africa.  Having worked in the “real world” for a 
considerable time and with an awareness of brutality, power and the sliding legitimacy of the 
State and it’s designates, I became more committed than ever to the “truth” that can be created 
through using participatory methodologies, in what I would consider a development context.  I 
define a development context as one where change is required for the benefit of the poorest to 
live a dignified sustainable life.   
      As a professional who utilises participatory methodologies with communities, I 
recognise that the engagement process can be transformative, both personally and in terms of 
local civil society.  It is essentially promoting the conditions to transfer the mechanisms for 
people to organise civil society.   To deploy engagement techniques convincingly with 
communities requires a personal skills base, underpinned by aptitudes borne out of experience 
with communities over time.  Understanding how powerlessness feels and understanding the 
factors that enable “social space” for engagement to occur are not in my experience behaviours 
that can be learned in the abstract.  This is one reason there is a paucity of equipped social 
science trained people in the extraction (mining) sector.  Creating skilled hydrologists, mine 
engineers, financiers and security specialists who can work in the field, equally requires time 
spent and exposure to success and failure enabling reflexive practice.   There is a route to 
selecting, training, and enabling this process in those fields and a defined, agreed skill set that 
can be concretised through practice.  Currently, in the extraction industry, this is not the case 
for community development.    
1.3.4 Objectivity and the need to unpack the academic.    
      I currently work as an expert trying to predict and resolve the conflicts between 
communities and the extraction industry.  Expert status is what underpins much of the 
legitimacy of knowledge creation in the sector (Joseph, Gun ton, Rutherford 2015, 
Radosavljevi and Radosavljevi.  2009).  In my experience, many such experts appear to have 
worked their whole (rather protected) lives, operating in corporate groupthink.  Social licence 
failure may, in part, be linked to faulty knowledge creation regarding communities being 
undertaken by “experts”.  Largely, in my experience, these experts do not live in, belong to, or 
understand the type of personal, economic, and social relationships that dominate the lives of 
people in those communities they are paid to comment on.  Rarely do they possess the 
academic, social science discipline to enable them to unpack the alternative realities  of affected 
communities.  
The creation of knowledge and ultimately narratives about communities, knowledge 
which becomes the building blocks to social licence solutions for mining companies, is always 
undertaken by professionals external to the community under investigation.  The recent rise of 
social licence failures may be evidence of a range of changing social landscapes were 
competing narratives driving conflict have sometimes more value in the short term for 
communities than is likely to be realised by those communities from the underground mineral 
deposits.  Conflict can be a product as well as a form of capital, certainly from the perspective 
of those in the media.  In terms of those that may be equipped intellectually to unpack 
community conflict there is good reason why there are so few in the industry.   
      Coumans (2011) details at length the precariousness of development practitioners and 
anthropologists operating in the mining sector, those specialists who have professional training 
in interpreting communities.  Embedded specialists are rare and most social specialists are 
contracted to deliver reports and solutions in a pre-determined format within a short timeframe.  
The paucity of alternative perspectives on communities may be one of the root causes of the 
extraction sector’s failure to grapple with a social licence.  Raising this issue of whether 
corporate selection, recruitment, retention, and indoctrination/conditioning were a critical 
aspect to social licence failure, a seasoned, strategic thinker and operator in the global precious 
metals mining sector, expressed his views on the issue.  Bemoaning the socially and 
professionally restricted background that most mining professional dealing with communities 
go through and the impact that has subsequently on their views of the community, he said in 
his educated Australian drawl; “It’s the E word Mark,…….  Empathy” (Interview 4, LM 2018).  
I understand what he is saying, having worked with communities for what is now on, in access 
of 30 years.  Fleckenstein (2007), using a range of theorists, skilfully unpacks empathy as not 
“just” an emotion but as a tool to support thinking and identified that it is essentially rational, 
although often created only through experience.  She quotes (ibid:12) White (1983) who, 
“distinguishes empathy from sympathy”. 
 Empathy consists of a "realistic understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others," 
while sympathy is "feeling with others. ”  My own experience is, that with all major project 
development, communities are viewed in a comparable way to endemic flora and fauna, 
something to be “dealt” with.  Empathy or something eliciting a similar sense of understanding 
about the impacts of a mine is a necessary factor in terms of engaging with mine-affected 
communities but also in terms of facilitating the interpreting of and predicting community 
reaction in conflict situations.  I am therefore unable to avoid reflexivity as a post-structural 
geographer, regarding my own experiences underpinning, how I engage with research subjects.   
Finley (2002:4) makes a very good point when he says regarding research analysis that 
“[r]esearchers have to negotiate the ‘swamp’ of interminable self-analysis and self-disclosure”.   
A doctoral thesis of this type is not the place for extensive “swamp” wallowing but this notion 
of “empathy” and defining the relationship between the researcher and subject, very clearly 
needs unpacking.  That in a sense is what I have tried to do earlier on in this chapter by detailing 
my own personal baggage.  Specifically, this is pertinent in terms of understanding the veracity 
of, or my application of the selected method of data collection and my understanding of the 
relationship between “consent” given by a community and the role of “legitimacy” in terms of 
state and company on social licence issues. Oak (1997:10) details that “research is [as] a co-
constituted account, adherents of participative research argue that as research participants also 
have the capacity to be reflexive beings, they can be co-opted into the research as co-
researchers”. 
This notion of reflexivity as something to be managed in research participants as well as 
essentially utilised by the researcher (Sage, Dainty 2014), raises significant issues of 
competency in terms of undertaken field research.  Managing participants, in my case ranging 
from Roma people living in tumbledown housing to government officials, through to 
academics and mining sector professionals required, to illicit "real" answers rather than stock 
answers, certain personal skills.  It requires “empathy” and the ability to demonstrate it in a 
culturally appropriate way, to enable the research subjects to feel safe.  My reflexivity was 
equally qualified or enabled through my own experiences as outlined earlier. Outhwaite and 
Turner (2016:21) detail the philosophical destruction of "objectivity" that might seem as a 
counter argument to my emotional/rational investigative process when they say, “Bourdieu 
agrees with Foucault (and Derrida) that the idea of scientific ‘objectivity’ must be 
deconstructed, that power always plays a role in sustaining scientific belief.  He agrees also 
that ‘reason’ needs to be historicized and that there can be no appeal to a transcendental 
subject”. 
The use or referencing of personal “experience” as a tool in investigating issues around 
social licence has become an accepted practice. Eerola (2017) in his investigation into failures 
of corporate social responsibility in mineral exploration references the need for learning in 
maintaining the social licence to operate and made four judgments underpinned by his own 
experience in the sector. Notably in the subject area of dialogue development, that which 
underpins social licence, experience is defined as critical but this time Mercer-Mapstone, 
Rifkin, Louis and Moffat (2017:140) define it as that which must be changed or disrupted, 
“Thus, dialogue in both models involves and inspires processes of creation, and potential social 
and personal transformation, through the disruption of perspectives and experiences (Bohm, 
1996; Buber, 1947; Freire, 1972; Gadamer, 1975)” (ibid:140) . The first part of this chapter 
outlined historically the major influencing experiences that underpinning my reflexivity 
regarding community, legitimacy, and notions of consent.    
1.4 Introducing the Chapters  
Chapter Two sets the scene within the mining sector to frame an investigation of the 
pressures on mining companies as corporate entities to operate and how they relate to state 
sponsored forms of capitalism or market economic activity. The temporal aspect of how mining 
corporations are driven towards short term operational decision making are discussed as well 
as the constraints placed upon the sector through lender regulated enforcement processes and 
associated implementation challenges. The current dominant mining business model still 
utilised processes where capital is attracted through speculative investment by early stage 
mining exploration projects and these may either fail or be developed. If an attractive enough 
financial model is presented the mine can possibly change hands many times before becoming 
fully operational.  There is currently nothing within existing business models that support the 
continuity of stakeholder identification and engagement. Promises made by respective 
corporations to local host communities hold little value as they are normally unenforceable. 
The exploration of “Contractualism” as well as developing an understanding of agency, 
necessitated an investigation of the nature of the factors driving decisions making by a mining 
company. The mining company or corporation, used interchangeably, has been viewed herein, 
as a capitalist-based shareholding entity. This is predicated on the latter’s potential freedom 
from a range of financial and governance pressures such as the need for servicing shareholders 
and notably the need to service capital in the short term, a process inherent through 
Financialisation. In contract to this, the ability of Chinese funded mining projects to plan over 
a longer term due to fewer theoretical pressures from the financial market and shareholders are 
also explored.    
Chapter Three focuses on the ‘Pyramid of Theories’, illustrated in Figure 1-1, designating 
"where" in a theoretical, spatial and agency sense, the new model will need to reside.  
Addressing the “agency- structure” debate and that of "space" was critical but I had to utilise 
several working propositions, rather than undertaking an extensive unpacking of the significant 
and vast bodies of work from both a philosophical and social theorist tradition.  Recognising 
the need to develop a framework and foundation not just for deconstructing existing social 
licence models but building a new one a range of theoretical paradigms are introduced, and 
decisions made about what has utility.   
Chapters Four and Five detail case studies research findings and analysis.  They present 
a retrospective case study analysis of a mining project in Romania that was being developed 
while the country was in the process of joining the European Union (EU) and current day case 
study on the mining sector in Serbia.   
Chapter Six draws together the findings and analysis with the conclusions from the 
research to present the trialled Social Licence Settlement Model.   
1.5 The Research Questions 
Both the desk and the field research investigate different aspects of change within the 
relationships between the State and citizens and how this affects mining projects social licence 
in their respective localities. Drawing inferences from the desk-based case study research, 
looking at evidence and in particular at the Rosa Montana mining project in Romania in the 
context of Romania joining the  EU, stakeholders related to the mining sector within Serbia 
were identified and targeted for a series of interviews.  These interviews were aimed at both 
understanding the relationship between the respondents and the state.  This was an attempt to 
understand how this might change during transition to EU member state through the 
introduction of new opportunities for dissent, protest and paid involvement in regulatory 
processes. I investigated what respondents anticipated what would happen, based on their 
knowledge of what had impacted on the industry in a neighbouring country.  This cross-case 
analysis within differing temporal setting was an attempt to identify aspects or factors that 
influenced citizens relationship to the state with regards to influencing mining.  It also sought 
to illustrate that the State through losing aspects of its hegemony with citizens, was less able 
to be the sole regulator of consent required to operate a mine successfully.    
Some of interviews in Serbia were with individuals and some were in a group format.  A 
paid interpreter was utilised for engaging with non-professionals but in terms of mining 
professionals and government functionaries, this was not necessary, due in large part to the 
generous support given from a Serbian academic professional and those speaking English 
within the sector.  Access in Serbia to officials, academic and mining sector professionals was 
generously facilitated by a professor of mining at Belgrade University, and it is unlikely that 
the research could have been undertaken without his participation. Access to community 
stakeholders was undertaken both through direct approaches (Bor area) and through those 
representing tourism development in others.  In addition to these formal interviews, a number 
of visits to Serbia were undertaken, accompanied by an interpreter, talking to communities 
affected by mining and investigating the respective drivers for a social licence.  Based on 
emergent concepts and themes that were coherent across the two case sites and reflecting on 
factors identified as driving change, tentative hypotheses are constructed utilising aspects of 
the theoretical framework developed within the thesis.  These hypotheses were subsequently 
compared iteratively with observed evidence to and the observed data to validate the structure 
of the new Social Licence Settlement Model.    
Chapter 2 The Social Dimensions of Mining  
2.1 Setting the Scene 
In this section, the thesis addresses how some of the pressures that business (mining 
corporations) function and operate with. It attempts to illustrate, how aspects of mining 
corporations established global practices and the nature of how they do business, has shaped 
the parameters of theoretical discussion around social licence and driven the analysis of the 
loss of host community consent, into a theoretical cul-de-sac.  The pressures from a rapidly 
changing twenty-first-century business ecosystem are explored and the impacts of some of 
those changes, namely financialization, can be seen to have changed the dynamics of what 
could be perceived as traditional or historical approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR).  By CSR this thesis means those activities undertaken by industry to engage or secure 
compliance from communities whilst supporting their corporate image.  Global business 
processes < where is the rest of this sentence?  
2.1.1 Why we need mining and European challenges.    
The EU has identified exploration and mining of certain minerals, it has classified as 
Critical Raw Materials (CRMs), as a key prerequisite to achieving the ambitious targets set out 
in the EU Green Deal.  Whereas a Circular Economy is seen by many as the ultimate goal, for 
now, the EU currently acknowledges that CRMs still need to be accessed through mining.  Past 
initiatives, including INFACT Horizon 2020 project, that has supported some to research 
supporting this thesis, focused on developing innovative exploration technologies to discover 
metal ores and minerals to transform Europe into a sustainable resource-efficient and 
competitive economy.  They identified the importance of social and environmental 
acceptability of the sector and the challenges faced in building mutual awareness and trust 
between communities, society and the mineral exploration and mining sectors.  The European 
Commission Joint Research Centre produced a report entitled Critical Raw Materials for 
Strategic Technologies and Sector (2020:79) detailing that “these materials are the basis for all 
industrial value chains and ultimately contribute to societal well-being to secure current and 
future supply of materials”  
European’s face a stark choice in decarbonising its economy (Herrington 2021).  Either 
they find mechanisms for obtaining these CRMs from under the ground in Europe, negotiating 
the building SLO storm from communities distrustful of the mining sector or they rely of CRM 
material from localities where the social and environmental impacts are less likely to be 
regulated.  If they do the former, they can erect trade barriers to imported minerals, drive 
positive change within the sector environmentally and socially globally and strategically their 
industries are insulated from trade conflicts.  This thesis with its SLSM, points to a need for 
mining companies engaged in working in Europe needing to radically change their business 
models to deliver mines with a workable SLO over time.  Failure to mine in Europe for the EU, 
will result in its citizens being hostages to fortune and dependant on national states that might 
well see the EU as a competitor.  It will also contribute to continuing environmental and social 
devastation in locations like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  The former course of 
action, mining in Europe, offers major challenges.  There is a rising tide of well organised 
networks in the EU which it would be possible to broadly typify as anti-mining.  A good 
example of this is the Joint civic statement on the European Horizon 2020 project MIREU 
(2020), signed by signatories from Bosnia, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain in a 
well-crafted academic paper sent as complaint to the European Commission (EC).  This 
complaint was directed at the MIREU project’s lack of community consultation with the 
construction of their SLO guide through the EU funded Horizon 2020 project.  The EU is ill 
prepared for this process of enabling mining, given that the rules for financing the mining sector 
with Green Deal EU monies have not been defined.  There is no guidance for investors on how 
to define a project with a potential mining project with a social licence.  The EU Technical 
Investment Group (TEG 2020) identified the need for a mining taxonomy.  Such a taxonomy 
covers many sectors in the EU and identified critical issues that have to be addressed before 
investment of EU sourced funds can be committed.  The TEG 2020 group recognised the 
complex nature of doing this for mining and their inability in terms of time and expertise to 
complete this task.  My discussion in February 2021 with the head of the European 
Commission’s DG responsible for issues such as mining and industrial growth demonstrated 
that there was very limited institutional understanding of the nature of the challenge.  The lack 
of a taxonomy guidance framework for mining is in marked contrast to taxonomy guidelines 
relating to the financing of agriculture, energy production and a myriad of other activities.    
2.1.2 Financialisation and the mining corporation.    
In reality, profit maximisation is not a legal mandate for corporations but a standard of 
conduct for private corporations (French, Leyshon, Wainwright 2011).  The nature of the 
corporation and corporate governance has changed over the last thirty years, largely through a 
process of financialisation and with it the relationship between capital and directors.  Zhang 
and Andrew (2014) delivered a definition of the term.  Financialisation describes the evolution 
of the development of financial capitalism during the period from 1980 to the present 
(Sawyer 2013).  This was a product of the increased prevalence of "hot" money, moving freely 
through the range of unregulated banking institution facilitated by London and US central 
banking measures and in Britain’s case, tame former colonies (Özgür.  2008).  Britain turned 
its decolonisation process into a financial opportunity and created a root for the London money 
market to access resources stripped by elites from former colonies, the results of criminal 
activity and assets salted away from tax authorities with plausible deniability.  This also 
explains how Barbados and the Cayman Islands became financial powerhouses.  In this period 
in the UK from the 1980s, debt to equity ratios increased and financial services accounted for 
an increasing share of national income, relative to other sectors.  As such, they became 
increasingly important within national economic and political contexts of the UK and other 
major financial centres notably the USA.  Financialisation describes the economic process by 
which exchange is facilitated through the intermediation of financial instruments.  
Financialisation may permit real goods, services, and risks to be readily exchangeable 
for currency, and make it easier for people to rationalize their assets and income flow.  In basic 
terms, risk as a trading commodity, through financial services and products becoming 
commodities, exerts pressure on how those commodities perform.    
French, Leyshon, Wainwright (2011) detailed the impacts of financialisation and the 
birth of that concept, to account for the empowering of financial markets and those market 
processes extending influence over the unfolding of economy, polity and wider society.  These 
processes “manifest at several scales, ranging from higher levels of instability within the 
economy as a whole, through pressure exerted on corporations by capital markets, to the equity 
effects of the financial system on individuals and households.  In seeking to explain the change 
within contemporary society, financialization has, to date been relatively underplayed, 
particularly when compared to similar and related concepts such as neoliberalization” (Ibid 
2011:2).    
In this, French, Leyshon, Wainwright (2011) are alluding to the relatively little attention 
given to financialization as an offshoot of international neoliberalism.  They are addressing the 
wide-ranging and extensive debate around neoliberalism itself, particularly given the impact 
of the former on business and that this critical aspect of the outcomes it drives has largely been 
ignored. Gregorčič and Krašovec (2016) cleverly packaged up the pervasive nature of the 
impacts of financialization in their paper on participatory budgeting and social learning.  The 
concept was seen to drive a process that coupled with global economic constriction caused a 
widely experienced political and fiscal realignment. They defined it as, “[t]he result of the 
global financial crisis and economic downturn in 2008 was socialism for the rich and capitalism 
for the poor, forcing citizens to shoulder debt through economic austerity measures that had 
different implications in different continents.” (Gregorčič and Krašovec , 2016).  For them, the 
poor were forced to deal with the failure of the banking systems through governments 
introducing austerity programmes restricting their public services whilst those that benefited 
from government bailouts of financial institutions they had invested in; the wealthy, benefitted 
from their debt being carried by others.   
The new "reality" of financialisation and the measuring of success is captured by French 
et al (2011), who describes the mechanism where shareholder value becomes the metric for 
business success, coupled with increased transparency and pervasiveness of electronic 
mechanisms for engaging with markets. The notion of shareholder value is critical to the 
arguments in this thesis.  In that financialisation drives short term decision making in mining 
corporations, that inhibit long term relationship building with communities.  The pressures by 
these processes act internally and externally on the mining corporation as international 
businesses.  Within a social licence context, this is critical.  The temporal aspect to both social 
licence conflict between community and corporation is set within the context of the (relatively) 
short term needs for companies to perform well and retain their share value.  Financialisation 
could be one contributing cause to the documented increase in social licence failure over the 
last 10 years (EY2019).  The pressure caused by Financialisation on mining corporations as 
they respond to short terms aspirations of those controlling their working capital, means long 
term commitments to communities are hard to sign up to.  Quarterly profits of mining 
companies are published, and this represents total income from the sale of product, minus 
overhead costs.  If communities are viewed as an overhead cost, there will always be the 
temptation to squeeze the economic cost to push profit and shareholder value up. Similarly, 
although potentially very damaging to mining corporations, social licence failure may provide 
opportunities for new financial products to emerge.  Financialisation is self-serving, it is not 
about wider societal utility.   
This is expanded on by French et al referring to Froud and colleagues definition of the 
financialisation mechanism and its machinations as “[t]he rise of the discourse of shareholder 
value and a burgeoning economy of financial metrics to measure it, underwritten by the 
expectations of institutional investors for constant asset price appreciation, has led to the radical 
realignment of the interests of corporations and corporate managers in the US and UK since 
the 1990s” (French et al, 2011:4).    
Zumbansen (2008) also charts these changes and whilst demonstrating that the very 
nature of a company as a legal person is a creation and a fabrication, he argues that external 
changes to the sources of companies' capital have changed the game, with regards to wider 
corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Note here that he is addressing the wider concept of 
CSR, not as it is routinely applied in the mining sector and within this thesis, but more generally 
as the name for activities producing social goods or outputs from business that are a benefit to 
society.  Zumbansen demonstrates with his wider concept of CSR, the company must adapt 
how it conceptualises and operationalises it social goods production, to engage with the new 
reality of short-term financial accountability.  This thesis argues that mining sector businesses 
operating in instances where they might be exposed to factors which could precipitate the 
collapse of their social licence, need to pre-empt this.  Pre-empting or anticipating the need to 
build a secure social licence means not only making a realistic assessment but recognising the 
temporal aspect. Working with communities can be a lengthy process and processes for 
working with communities are difficult to "hothouse" or compress as Schirmer & Vanclay 
(2014) point out.   To avoid the scenario that directors will be hamstrung by short term financial 
accountability, they will need to adjust to a new temporal reality with regards to shareholder 
value and expectations.   
Directors will need to operate long-term strategies to secure social licence and to do that, 
they need to make the case for certain types of longer-term community engagement, to those 
controlling their access to capital. Recognising the prospective costs of community engagement 
throughout the life of the mine as early as possible within the mine exploration and valuation 
process would help.  It would still represent an overhead but a non-negotiable overhead.  The 
business model for mining must change in some way of it wants to reconcile the short-term 
pressure on capital return coupled with the long-term investment into communities.  This may 
be tantamount to stating that there is a need to reconceptualise the business model, not just 
ensuring that investments can be sufficient long-term but perhaps to facilitate that situation, the 
mine corporation could have to surrender control over the ore asset.  The mining sector could 
end up operating as a combination of service providers and others, governments, supranational 
governments, or agents of long-term bond production (banks), used to finance, facilitate, and 
broker social access to that ore body.   
As Zumbansen says, “[i]n order to remain operational, the model had to be adapted to 
the processes of financial engineering, which – at least partially – moved the corporation out 
of the centre of the labyrinth of contracts in which it, or its securities, are entangled” (2018:5). 
The global rise of social licence failure could be seen as being driven less by issues such 
as digital technology or resource nationalism (EY 2019:3) and more by a failure to respond to 
the structural issue of changes in capital flows.  It is important to explore the nature of Agency 
within a mining business as this defines why and how corporations operate with relation to host 
communities.  The decisions taken at board level reverberate out to the communities.   
Fauziah, Yusoff and Alhaji define agency in a business corporation sense as referring to 
the “agency role of the directors [business] refers to the governance function of the board of 
directors in serving the shareholders by ratifying the decisions made by the managers and 
monitoring the implementation of those decisions” (2012:54). 
The agency of directors within a private company or corporation setting although 
expansive in pursuit of exclusively business motives is normally seen to be directed by law 
towards the primacy of interests for the shareholder, that of profit-making.   The famous Dodge 
versus Ford Motor Company Michigan Court determination of 1919 is often used, incorrectly 
as a rationale for profit maximization by the corporation as the sole driver of business 
processes.  Henry Ford, as the major shareholder in Ford Motor Company, had wanted to end 
special dividends to shareholders and reinvest massively in the company.  Through the court 
he declared, “ ‘My ambition,’ declared Mr Ford, ‘is to employ still more men; to spread the 
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes.  To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the 
business’” (Mich.  1919).   
It is possible that Ford wanted to deprive the minority shareholders, the Dodge brothers 
of capital to start a rival company which of course they later did.  His “charitable objectives” 
were seen by the court as outside the scope of the purpose of a private company, detrimental 
to shareholders and he was ruled against (Zumbansen 2008).  If he had rephrased his intentions 
in purely business terms and not philanthropic ones, it would have been likely that investment 
back into the company would have been authorised.   
2.1.3 Political ideology shaping corporation’s social goods.   
The argument as to the purpose of the company rumbles on as demonstrated by the CEO 
of Blackrock, Larry Fink, in his open letter to CEOs in 2019 (Fink 2019).   Blackrock is an 
investment company, started in 1988 and at the time of writing manages self-declared assets 
above $6.84 trillion (Blackrock 2020).  Fink’s letter dated 14th January 2020 comes on the back 
of 631 institutional investors managing more than $37 trillion in assets, urging governments to 
step up efforts to tackle the global climate crisis and achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement 
at the United Nations Climate Conference (COP25) (Investors 2020).  Fink as an industry 
leader has declared that climate risk is a business issue, not a political one.  As an industrial 
leader and as part of a cadre of investors who wield considerable economic power 
transnationally, both directly and indirectly, it is worth considering Fink's views.  Mining 
requires “lenders”, those that support the extraction of minerals through directing large 
amounts of capital and mining is a truly international industry.  The focus of this thesis may be 
a model tested through research in South-Eastern Europe yet the finance for such mining 
activity in that region is European, Canadian, American, Australian, and Chinese.  The views 
of Fink on the purpose of a company will have an impact on choices made by those allocating 
capital globally and will influence mining.    
Two concurrent lines in Fink’s (Fink 2019) letter are, “Purpose is not the sole pursuit of 
profits but the animating force for achieving them.  Profits are in no way inconsistent with 
purpose – in fact, profits and purpose are inextricably linked.” 
If we accept Fink's proposition, it appears that financialization as a process and reality, 
has not, despite being a driving force for short term profit creation, managed to ensure business 
directors are programmed to support the purity of profit as the sole purpose of business.   There 
appears to be a conflagration of risk evaluation and defining of company purpose in Fink's 
most recent letter.  The statements from the 631 institutional investors also appear to have 
resolved that pure profit as the motive for business is simply not enough.  It may be, through 
exerting pressure towards shorter rather than facilitating longer-term plans and long-term value 
for shareholders, financialisation is about to be challenged by specifically the need for longer-
term investment in risk management regarding climate change.  That remains to be seen and 
the present Covid-19 global pandemic and the likelihood of similar recurring pandemics offer 
the corporation a platform for a longer-term purpose; promoting corporate resilience through 
building collaborative functions that can support human society resilience.  Notably, Mr Fink 
sees investment preference and choice of employment for those most talented, being driven 
through an expression of social awareness that will drive corporations forward.  This thesis is 
not the place to argue extensively on such matters, yet it is important to recognise that different 
value or political systems where companies draw their staff from, are likely to precipitate 
different interpretation of “social goods”.   
Social goods as argued earlier, are those products of business that are positive and a by-
product or co-product of business activity.  Social goods are what a company might 
intentionally deliver to ameliorate a social licence conflict and hence are pertinent to discuss 
here.  Given that the Bor mining complex in Serbia, where the most extensive aspect of the 
field research for this thesis was undertaken, has been bought by Chinese investors it might be 
interesting to investigate this concept of social goods, given that different political systems, are 
likely to precipitate differing social goods.  Social goods could perhaps be termed here as social 
products and as products will have different values in different locations, producing water for 
a community in Wales is less likely to be viewed as positive than producing water in an arid 
zone in north Africa.    
It is worth considering from a social licence perspective, how we might compare the 
values underpinning Chinese and western-based businesses as that might reflect different the 
production of different types of social products from each.  The perspectives differ yet the 
location of where these businesses operate may overlap as in Bor.  A third perspective from 
those countries which desperately need investment to reform or develop their economies, also 
needs to be considered.  The Pew Research Centre (Pew 2018) researched attitudes in many 
countries towards China.  Significantly, numerous African countries had significantly more 
positive views on China than those in the traditional “developed” or what is better termed, the 
industrialised global North.   Current narratives in the UK for example, underpin a strong 
attachment to capitalist and nationalist values.  Oxford University suspended involvement with 
a Chinese firm following intervention from head of MI6, Alex Younger.  His critical point of 
concern was about China’s prowess in the engineering of data and the underlying political 
ecology.”  China, he said has “a different legal and ethical framework’ whereby they ‘use and 
manipulate data sets on a scale that we can only dream of” (Younger 2019). 
The politicising of competition between Chinese “state” industries and large independent 
US, French or UK defence companies could be argued to be more about business, soft power 
and competing ideologies, given the later countries “PLCs” are heavily dependent of state 
defence contracts.  Chinese firms do not have shareholders and are state or communist party 
entities.  Are western firms less able to be controlled by their respective states than Chinese 
firms by the Chinese state?  Is there a merging of types of social goods production between 
western, North American centric mine operators/infrastructure developers and Chinese ones?  
The author is not aware of any such study.  The purpose of a corporation may depend on the 
political origins or residence of that entity.  The question is, would Fink differentiate between 
a social and a political purpose?  The political and governance regimes impacting on a mining 
corporation will ultimately determine aspects of their activities in mitigating social licence.  
The global issues caused by social licence failure, affecting Chinese, Canadian, US, British 
and French firms may drive competing political systems to produce similar forms of public 
goods, if such products are proven capable of resolving the issues of social licence.    
In summary, Fink as an industry leader, appears to be resonating with thinking within the 
global North’s investment sector, has defined climate change as a business risk but also clearly 
stated that business has a purpose other than making a profit.  It is argued here that the type of 
social goods produced might be driven as much by the political ideology of where the business 
has its roots, as much as where the business is operating.  Social good production, therefore, as 
included in a SLSM should recognise that the Mine as an entity or a container of activities and 
interests, is likely an entity which is political imprinted from a jurisdiction different to the one 
the model is operating in.   
2.1.4 Capitalism and social obligation.    
In Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Friedman argued; “There is one and only one social 
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition without deception or fraud” (Friedman 1962:29).    
Friedman’s refutation of any attempt to attribute general social obligations to the business 
firm, is grounded in the idea that a corporation is a physical entity, created and structured 
through a series of private agreements among individual businesspeople.  Attributing a general 
social responsibility to a corporate manager would, in Friedman's view, constitute both an 
unwarranted expansion of his duties and a non-permissible violation of management's duties 
to its employers, the firm's shareholders, echoing the Ford Vs Dodge (1919) court decision 
outlined earlier.  Freidman and Larry Fink at Blackrock from his letter (Fink 2019) agree that 
whilst a notion of general corporate social responsibility is not in line with the purpose of a 
company, corporate social responsibility that services the interests of the shareholder, would 
fall within the business purpose.  Climate risk being viewed as “business risk” by a significant 
section of investor (Investors 2020) would support this assertion.  It is too early to see how the 
Covid-19 pandemic will feature in shaping corporate purpose.  For Fink there has also to be a 
“purpose” and intention, or corporate agency is framed within the company mechanisms and 
support for the interests of shareholder should be explicit.  Friedman's position does not exclude 
it.  Utilising or labelling as corporate social responsibility (CSR), forms of agency by the 
corporation board aimed at mitigating business risk, creates new questions such as who 
determines the temporal limits of shareholder's interests.  Is it one year, 10 years or 50 years?  
Mitigation and management of social risk related to the mining business, and corporation 
agency toward the local community, is governed not by morality or social justice but by the 
'financial bottom line".  Yet what is it that defines the temporal limits of that ‘financial bottom 
line”, given that a mining project may last 20 years?   
In a discussion on social risk, Sandy Worden made the point concerning corporate 
reporting that Barrick Gold’s (2012) Community Relations Standard, for example, defines a 
social risk as “a risk to the business related to external stakeholders, particularly the local 
community.   ”(2016:337).  It is worth clarifying, this is a potential risk emanating from the 
local community, not that which might affect the local community.  What this approach does, 
is connect social risk to the business ‘bottom line’.  This notion of a business bottom line relates 
to the precedence of financial considerations.  The challenge appears to reside in the uncertainty 
of allocating resources to certain courses of action designed to secure and maintain a social 
licence.    
 Deanna Kemp, an experienced applied academic makes the point very well, in writing 
“[T]he difficulty is there is always uncertainty as to the appropriateness or effectiveness of 
social engagement with communities.  Social licence and conflict between host communities 
and mining corporation is rarely about that ‘bottom line’” (Kemp et al.   , 2016).    
Shaping this notion of agency within corporations, Muellerleile (2013) examines and 
compares two separate views of the function of capitalism.  He attempts to illustrate common 
purpose between Polanyi’s conception of (dis)embedded markets with the performativity 
thesis, authored mainly by Michel Callon.  Polanyi viewed modern liberal capitalism as 
inherently linked to the increasingly remote or dis-embedded markets.  Whereas 
“performativity” for Callon represented the power of language to drive change in the world, 
noting that language is not just a signifier or describing device it but may function also as a 
form of social action.  Muellerleile (2013) points to this recent change in the process of global 
capital allocation characterised by financialization as evidence of Polanya’s accuracy but also 
in the way the language of business shapes the function of that capital.   
From the 1970's we have, Muellerleile states, “The emergence of a market-based model 
of financial management that over the next thirty years would drive Western socio-economies 
toward many of Polanyi's worst predictions through the marketization of 'almost everything' 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 2007).   ” (Muellerleile 2013: 1625).   He goes on to ask a very pertinent 
question regarding the mining sector and communities hosting mine projects, in exploring the 
changing relationships between labour, capital and land, “What kind of methodology should 
we use to analyze a system where fictitious or not, financial markets influence many of the 
political, social, and even cultural decisions we make?” (Ibid:1626)   
This might be a particularly prescient question given that there are pressing obligations 
to successfully extract critical raw materials within Europe, to support the technological 
advances needed to combat climate change (INFACT 2019).  Many of these critical raw 
materials are located in South-Eastern Europe and the "Baltic shield” of Northern Europe, 
hosting investors and mining operatives from across the globe.  These countries with their 
CRMs are in very different political jurisdictions, yet a large percentage of these CRMs are 
under the ground in localities that are either governed through stringent transnational 
environmental regulations (parts of the EU,) or in locations like Serbia, who are in the process 
of accession to the EU, with a target date of 2026 for EU membership.  This makes the process, 
in a practical sense, of getting these critical minerals out the ground, difficult to near 
impossible.  This is the case because a mining sector trying to satisfy relatively short-term 
financial markets, using valuations systems that are ill-adapted and lacking an effective 
language at present to encapsulating social risk, do not have the tools to enable extraction.  
Given the current guidance from regulatory bodies such as the World Bank (IFC 2014) and 
throughout the plethora of literature on the social licence (Franks and Cohen (2012), Owen and 
Kemp (2013), Zhang, Moffat and Lacey (2015) Constanza (2016), Vanclay (2019) and many 
others), long term strategic engagement with host communities is a basic requirement of 
obtaining and retaining social licence.   
The role of companies within the mineral sector and their business model is underpinned 
by the financialization process and the other aspects driving capital investments.  If mining 
corporations are going to keep an ability to access capital successfully and deal with short term 
market pressures, they will need to ensure that “social risk” and its necessary mitigation, are 
factored into mining project valuation.   They will logically have to ensure that the language, 
concepts, and business systems are there to drive performativity.   There must be an engagement 
between neoclassical economics and the new reality of an ever-changing social discourse.  As 
MacCallum and Proctor (2019:10) put it their “Canary in the Cage” paper regarding social 
licence, “This requires the financial sector to recognise the need for risk reduction measures 
and classify them”.   
We can see that “climate risk” has been flagged by the investment sector and there are 
clear metrics for assessing this.   The social risk appears more problematic in terms of how it 
is measured and finding and what the metrics are.   These metrics, perhaps workable social 
licence indexes, are needed to value social licences as assets linked to company performance, 
much as carbon, another invisible but tangible asset that can be measured, is starting to be 
valued.  Mining company performance, a key metric for attracting capital, is not abstract and 
aggregating results may produce a market "logic" reflected in Muellerleile's performativity.  
Muellerleile (2013: 1626) defines this concept of performativity, “as it has been put to work to 
analyze financial markets by Donald MacKenzie and others, [as focusing] on the ways 
neoclassical economics influences market construction.  Thus, performativity demonstrates 
how abstract market logic can be productive of actually existing markets that appear to 
reproduce that logic across a diversity of social and geographic contexts.”  
Callon (1998:2) instead defines performativity as the concept that economics; “performs, 
shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions”.   Observing, “how 
it functions” is, for Callon, less important than how it shapes the economy and the subsequent 
outcome.  Economics incorporating new “truths”, will drive change in how the global 
economic system designates investment and assesses financial risk.   In that sense, given that 
EY (2019) identified social licence failure as the biggest single risk factor facing mining sector 
operators, there is a major failure in the mining sector that needs to be captured by a 
performativity thesis.   Current forms of logic utilization are not working, the logic must change 
and drive new business models and practices or abandon the resources.    
Muellerleile’s point is well made, that by merging Callon’s performativity with Polanyi’s 
theory of embeddedness, linking land, labour, and capital interests, it is possible to create a 
more holistic approach to analysing how markets can serve the wider socio-economy.  Polanyi 
defined the economy as an “instituted process”, meaning that it was not an independent sphere 
of human life, but instead “embedded” or “submerged in social relationships” (Polanyi, 2001 
[1944], page 48).   Callon’s wariness of “institutions”, makes him view the assembled social 
as a continuous creation or translation and (Callon 1998) views society as a flawed, 
counterproductive construct.   Muellerleile (2013: 1629) says, “he has attempted to overcome 
the society/ economy binary, and as such the paradox of embeddedness (Slater, 2002), as well 
as the debate between formalism and substantivism (Caliskan and Callon, 2009).   ”  For 
Muellerleile, “These processes of marketization are defined by action, agency, and 
assemblage” (Ibid:1629).    
Agency results from the interrelatedness of actants, or “sociotechnical agencements” and 
are transient but expressions of truth.  Assemblage is the English version of the French word 
agencement and this terminology was created by Deleuze and Guattari as a way of using 
Dynamical Systems Theory to address social theory requirements.  Agency here could be 
termed as the actions taken by a mining company by its directors and their proxies on site.  As 
Muellerleile (Ibid 2013: 1630) succinctly puts it, “and with intellectual debts to Deleuze and 
Guattari, agencements are ephemeral, but all-encompassing configurations of reality.  As such, 
like Polanyi’s autonomous or disembedded markets, agencements in effect have no 
consequential ‘outside’ (Caliskan and Callon, 2010, pages 8–10) as they draft their own 
contexts.  It is the relations between market components, particularly framing mechanisms, 
market devices, and scientific knowledge systems, that constitute both the agency and the 
context of the agency”  (italics added). 
This useful quote from Muellerleile relates to the validation of why a new model of social 
licence is needed and as to how the author has gone about creating the building blocks of 
assemblages.  The creation of a new language which the new model will drive, can itself 
support change within the industry if we are to except the premises of performativity.  
Similarly, if we look at the italics in the quote above, it demonstrates that framing mechanisms 
and a range of component parts set the context for agency and agency itself.  They are at the 
crux of what this thesis in trying to encapsulate.   
2.1.5 Conclusion.    
The standard analytical frameworks link social licence failure to management practices 
through designating standard operating practices in engaging, normally unsuccessfully, with 
communities.  This argument for working in this fashion is grounded in a form of basic 
transactionalism embedded in capitalism.  The corporation functions within a larger 
marketplace and this affects not just the sale of the product but access to finance for the 
corporation.  This chapter details why we need mining and the challenges within the EU.  It 
then tracks the effects of financialization on the functioning of businesses and agency of the 
directors of the company.  In doing this it explores both the role of directors and profit 
maximisation practices and questions how financialization, with its propensity to shorten the 
timeframe businesses operate in, might be contributing to social licence failure.  It points to 
long term planning and relationship building as critical to social licence building but illustrates 
how that might be at odds with global financial pressures.  Recognising that the new social 
licence model must sit within a wider economic theory, performativity and disembedded 
markets concepts have been utilised.  This has been done to demonstrate whilst reflecting on a 
discourse on business purpose, drawing from current real-world events and debates, that 
company and directors’ agency are linked to language and global financial processes, latterly 
focusing on financialisation.  Relating the realities of the temporal and the volatility of social 
licence, this section identifies a critical real-world failure of the current mining model in Europe 
that will over time, if Polanyi is correct that business is “submerged in social relationships” 
(Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 48), lead to a transformation of current mining business practices.  To 
follow his logic, the needs of European society to access the rare earth materials from elsewhere 
will generate the space for a new business model, so long as the current social and 
environmental architecture of EU remain unchanged.   
The wider debate within the corporate world that business has a purpose other than profit 
maximization would resonate with this.  In a sense mining is the perfect petri-dish in which to 
explore the agency of corporations, society, markets, land, changes to global capitalism and 
their interrelationships.  It is the nexus of competing concepts of space; the corporate, financial, 
and geological between global finance and mine companies on the one hand and a range of 
community actors and activists on the other.  The varying conceptualisation of natural asset 
value and use are supported through the embeddedness of meaning, symbols, experiences, and 
livelihood.  Similarly, there is a divergence in temporal frameworks of those involved for it 
might be a project, a job, or a home.  There is a clear need for a theoretical platform or model 
to enable some form of clarity.  Lenders or finance capital demand either regular returns on 
investment, and/or unambiguous assessment of risks to future profits.  This ‘impatient’ capital 
makes it increasingly difficult for mining corporations to invest the time and resources 
necessary to seek ongoing consent from ‘society’.  Fichtner (2015) details how the selective 
practices of Dutch and Belgium property developers engaging with impatient resulted in 
differing outcomes for national economies more generally.  In a mining context the ability of 
communities to delay or push production cost up through social/community resistance, lenders 
drive to can lose patience and force the mining corporation to cut their losses and abandon a 
project.    
2.2 A Social Licence to Operate (SLO). 
2.2.1  Introduction.    
It is necessary to both define what social licence is and give an overview of the scale of 
the problem to the mining (extraction) sector represented by social licence to operate failures.  
This problem with a social licence to operate, is not confined to one country or indeed one 
continent and the financial implications for both those that operate mines and those that finance 
them, are huge.   Otto, (2017:2) states that “The respective roles of government and extractive 
companies, with regards to community development, are complex and vary considerably from 
nation to nation and from project to project”. 
The complex nature of this tripartite relationship underpins whether a mine can operate 
or not in all localities.  The relationship between these three realms, the state, the company and 
the community is difficult to unravel and the cultural and social factors, as well as the legal and 
political factors, make it difficult to take away little more than generalised lessons from the 
literature and recorded experience.  The reality is that the failed relationships between 
communities and mining corporations, characterised as social licence to operate failure, 
represent the biggest single market risk to the extraction sector in 2019 (EY2019).   
In Andrews, Elizalde, Billon, Oh, & Thomson[‘s] (2017) study of the conflict between 
communities and the mining sector between 2000 and 2013, the Canadian based team of 
researchers pointed to a sharp rise in recent years of issues of conflict between communities 
and companies and substantiated this with reference to “The Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre (BHRRC), EJOLT ,various Peruvian sources including the Sensoria del 
Pueblo  and a recent compilation by the International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM), 
2015.”  Their research which has drawn together many of the top North American academics 
in the field of Social Licence to Operate (SLO) in mining and is underpinned by an assertion 
(ibid:11) that despite innumerable conflicts having been widely documented, it has still not 
been possible to design a model for social licence conflict as the process was partly being 
driven by “rapid globalization” (Ibid:11 emphasis added).  Rapid globalisation is not defined, 
and this is unfortunately symptomatic of much of the literature around social licence, in that 
plausible factors are put forward, remedies suggested but there is little in terms of theoretical 
analysis of the relationships or even an agreement on what they are.  The lexicon of analysis is 
locked into rather woolly wielding of terms such as “stakeholder” “trust” “community” 
“shared content” and a range of others.  Furthermore, research is limited by pragmatic 
constraints caused by clients’, by which I assume they mean mining companies’, need for 
confidentiality (ibid:12).  It is important to realise within the terms of this thesis that the 
“confidentiality” issue has provided certain challenges when working with the private sector, 
the State and academic actors.  It is precisely because various theorists in the field utilise a 
variety of terms coherently and logically, that it is so difficult to discard many of these 
“umbrella” terms for the relationships between actors, yet there are so few prescriptions for 
success.   
The approach of this thesis is rooted in the objective outlined in Sage, Dainty and 
Brookes (2014) in, 
 “[a] critical argument in favor of theoretical pluralism: Project failure and the many and 
varied limitations of project management”.  Like this thesis they “do not claim to provide a 
definitive survey of critical engagements with project failure; rather we hope to provide 
sufficient momentum, reflexivity and plurality to open up project failure, and similar emblems 
of managerialism in project management, for more critical analysis ” (Sage, Dainty and Brooks 
2014:554).  
The aim of this thesis is to produce and test a model that offers plurality and reflexivity 
as is implicit in understanding of representing social licence.  The term Social Licence to 
Operate (SLO) was first coined by Jim Cooney (Cooney, 2017) and Boutilier, (2017:2) makes 
the point, that Joyce and Thomson (2000) made the first attempt to define an existing social 
licence to operate within the academic literature, as quoted earlier in this thesis, as being “when 
a mineral exploration or mining project is seen as having the approval, the broad acceptance of 
society to conduct its activities”.  Interestingly Thomson’s most recent papers detailing 
extensive research into conflict within the mining sector, fails to use the social licence to 
operate term once, despite him having written numerous papers on that subject.  Almost twenty 
years on from social licence to operate being coined as a term, it appears to be mutating.  
Boutilier suggested “usage of the term ‘social licence’ has spread outside the mining industry 
to such an extent that the qualifier ‘to operate’ is falling into disuse” (2017:2).  Morrison 
(2014), sees it necessary for all organisations to have a social licence for their activities, 
including government and non-government organisations.   
Kemp and Owen (2018) in their social performance position paper, write of a social 
licence becoming tactical rather than the outcome of strategic relationship building and 
measured by absence of protests and positive perception studies.  Whether ‘social licence’ or 
‘social acceptability’, it is a useful and accepted catchall phrase for defining something that is 
required and without which business or activities based in a locality cannot operate, for reasons 
associated with the social context and those within it, yet defining social licence continues to 
be problematic.  Building on a designated social licence as the number one risk factor facing 
the extraction sector (EY2019), EY produced a promotional YouTube video (YouTube2019) 
that details a range of potential contributing factors to social licence failure, and I quote; “the 
rise of nationalism, disrupters”, “changing stakeholder landscape and stressed the need for 
mining companies to, make it part of your companies DNA” (emphasis added).  The question 
is what part of your company’s DNA and what does this mean in terms of operating a mining 
business?   There are many questions compounded here, who are the stakeholders, who are the 
communities, how can a company tell their social licence is under threat and what can they do 
about it, how much will it cost to resolve or secure, is it viable to invest in processes with no 
guarantee of financial return and how will the board justify spending money and increasing 
debts or operational expenditure/costs to the shareholders?   The current state of play within 
the industry is that social licence is treated like a "Black Box" with inputs and outputs but 
unlike the processes of environmental compliance, engineering and cost analysis of production, 
the factors driving the analysis of social licence or essentially remain largely anecdotal in terms 
of their analysis.  Frederiksen (2018) neatly framed the issues of relating the complexities of 
social risk to practice through utilising the work of Bice, another theorist struggling with the 
lack of application of theory to reality.   He quotes one study which sought to interrogate risk 
noted that “a key challenge of exploring the mining industry's application of social risk 
assessment is the paucity of empirical studies on this topic” (Ibid:14). 
In a sense, arguments for preventative approaches, always have the same validation 
issues to address; do we really  need to do anything, how do we spend as little money as 
possible for maximum benefits and what are the mechanisms at play which drive change?  As 
with other fields of practice, for example, health promotion specialists in a western democracy 
trying to design community interventions, these are the types of standard questions raised by 
companies, financiers, and investors, in trying to deal with social licence matters.  Thompson 
(in Andrews 2017 et al:22) alluded to the complex nature of engagement when talking about 
CRS, Corporate Social Responsibility, "[c]onflict can arise in the absence of such programs 
and in the event that they are poorly designed or poorly implemented.  While CSR practices 
have contributed to progress in company-community relations, given the high degree of 
complexity involved in successfully applying such practices, there are many pathways leading 
to unintended consequences and failure”.  
    As with the health promotion analogy, there is a need to identify the vectors of disease, 
or whatever behaviour one is trying to alter, so/therefore an accepted language or lexicon is 
needed.  The extensive lexicon of a social licence offers opportunities for investigating the 
extensive range of understanding on how to approach working with communities.  There is 
however no clarity in terms of identifying vectors or proven relationship between approaches 
and remedies.  An example might be CSR implying a one-way relationship of responsibility 
from the corporate towards those in the social realm.  It does not, to my interpretations, imply 
a negotiable relationship, although that would no doubt be the stated ends.  Is CSR solely about 
reputation or trust-building through distributing resources to assure legitimacy and is there 
anything wrong with that?  Argenti, Landucci, Spadoni, & Cozzani.  (2015) in their paper titled, 
"[t]he assessment of the attractiveness of process facilities to terrorist attacks”, identified the 
operating company’s reputation with the local population, as a factor reducing the likelihood 
of an attack.  In their words, “[c]ompany reputation and image are extremely positive if the 
local community judge company activities beneficial” (Argenti, 2015:175). 
     Within the academic and grey literature as well as in practice, there is a “feel” for the 
importance of relationships and reputation.  Nevertheless, little has been published on either 
proposed metrics or mechanisms linking a reduction of business risk from enhanced social 
acceptability in an empirical sense and no coherent model demonstrating the relationships and 
their connectedness.  The process of “engaging” with the community, however they are 
conceptualised, as stakeholders, as a single community or otherwise, is seen as critical in all 
the academic and grey literature.  “Failure to engage stakeholders in meaningful ways is seen 
to be the predominant cause of social conflict in resource extraction, with the costs of such 
conflict running high (Davis and Franks, 2014; Hall and Jeanneret, 2015; Hindmarsh, 2010; 
Lloyd, Luke, and Boyd, 2014; Pullin and Knight, 2003)” (Mercer-Mapstone et al 2017:137). 
Mercer-Mapstone quote Davis and Franks 2014 when she lays out the consequences of this 
failure, “Potential costs to resources companies can run into the billions of dollars when 
stakeholder engagement is not carried out successfully; expensive delays can result from 
resistance in the form of protests, violence, campaigns, or activism (Davis and Franks, 2014)” 
(Ibid:138). 
The lack of progress on dealing with the issue within the industry and the lack of a 
coherent theoretical model may be why one of the leading global auditors ranked social licence 
failure as the most significant threat facing the extraction sector with, “54% of 200 mining 
executives” (EY 2019) questioned identifying social licence as the number one threat to their 
industry (mining/extraction).  Gehman, Lefsrud, & Fast.  (2017) point to the proliferation of 
the concept of social licence to operate in North American media, “after mentioning the concept 
of social licence in less than 10 articles a year from 1997 through 2002, news media mentioned 
social licence in more than 1,000 articles a year from 2013 to 2015, and more than 2,000 articles 
in 2016”. 
The term “Social Licence to Operate” (SLO) may be a useful catchall but it remains 
problematic in terms of defining the parameters except whenever SLO is lost.  One knows 
when one does not have a social licence to operate because despite holding all relevant statutory 
Licences, your business is inoperative, and your capital is not working.  The company can 
usually locate the site of the “disruption” both in terms of communities and operations but what 
is it they have lost and how can they get it back?  Does it degrade by levels or switch on and 
off, if it has levels how can they be calibrated?  Does it remain stable and who was at fault?  
The conflict causing an SLO may be compounded or driven by issues of litigation or staff 
retention but more importantly for the stymied operator, what could have been done differently 
and what can be done now?   
The formal mechanisms for resolving a conflict between investors and national 
governments are starting to recognise the permeability of its standard operating procedures to 
a range of shifting social and ethical norms.  A range of critiques is starting to emerge that 
present the importance of a wider strategic review of how issues like a conflict between 
corporate and community stakeholders can be challenged.  Mercer-Mapstone is one of the few 
theorists to analyse how to categorise concepts and actions set within industry culture.  Relating 
to a classification of types of (approaches to) dialogue into what could roughly be construed as 
the dichotomy between a “learning” and a “goal orientated” approach she succinctly puts it in 
a way which resonates with my own experience from the field, “[i]n an environment such as 
resource extraction, where outcomes are corporate if not government economic imperatives, 
this structured strategic approach to dialogue can be seen to make sense, and that may be why 
it predominates.  While certain affordances are allowed by the strategic conceptualisation, 
challenges also arise.  Dialogue that is goal-driven and time-constrained can limit opportunities 
for learning and relationship building” (ibid :144).  
The constraints are driven by sectoral culture, which is term is driven by both a 
lender/board accountability model and the reality that key international staff who control local 
business processes are highly mobile.  Starting to develop, is pressure on corporations which 
may force them to change some of the established practices and foci of their businesses.    
2.2.2 The SLO context. 
With a review of some of the factors that drive the failures of existing models of social 
licence in mining several factors are clear not least the necessity to cut free from the current 
academic and industry framing of the subject, towards a new working model of social licence 
to operate.  Such a model, to have utility for the mining sector, need not be reliant on normative, 
or positional terms such as fairness, trust, shared value.  The corporation may think it is fair 
but the community may not.   It goes on to detail the existing theoretical models of social 
licence and the lack of a development framework by corporations, erroneously pursuing social 
licence with communities through a focus on philanthropy.  The chapter then identifies the 
critical aspect of MacCallum’s model, which is adopted into the model created in this thesis, 
namely that the State not only is essential for a social licence to exist in the mining context but 
that it is pivotal.  Putting the models in a tabular format, it is clear to see where some of the 
gaps to be filled by any such new model might be.  The subsequent sections begin to set the 
framework for this new model and explains how a form of “contractualism” offers 
opportunities to reconceptualise social licence as a product of a dynamic, complex social 
process.  This highlights a need to develop new theoretical containers to support the 
development of a new model of social licence based on "Political Settlement”. 
2.2.3 Failures of existing social licence models 
This section looks at some of the factors that drive the failures of existing social licence 
models and the consequences of diverse methodologies underpinning current thinking.  It looks 
at how we might, though going back through the history of political and philosophical thought, 
find a new foundation for developing a model of what is a complex business, social and 
environmentally linked accommodation necessary to enable mining projects.  It is important to 
make clear that any attempt to design a formulaic model to encapsulate the precise 
machinations of society, locality, actor choices, time and subsequent outcomes concerning 
social licence to operate, is doomed to failure.  Natural or physical science, even with the 
arguable advantage of working with physical material rather than with relationships between 
individuals and societies, has been unable to develop a consistent Theory of Everything (Hooft 
2019).   Yet there is consistency in that numerous academics cite examples of extraction sector 
projects being compromised by public opposition or social licence issues and note that this has 
been extensively documented (Brown et al, 2011; Davis and Franks, 2011; Prno and Slocombe, 
2012; Thompson and Boutilier, 2011).   Debrah, Mtegha and Cawood outline the link between 
lack of utility of the concept of social licence and the questionable theories use to explain 
current social licence thinking, “[d]espite the momentum that SLO has gained, there have been 
reservations about the theoretical underpinnings of the concept.  Because of the lack of 
theoretical rigour as a construct, opponents often argue that SLO is not clearly define” 
(2018:97).  What this tells us is that there is no single theoretical or legal definition of Social 
Licence to Operate and the opportunity exists, as defined in Chapter One, to construct some 
sort of framework with utility for the mining sector.  In a sense this thesis represents an 
approach were, to quote Layder (1998: 9), “social research and theory should be brought 
together in the service of explaining how particular configurations of activity and structure (or 
system) combine to produce specific outcomes in any area of social life”. 
Moving forward towards a working model of social licence to operate in the mining 
sector requires us to cut free from the current academic and industry framing of the subject, as 
these are harnessed to normative terms such as fairness, trust, shared value (Zhang, Measham, 
& Moffat 2018, Mercer-Mapstone, Rifkin, Moffat, and Louis 2017 and Salmi, 2000) to 
represent a small sample or work engulfed in this approach.  In addition to this normative 
positional based approach underpinning existing approaches, there is a general absence of 
reflection on the temporal component within the research and how time can put pressure on 
relationships.  What one configuration of the community has previously agreed to, could 
change for numerous reasons.  When the visions of mine and community regarding shared 
benefits from the mining activity, diverge or community experience contravenes anticipated 
reality; dust from mine vehicles or mine workings start impacting on people's health, for 
example, a social licence can experience a range of new or previously non-present pressures.   
The work of Vanclay, & Hanna (2019), and previous work and joint publications by Vanclay 
(2014, 2016 and 2017) all point towards the temporal aspect of social licence production, but 
this does not get reflected across the wider literature.    
Deploying these value-laden, normative positional terms as central to SLO does not 
enable us to investigate or analyse power relations or indeed uncover the critical path of 
interactions necessary, to move forward with a mining project through obtaining a social 
licence.  The use of normative positional terms in themselves does not stop the analysis of 
power relations.  However, their use within the context of social licence analysis, feeds into a 
diverse range of theoretical amalgams of social justice, sharing of benefits between 
communities and corporation and local conflict, used to fill the conceptual cavities of existing 
social licence theories.  The use of terms such as fairness, trust, the shared value within an 
analytical framework for social licence moves away from a holistic, structural analysis based 
on the totality of relationships.   Better for the mine corporation to move away from trying to 
build globally valid generalities through what could be characterised as the two traditional 
practical approaches to securing and maintaining a social licence; using philanthropy to barter 
with communities for their consent and secondly regulating all aspects of production based on 
adding value to the mine product.  This second approach is predicated on being able to 
differentiate the product in an increasingly socially and environmentally sensitive global 
marketplace, giving a financial incentive to the industry to behave better towards local 
community.  Most of the literature around social licence is written from a mining perspective 
or banking (Lender) perspective and that which is not, generally uses the SLO term to attack 
specific mining ventures.    
2.2.4 Review of existing models. 
The widening debate following the recent rise of SLO failure has pointed to enhancing 
transparency and promoting standards of non-core business activities as mechanisms for 
dealing with the elevated level of uncertainty facing investment in mining.  Debrah, Mtegha 
and Cawood succinctly categorized existing theoretical paradigms as follows: “the authors 
posited that there are three varieties of SLO.  These include the pyramid model (from Boutilier 
and Thomson, 2011), which is premised on trust, credibility and legitimacy; the three-strand 
model (by Gunningham et al, 2004, 2003; Morrison, 2014), which requires a mining company 
to obtain the legal, economic as well as social licence before legitimacy is acquired; and the 
triangle model (by Wüstenhagen et al, 2007), which points to asserting socio-political, market 
and community acceptance of a mining project (see Gehman et al, 2017) for a detailed 
overview” (2018:97).    
Current theoretical models are all driven by industry attempts to achieve two outputs.   
These two outputs are, firstly attempts to identify and quantify the factors driving social licence 
failures in project development and associated project investment and secondly, being able to 
translate the associated uncertainty into Risk.  Doing the latter offers the opportunity to map 
successful and unsuccessful approaches to dealing with the Risk.  That risk itself is something 
that can be financialised.  By this, it is meant that the risk, can become a product, something to 
be traded.  This issue of the creation and global trading of more and more financial products 
over the last thirty years, is dealt above in looking at financialisation as one possible underlying 
drivers of the rise of social licence failure, given that it drives short term investment pressures 
on directors of mining companies or corporations.   
     MacCallum (2015:2) mapped how the financial sector responded to SLO issues in 
lesser developed, or countries of the global South, whilst pointing out that none of the concepts 
utilised in the literate for managing SLO failure are linked to what we might identify as 
strategies for "development" or creating sustainable change in poor affected communities.  She 
drew attention to “examples of promotion of good practice such as The Extractives Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), which is a Global Standard to promote open and accountable 
management of natural resources.  (EITI, 2015).  There is also the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) that stipulates environmental, social and governance requirements 
for all World Bank investments in private sector projects and the Equator Principles (EP) which 
is primarily a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects and facilitates responsible 
risk decision making by investors”.  In looking at how the mining sector has traditionally 
responded to engaging host communities with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
MacCallum (2015), highlighted that the approach acts “as the bridge between these ambitions 
[promote mining outputs], but the persistent emphasis on charity and corporate image does not 
align stakeholder's interests with the host's locality” (ibid:1).  Charity, for MacCallum, is not a 
tool for aligning the interests of all those in a locality, if anything, it illustrates the disparity 
between corporation and community.  The public and commercial image of the corporation has 
a value that is being protected and enhanced through gifting to the community.  The community 
receives but they have no right to receive, benefits flow due to the magnanimity of the 
corporation.   The mining sector, various aspects of the State, and the host community sector 
are all for MacCallum, vital to defining an SLO and this thesis concurs with that.  MacCallum’s 
(2015) approach is interesting in that those three entities, containerized, make up the space that 
is occupied by social licence.    
 
Figure 2-1 MacCallum's SLO Model 
The trilateral relationships of a Social Licence to Operate (SLO) depicted in 
MacCallum’s SLO model (20016:6) presents the only conceptualisation to date that would 
logically be said to assert that SLO cannot exist without the endorsement of mining activities 
by the State (Government and Institutions).  The shape of the model and the interlocking 
triangles, notably all the same size, creates the space for a social licence yet does not show the 
relationships between the other containers Host communities, Mining Companies and 
Government and Institution.  It is thought-provoking because it moves away from a purely 
normative description of social licence and shows it as a set of relationships that must include 
all three containers.  In comparing the different SLO models, Table 2-1  the gaps between them 
are highlighted.   
 
 
Table 2-1 Comparison of SLO Models 
Model Predicated on Drawback 
Boutilier and 
Thomson, 2011 
Trust, credibility, and 
legitimacy 
Normative terms in a normative hierarchical 
framework and fails to demonstrate the pivotal 
role of the State.  Excellent at defining what are 
necessary “products” but less useful at showing 
relationships between actors over time.    
Gunningham et al.  , 
2004, 2003; 
Morrison, 2014 
Legal, economic as well 
as social licence before 
legitimacy is acquired 
Social licence is a component, and it does not 
show the relationships between those involved 
and the brokering process nor define the type of 
institutions needed to secure social licence. 
Triangle model (by 




acceptance of a mining 
project 
It does not demonstrate how social acceptability 
is linked to a brokered agreement with 
institutions and hard to use to locate solutions.  
The State is not identified as pivotal.    






It does not illustrate the nature of the 
relationships between those names entities or 
illustrate how change can happen within the 
system over time.    
 
2.2.5 Contractualism and conceptualisation of social Licence.    
This section deals with contractualism and the need for a cohesive conceptualisation of 
social licence as a product of dynamic, complex social processes using new theoretical 
containers to develop a new model of social licence based on a Political Settlement concept.   
That new model is trying to demonstrate that to move beyond the MacCallum model and 
provide a conceptualisation that can accommodate the changes brought about by the temporal 
aspects, a new paradigm for framing the relationship between actants needs to be created.  That 
new model is aiming to deliver a cohesive conceptualisation of social licence as a product of 
dynamic, complex social processes, applied within a contractarian approach.   The theoretical 
construct of Contractualism can be utilised to unpack how an institution, moral or political 
rules are framed within a wider context to obtain the consent of all persons concerned with it 
and represents an umbrella term for a type of political theory related to Social Contract theory.  
MacCallum's model is unfortunately neither dynamic nor able to capture the temporal aspects 
of social licence as there is no potentiality for the model to change.  Neither does the 
MacCallum model define relationships between the actants although she might argue that that 
is implicit.  Heffron, Downes, Ramirez Rodriguez, & McCauley drawing on Wilson (2016) 
and Morrison (2014) are correct to recognise that the origin of the social licence to operate 
term goes much further back than Jim Cooney to the notion of a social contract; “SLO could 
trace its roots philosophically from Rousseau and Locke whom both wrote on the 'social 
licence', i.e. the concept of the social contract is where society supports ruling government 
activities when societal needs are met (Wilson, 2016; Morrison, 2014)” (|Heffron et al 2018:2). 
Iterations of social contract theory, arguably dating back to Socrates, have containerising 
concepts of free will, legitimacy, and agency, opening the door for a reworking for example by 
firstly John Rawls, of a Kantian version of social contract theory and then by others such as 
David Gauthier.  Critically, social contract theory has become used as a mechanism for 
packaging containerizing components such as “citizen and individual agency”, “State”, 
“legitimacy” and others, and explaining how they interact.  The World Bank made the point 
concerning citizens and the law, which has pertinence to the social licence issues when they 
state, “even if a government delivers on its commitments and is able to coerce people into 
complying, there may be “legitimacy deficits” if the process is perceived as unfair and people 
may not be willing to cooperate and would rather opt out of the social contract” (2017:31). 
Utilising a form of abstract Contractualism to demonstrate how relationships need to be 
managed to ensure citizens "buy-in”, gives direction to the necessary component and utility of 
a new model of SLO which does similar.   What is more, the notion of a Contractarian approach 
brings into play a range of additional and potentially useful theoretical devices for tackling the 
issue.  For example, as Demuijnck and Fasterling draw a distinction between that which 
underpins social contracts by contrasting a “Hobbesian version of contractarian theory must be 
distinguished from the Kantian one, in which consent is not based on interests, but ‘reason’” 
(2016:677).   A contract in the Kantian tradition is a hypothetical agreement made by people 
whose judgment is rational, that is (in Kantian terms), “not distorted by prejudice, passions, 
interests, and starting from the idea of each person being an end in itself” (Kant 1788: 94–95).    
Distinguishing consent based on reason from that which is based on interest opens the 
door for unpacking numerous aspects of the complex relationships involved in securing and 
maintaining a social licence.  It gives space for representing the varieties of realities of 
stakeholders surrounding a mining project as “weighing up” matters such as the impact on their 
livelihoods and the likelihood their agreements will be honoured.  The notion of rationality and 
judgement support both the encapsulation of normative aspects used in models such as 
Boutilier and Thomson (2011) yet assumes communities are capable of giving the correct 
conditions or being reasoned and bartered with concerning consent.  Looking at the utility of 
drawing parallels in paradigm development around “consent”, it is worth noting that no 
practical template or standard working model for the “social contract theory” has ever been 
adopted, yet there is a loose understanding of how components of the theory are linked.  These 
components are assembled to create social contract theory are what might be labelled container 
terms; legitimacy, society, and ruling government, to name but a few.  The term “container” is 
not new, French, Shaun & Leyshon, Andrew & Wainwright, Thomas in “Financializing Space, 
Spacing Financialization” represent the, “nation-state as container of economic activity [     ]” 
(2011:18).  Although in that particular case they challenge the primacy of the State in financial 
matters and containerise UK and US financial institutions and practice.  This packaging 
together of geographically and legally separate entities into one term demonstrate the utility of 
packaging interests which are not geographically contained to facilitate analysis of both 
relationships and overall outcomes.  The creation of the Social Licence Settlement Model 
(SLSM) utilises this approach.    
It is unlikely that mathematical equations would have much purchase in linking those 
concepts or container terms to demonstrate how the social contract works, yet it is not difficult 
to understand some of the tensions and the relationships between individuals and the State.  An 
example of how the social contract paradigm is still used today in modern political discourse 
is Kapaau (2016) Triumphant memory of the perpetrators: Putin's politics of re-Stalinization.  
She uses the notion of a "new social contract" to demonstrate how the current dominant 
political class in Russia is changing the relationship between the state and citizen through the 
promotion of a range of narratives.  The application of the social contract paradigm is loosely 
applied and therefore very pertinent to demonstrated that in terms of a wider application, there 
is a broad consensus of what the component parts are, relationships and beneficiaries.  Kapaau 
was selected as an example to illustrate that social contract theory need not only be applied 
within a western European political or academic context.    
The overall working construction of social contract theory has an intrinsically dynamic 
facility, detailing the necessary relationships to a social contract.  These are often loosely 
defined are and rarely incontestably.  We understand if one aspect changes, it has some effect 
on others and can upset the apple cart transgressing the ‘social contract'.  Notions of legitimacy, 
authority and agency are represented as products of a balanced system, as demonstrated 
through the very existence of a "social contract".   To clarify, this thesis is content to use a 
mash of all three of Weber’s classic categorisation of “legitimacy with authority”, where people 
have faith in a particular political or social order because it has been there for a long time 
(tradition legitimacy), because they have faith in the rulers (charisma legitimacy), or because 
they trust its legality, echoing Kantian concepts of Contractualism, through the rationality of 
the rule of law (Weber 1990 [1918]; 1964).    
 The existence of “legitimacy” as a product, in standard social contract models, provides 
a significant opportunity for drawing parallels with a model for SLO.  Gehman, Lefsrud, and 
Fast in their conclusions looking at “different models of social licence, [and] showed how it 
appears to be little more than a new name for legitimacy” (2017:311).   Identifying social 
licence as legitimacy, does not in itself move us any further on in terms of understanding what 
the factors are that cause SLO to exist, disappear or degrade.  Calling it legitimacy obviously 
illustrating that there is at the heart of social licence, a relationship that is dynamic, but it gives 
us no more purchase on how to advocate for one.  It does, however, point to the logical 
conclusion that there is a utility to SLO being represented in something akin to a social contract.  
Indeed, a "societal umbrella" conceptualisation of relationships around a mining project, is 
more inclusive than a business defined “stakeholder” approach.  In the case of this thesis, the 
development of a model of SLO based on contractualism demonstrates considerable resonance 
with that of the social contract.  In developing such a model there is a need to similarly 
“containerise” those entities and process so that the relationships can be illustrated, 
interrogated, and illuminated.  Through recognising the existence of a myriad of social 
processes, relationships, financial and environmental contexts and the wider political context, 
this thesis is an attempt to move away from solutions that are predicated on models driven by 
business conceptualisations of social reality.   
   To conclude, within both the considerable body of academic and grey literature there 
exists a consensus of a range of factors which are significant in terms of developing a model 
to replace those existing models that appear to be either temporally or normative positional 
challenges.  Contractualism offers well-established arguments in dealing with the relationships 
between some of these factors and may offer a more holistic, realistic, and dynamic framework 
than business stakeholder theory for reviewing social licence to operate.    
2.2.6 Social licence, an international processes of governance.    
Barnes (2019) analysis of research undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) into the language used in bilateral investment treaties 
(BIT), identified a proliferation of phases supporting sustainable business practices and aspects 
of sustainable development in recent years.  Barr (ibid:22) states that, “[t]his indicates that 
investment tribunals are starting to recognize the 'potential interactions' between international 
investment law and other matters such as sustainable development, responsible business 
practices and human rights in general”. She drives her argument home, citing the findings of 
and investment tribunal arbitrating in the 2017 case of the Bear Creek Mining Corporation v 
Republic of Peru (the Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Republic of Peru ((ICSID Case No 
ARB/14/21).  The former was a Canadian investment vehicle seeking damages of USD522 
million and were subsequently awarded USD18 million.  The central issue in the reduced 
damages was indicated to be the failure of the claimant to develop aspects of their SLO.  
Although there appears to be no definition of SLO used in this finding, it does appear to have 
been conflagrated by the BIT with Free and Public Informed Consent (FPIC).  This latter term 
refers to a requirement under a range of international conventions specifically supporting the 
rights of indigenous peoples.   
FPIC is about ensuring consent at a specific point in time, and one could argue, SLO 
requires a continuous assurance of consent, Free and Informed Continuous Consent may be 
more accurate.  Working towards a single temporal hurdle requires a different strategy and 
approach to developing a relationship capable of sustaining consent over the life span of a mine 
site.  FPIC is also something that must be negotiated before physical operations commencing.  
During the production phase, the community will have a fuller understanding of the factual 
issues likely to diverge corporation and community interests.   The evidence emerging from 
the latest BIT processes also sends a stark message to both corporations and international 
pressure groups and NGOs.  This relates to the Rosa Montana desk-based case study further 
on in the thesis.  The mine developer in that case, Gabriel Resources (GR) had their permits 
withdrawn by the Romanian government despite complying with all legal requirements.  This 
was done on the grounds that GR had failed to secure a SLO.  Given that there is no EU legal 
definition of a SLO,  GR took their case for damages alleging a breach of the BIT rise 
concerning a proposed open-pit mining development in Roşia Montană, Romania.  Findings, 
issued as an “order” from a BIT tribunal (7th December 2018) currently presiding over Gabriel 
Resources Ltd and Gabriel Resources (Jersey) Ltd vs Romania (ICSID Case No ARB/15/31) 
excluding the amicus curiae submissions from three international NGOs are significant.  
Amicus curiae submissions are covered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and are a 
theoretical means for experts or interested people to be introduced as a “friend of the court”.  
WTO describes recognises them as, “[a] controversial issue [which] has been whether panels 
and the Appellate Body may accept and consider unsolicited submissions they receive from 
entities, not a party or third party to the dispute.  These submissions are commonly referred to 
as amicus curiae submissions” (WTO 1).   There is space for this type of evidence to be more 
tightly bound or excluded from the processes altogether as, “[a]micus curiae means “friend of 
the court”.  These submissions often come from non-governmental organisations, including 
industry associations, or university professors.  Neither the DSU nor the Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review specifically address this issue”(WTO 1). 
The scope of these forms of evidence/brief appears to be defined by this recent tribunal 
order.  A briefing to the tribunal from three international NGOs, representing the local protest 
group, was excluded from the legal process on the basis that the three international NGOs were 
acting as a conduit for evidence from a local (to the conflict) organisation, rather than being 
local themselves.  On a practical level, this drives the need for the operator (mining company) 
to drive a wedge between external (non-local) environmental actors and local communities and 
for those international environmental actors to legitimise their activities through closer 
affiliation (work through, rather than with local entities), if they are not to be automatically 
ruled out from briefing future BIT disputes.  Similarly, WTO participating governments who 
consider that they may end up in a dispute with companies over issues such as social licence, 
need to integrate local organisations into their original argument if they wish those community 
views to be considered.  WTO’s position on this is, “Amicus curiae submissions have 
frequently been filed in Appellate Body proceedings.  When these briefs are attached to the 
submission of a participant (appellant or appellee), for instance as exhibits, the Appellate Body 
considers such material to be an integral part of the submission of that participant who also 
assumes responsibility for its content” (WTO1). 
This is rational given the tribunals need to weight a final settlement decision based on a 
binary decision, responsibility for controlling the veracity of briefings will fall to one of the 
two partners and they will be held accountable for its accuracy.  What the finding does suggest, 
is that if in the case of Rosa Montana, the local organisation had had presented its argument 
directly it may have been included.   Local communities can then, represent a form of conflict 
capital within BIT but not if they are not direct contributors to the briefing and attached to one 
of the two sides directly.  This notion of conflict as a form of capital will be revised later.  It is 
significant that to date, only a few panels have made use of their discretionary right to accept 
and consider unsolicited briefs and “[o]n the basis of the Appellate Body’s interpretation, 
panels have no obligation whatsoever to accept and consider these briefs.  Accordingly, 
interested entities, which are neither parties nor third parties to the dispute, have no legal right 
to be heard by a panel” (WTO1). 
 
It would, in practice, have been politically more difficult to exclude evidence such as a 
briefing from a local protest group and one ponders as to why the Romanian government did 
not introduce the briefing as part of their evidence unless they had concerns about the quality 
of the evidence.   These are some of the questions that have been precipitating theoretical 
models of social licence to operate and be the driving force behind the creation of the 
neologism.   Creating a theoretical model that can support action and remedy would provide 
the mining sector and others with a useful tool to review ongoing inputs in specific localities.   
2.2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter isolates from the defined literature the main inadequacies of existing 
conceptualisation of social licence.  It links their failure to offer solutions to or explanations 
for social licence failure, to the lack of rigour in the theoretical context and subsequent social 
research.  It is argued here that there is a need to move away from the utilisation of value-laden 
terms such as fairness, trust, and shared value as they drive what herein has been characterised 
as two traditional approaches by the mining industry towards engaging host communities in a 
social licence process.  These two approaches are philanthropy and utilising increasingly 
vigorous quantitative environmental standards seeking added value to the end-product, giving 
social licence through better environmental and social stewardship.  This latter approach is 
validated as a social licence driver as it is seen to follow that better environmental standard 
"lift" the mine's relationship with the community to secure a social licence, a rising tide lifts all 
boats approach.   Next, the section addressed the current models used to analyse and represent 
social licence and notes their deficiencies.  Identifying MacCallum's model as the most useful 
because although static in a temporal sense, it puts the role of the State central the model.  There 
is a discussion on the failure of existing social licence models to support a process of translating 
uncertainty into risk which is a goal of the financial sector, as risk can then be commodified.  
Finally, the section looks to social contractualism as a framework to bolt conceptual tools into 
so that we might define and explore the totality of relationships involved in social licence 
situations.  These conceptual tools are both containerized entities the state, community, and 
mining corporations to name the three most critical and relationships.    
Detailing the origin of the term social licence to operate and reflecting on the 
methodological narrowness deployed at interpreting social licence failure, the term is still very 
much what one could describe as a methodological Black Box.  Social licence is often defined 
by its loss post event, and investigation into its anatomy suffers from what Kemp et al, 
(2016:22) described as a “paucity of empirical studies on this topic”.  The sections describe to 
some extent what is at stake from mining corporations’ perspective, making reference to BIT 
and projects in North America and Romania that have culminated in losses to parties, valued 
not just into the hundreds of millions of US dollar but in billions.  The loss to communities 
may be more tangible, than that from poorly delivered mine projects with livelihoods, sense of 
place, culture and sometimes lives, erased.  To engage with the issue in a theoretical manner, 
the author has opted for a form of theoretical pluralism, building a new model of social licence.    
The failure of existing models of social licence to operate in the mining sector, provides 
space for a new social contract-based model using new theoretical language but the necessity 
of those responsible for ensuring a SLO on a project is for them to recognises that not all 
knowledge that is required can be obtained to engage effectively with communities can be 
obtained from attending academic courses.  Experience and reflexivity are as critical to 
understanding how to design social interventions as theoretical understanding of participation 
and community.  Where the company can recognise that they have little of either of these 
critical components, they are better placed to locate those that can assist.    
  
Chapter 3 Constructing the Pyramid of Theories.  
3.1 Introduction.    
       This chapter explores and critiques the theoretical underpinning of the development 
of the model.  In doing so, this section identifies some of the crucial actors and their relationship 
which are necessarily present for the existence of an SLO and looks beyond the research, 
introducing components for the development of a new model.  The theoretical construction of 
a model, one that was to emerge from the research findings, required some fleshing out at this 
point in the thesis.  Theoretically, the approach is underpinned by a pyramid, illustrated in  
Figure 3-1 Theoretical pyramid 
    , constructed of Actor-Network Theory, Political Settlement Theory, Poststructuralist 
Social Theory and finally the current academic/grey literature position augmented by practical 
experience from the field.  Throughout this chapter these four theoretical groupings are 
explored and interrelated, resulting in a Social Licence Settlement Model (SLSM). 
 
Figure 3-1 Theoretical pyramid 
     
Utilising Actor Network Theory (ANT) and detailing the actants or containers defined 
by activities and interests, necessary to capture reality for the new model in broad brush strokes, 
it is especially important to recognize the myriad of local, national, and international factors 
that shape how they relate to each other.  The State, mine company, lender and community will 
be defined in later chapters, as critical actants, in developing a view of how SLO is achieved.  
Yet paradoxically it is important to recognise that all these constructs are dynamic, amorphous 
and relationships between them have numerous vectors, they are at any given time each an 
assemblage.  Different States, mine companies, lenders, and communities as these containers 
within the model are to be called, have different realities and relationships and this supports 
the utilisation of the social licence concept as a translation of that wider Assemblage.  There 
is, this thesis argues, no such thing as a single global business reality, standardised relationships 
between shareholders and directors, states and companies or communities and states.   
    There may therefore be principles developed about what activities support SLO in 
numerous localities, yet the successful delivery of an SLO by those acting on behalf of the 
mining corporation, will be dependent on skilful and timely application of activities supporting 
those principles.  Identifying what skills are needed to do this, securing them in and over time 
and resourcing the delivery of processes, will still be no guarantee for a mining corporation, of 
securing and maintaining an SLO.   Changes occur in all relationships, Turner (1986) makes 
the point here that any system as it sits is inherently self-replicating, yet change, in reality, is 
ever-present, “[t]his denotes the use of rules and resources of structure by agents who, in this 
way, reproduce these very rules and resources that mediate institutionalised patterns of 
interaction (Turner 1986: 973).  Turner’s work is particularly pertinent as this thesis utilises 
Turner’s Synthetic Model of Conflict Processes (2013:41), to underpin a new model of social 
licence settlement.  In a sense too, it is worth identifying that the work is set within a 
perspective that Turner would class as meso-analytical, drawing on Giddens’s analysis of 
agency.   Turner illustrates the connections between the macro, meso and micro levels and this 
provides a useful way to illustrate where the new model is located.  Meso modulates the 
relationship between the macro and the micro.   
 
Figure 3-2 Turners synthetic model of conflict  
Linking Turner’s conflict model to the notion of a SLO highlights the importance of 
assumptions underpinning relationships at a local level.  If we do not want to replicate the 
institutionalised patterns of interaction that give us the result we do not want, loss or failure to 
gain a social licence for example, we need to change the patterns of relationships.  Social theory 
can be used to illustrate what, relating to SLO, might not be in the gift of the mining company 
or corporation.   Building on social theory, reframing SLO as a contextualised set of 
relationships, rather than a range of activities undertaken by mine corporations to gain 
acceptance from the host communities, is central to my premise.  
3.2 Actor Network Theory. 
Returning to the Theoretical Pyramid, to explore the relevance of Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) approaches in containerising this agency-structure argument, recognises the non-human 
actant’s role in the complexity of social licence.  It addresses the wider concept of what type 
of ontology we should be using to get to grips with these, on the one hand, complex issues 
related to the structure of wider society and wider economic system and on the other, the 
specific aspects of locality and the relationships around a mine.  It also addresses that traditional 
business management approaches to identifying project complexity recognise, that both the 
temporal aspect and social context are critical, yet they do not on their own, support any form 
of social analysis.  How does one develop a framework for knowledge which is theoretically 
robust and internally coherent within the wider literature whilst at the same time recognising 
the limitations on whatever approach has been decided on?   
At its broadest, this thesis attempts to fuse what can be characterised as a "tall” ontology 
with a “flat" ontology.  This has been characterised using Seidl and Whittington (2014:1408) 
approach, portraying the factors shaping social licence and the agency of those involved.  
Giddens and a range of what could broadly be called Foucauldian ideas, represent the tall 
perspective ontologically speaking, were vertical hierarchy and higher levels forces in society 
determine factors driving social licence failure.  The new social licence settlement model is 
constructed within the meso level of social theory and its rootedness in Giddens explains this, 
echoed by Turner in his conflict model in the preface to this chapter.  Similarly, ANT is 
deployed to represent the networks and "containers" of Mine, Lender, Community and State 
encapsulating or representing both human and non-human aspects of real-world mining 
operations.   
3.2.1 Ontologies “Tall” and “Flat”. 
Linking, as this and former chapters have done, a range of social theoretical perspectives 
together with developing strategy into practice re social licence, is challenging.  The author 
recognises the constraints and limitation of the ontologies that are applied.  Seidl and 
Whittington (2014: 1408) deal with this challenge theoretical, by defining two separate 
categories of ontology, tall and flat and demonstrating that they are complementary and useful 
in effectively linking 'local' strategising activity with 'larger' social phenomena.  The problem 
of integrating Foucauldian and critical discourse analysis, structuration theory, Archerian 
critical realism, narratology and Bourdieusian and Wittgensteinian perspectives, into 
systematic empirical research, has been outlined before (Carter, 2013; Ezzamel & Willmott, 
2008 in Seidl and Whittington 2014: 1408).  With the tall ontologies of Archer (1995), Foucault 
(1980) or Giddens (1984), micro-level phenomena are explained primarily by reference to 
meso-level or macro-level structures or systems.  That is what this thesis has tried to do, by 
utilising this type of theoretical approach within a social settlement model framework, at a 
meso-level.    
      Taller ontologies, Seidl and Whittington (2014) tell us, tend to situate instances of 
local praxis in a type of vertical hierarchy, were higher levels forces, enable or constrain what 
happens on at a lower or ground level.  This kind of ontological position is associated with a 
vocabulary of ‘structures’ and ‘systems’, especially as joined with terms such as ‘macro’, 
‘societal’ or ‘levels’. That in a sense is what the social settlement model is framed with.  Flatter 
ontologies locate local praxis or action not within a vertical hierarchy but in a network of 
interconnections.  The characteristic vocabulary of flatter ontologies is one of 'networks', 
'constellations', 'ecologies' and 'relations'.  The flattening instinct extends to actors, with equal 
status given to humans and non-humans, including technologies, ANT being an example.  Seidl 
and Whittington (2014) detail that ANT practice theory has already found its way into strategy-
as-practice research (see Denis, Langley & Rouleau, 2007 and Jørgensen & Messner, 2010, 
respectively in ibid).   Flatter ontologies extend the scope of strategy-as-practice research, by 
bringing in a range of sites, both local and distant, and a variety of actors, both human and non-
human.  ANT is used herein, to try and explain both the volatility of SLO as it is currently 
conceptualised and the myriad of factor that underpin the complex web of relationships around 
a particular mining project development.  This is an attempt to create a new lexicon around the 
narratives used to contextualise relationships around mine operations.  Similarly, illustrating 
those theoretical perspectives dealing with tall ontologies is useful in supporting an 







Table 3-1, Seidl and Whittington (2014:1412) have tabulated the range of theoretical 
perspectives and it can be seen, that Giddens and what might be termed his theoretical position, 
is portrayed as linked to conceptualising current or existing practices.  Current or existing 
practices and the prospect of changing them concerning mining operations drive this thesis and 








Table 3-1Overview of theoretical approaches 
  
Seidl and Whittington (2014:1412) 
Giddens’ replication of social and professional practices sits comfortably with the 
utilisation of ANT tools in the development of a conceptual model for social licence.  
Addressing terminology within ANT is important at this stage.  Using the ANT lexicon of both 
actants and assemblages to refer to mine and/or corporation, the lender, the state, and the 
community is particularly relevant.  This is because each of them is a complex entity made up 
of practices, legal persons, and equipment, in a complex web of relationships (assemblages) 
yet also take decisions and act – hence they are actants.  This section will explain why defining 
non-human actants are important and explain why the packaging up of the State, mine 
company, lenders, and community, in a meaningful way is central to representing their 
relationships in a new social settlement model.  As outlined in chapter two; developing 
mechanisms that can resolve, remove, or encompass social licence barriers to enable the 
extraction of critical minerals to drive the world's largest market, the EU and facilitate its 
transition from a carbon-based economy to an electric-based economy, is a major challenge for 
the mining sector (World Bank 2017).  To try and understand what is stopping SLO's from 
being developed, this thesis proposes utilising a contractual theory as outlined in chapter 2, a 
political settlement-based framework to illustrate relationships in agency terms between the 
mine and/or corporation, the lender, the state, and the community.   Agency from any of these 
named actants, according to Giddens, depends on the rules and resources of structure by agents 
[actants] who, in this way, reproduce these very rules and resources that mediate 
institutionalised patterns of interaction (Turner 1986: 973).   
Once it becomes problematic and the rules are no longer replicating, in this case when a 
social licence is no longer forthcoming, we must assume there has been an underlying change.  
Something critical has changed in the network.  There are innumerable and incalculable 
potential factors at play and this thesis attempts to present a framework displaying how the 
totality of relationships, is fundamental to understanding social licence.  In temporal terms, all 
these four key actants; Mine, Community, State, and those providing critical capital (Lenders), 
operate with significantly different time horizons.  Time is a critical issue for understanding 
how each actant is directly or indirectly affected by the environmental and social impacts of a 
mining project.  There is also a difference in the speed with which externally arriving 
information to the actant, can be processed, and ultimately actioned on by each of them, we 
might call this the rhythm of action.  This rhythm might be driven by organisational capacity, 
or it may be driven by other structural issues outside the actants’ control.  This makes it 
problematic designing a model with any kind of dynamism.  Yet recognizing this difference in 
the rhythms of agency for different actants, is fundamental to understanding how actants need 
to interact to deliver a positive result for the mine in terms of social licence.    
3.2.2 Communities and existing models failure.  
       The ontological crisis at the core of social licencing problems relates to the attempt 
by the industry to utilise scientific or classical economic theory to try to both understand and 
develop a series of social processes linking the mining corporation to communities.  
Communities do not generate their knowledge through a scientific paradigm and their 
conclusions as to the importance of mining activities, may not be driven by the need to make 
the mine a successful reality.  As Costanza (2016) points out in her excellent paper on social 
licence conflict in Guatemala, the community will be making their assessments based on what 
they know about the impact of a cement works, based on how any proposal might impact on, 
the "social fabric of their communities" (ibid:108).   Within the literature, it is clear that the 
knowledge base of the community and that of the corporation can be juxtaposed.  The creation 
of those two sometimes opposing forms of knowledge is often the result of different ontological 
frameworks.   
In Section 3.2.1, tall and flat ontologies were investigated with regards to how one could 
conceptualise various actants within a model for this thesis.  The mining industry and host 
communities also have their ontologies for trying to understand what issues are or will be 
affecting them.   For communities, knowledge is based on experience, perceived impact on not 
just the present but the future and often on an acute awareness of the social and environmental 
ecosystems.  Knowledge for rural communities can be characterised as "indigenous 
knowledge" built along with truth over time and reified through community experience.  The 
totality of relationships has an immediate and imagined impact on rural communities, often 
heavily dependent on social networks of obligation.  For the corporation, knowledge is 
scientific, incontestable, and defined as changes or potential changes along parameters 
understood internationally.  How many parts per million (PPM) of arsenic will be in the water 
and how does that correspond to international acceptability?  One exchange the author heard 
was where a mining company had inadvertently driven a road through a sacred grove of bushes 
resulting in conflict.  "They never told us their sacred bushes were in that area" was the defence.  
The mine management felt it was the community’s fault for wanting to keep their sacred bushes 
secret.  Their religious practices were neither understood nor respected.  Indigenous and 
traditional knowledge systems do now carry the same weight in terms of the techno-scientific 
system when deployed within a neoliberal global economic framework.  In many senses, the 
arguments around social licence, the validity of local forms of knowledge and neo-liberalism, 
is an echo of the argument outlined in the Kuramoto and Sagasti’s (2002) paper.   
This details the movement within the international development sector from a paradigm, 
echoing the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe, focusing on economic growth and productivity 
in the global South, toward a more human-centric position based on influential thinkers like 
Sen, as mentioned earlier, who stressed the need for development assistance to focus on 
supporting people's capabilities where their lives unfold.  Notably, Sen's perspective arose 
through the failure of thirty years of international development aid having little positive impact 
on the global South.  What would be perceived as progressive discussion within the mining 
sector on "shared value", most recently within the academic literature by Vanclay and Hanna 
(2019), focused on releasing part of the value of the ore body or sovereign wealth 
collaboratively to benefit the host community, as a mechanism for delivering social licence.  
Whilst there is nothing wrong with this in terms of practice, it does not address within a 
theoretical mechanism, what aim is being pursued.   Shared value as an unelaborated 
proposition fails to recognise that it is the stability of an agreeable totality of relationships that 
the shared value enterprise is deployed.  How that is visioned as outputs need to be shaped 
through a collaborative process over time rather than some sense of "development" being 
delivered.  Giving 5 local people loans to buy fuel bowsers and then paying them a premium 
for transporting fuel for the life of the mine, is not shared value unless it is part of a wider 
programme and must arise from protracted democratic processes.    
        Attempts to manage the supply chain (sale of metals) with processes developed to 
deal with “conflict” minerals/gemstones, best typified by the OECD (see ref 2) can be 
characterised as, forcing those with resources undertaking mining projects, to support a more 
in-depth critique of their proposed activities.  Similarly, the London Stock Exchange's 
environmental and social governance (ESG) protocol, is an attempt to recognise community 
vulnerability in the mining sector and create a framework for guiding mine operators in social 
practices that reduce the risk of conflict which may precipitate social licence failure (Ref 3).  
These are attempts to link “responsibility” with categorizing and managing "risk" so that 
mining corporations might mitigate the mechanisms of imbalance of access to the creation of 
scientific truth between communities and others involved in the mining process.   In these 
emerging frameworks, there is again a certain wooliness, a use of intrinsically “good”concepts 
like "responsibility", as aerosol terms, terms used to spray-paint over gaps in different 
conceptual understandings and enable practitioners and theorists to appear to talk to each other 
with a coherent logic.  The London Metal Exchange document states, "Since its adoption in 
May 2011, the Guidance has become the leading industry standard for companies looking to 
live up to the expectations of the international community and customers on mineral supply 
chain transparency and integrity" (London Metal Exchange:1).  This recent conversion, one 
could cynically suggest, has been a response to the rising crisis of social licence failure.  
Consumer awareness, social media and international tribunals may have also played a part in 
a social licence being the number one risk to the sector in 2019 (EY2019).  Similarly, debates 
are emerging concerning the linking of directors’ remuneration to good ESG (Wislon 2019).   
3.3 Agency, Entities, and Industry Metrics.    
     Internally, within the mine corporation, the nature of the complex relationships 
between directors and shareholders, within the delivery or development of a mine, sets the 
character for the relationships that emerge between the corporate entity and the other critical 
"stakeholders", often defined as, the lenders, community, and the State.  Lenders have their 
complexities, yet the latter two categories are themselves complex constructs with complex 
relationships with each other and this is highly variable both within countries and over time.  
This presents a range of challenges when trying to construct a generic model of social licence 
or indeed draw general lessons from project failures.  Additionally, in the case of the decisions 
emerging from corporation and shareholders, Fauziah et al recognise that "the agency problem 
depends on the ownership characteristics of each country"(2012:54).   Likewise, relationships 
between the state and community, local political issues, and relationships, vary from location 
to location and are complex, multi-layered, and fluid over time.  The challenge is how to 
containerise these entities whilst recognising the temporal aspect of the relationship between, 
State, mine company, lenders, and community, in a meaningful way.  Equally, representing the 
principles underpinning the relationships between them to construct a model is complex.  
Agency and actants/actors/stakeholder's ability to choose a course of action concerning how 
they engage within a social licence or potential social licence system is constrained by manifold 
problems.  Yet it is important to acknowledge that if we recognise agency and temporal aspects 
to decisions, as Giddens stated, “at any point in time, the agent could have acted otherwise” 
(Giddens 1979: 56).  Through avoiding the dualism of structure and agency, Giddens advances 
the notion of the duality of structure.   
The agent/actor uses the rules and resources of the structure, reproduce these same rules 
and resources that mediate institutionalised patterns of interaction (Turner 1986: 973).  
Giddens' concepts span the three dichotomies that are determinism and voluntarism, object and 
subject and synchrony and diachrony (Archer 1982: 456-7).  Giddens' strategy is to amalgamate 
(Archer 1982) the two sides of each divide, based on the argument that social reality duels of 
agency and structure are integral in any social phenomenon.  His “structuration theory” 
demonstrates a "seeming opposition of perspectives disguises a complementarity which they 
display" (Giddens 1986: 531).  In avoiding the dualism of structure and agency, Giddens 
advances the notion of the duality of structure.  This denotes the use of rules and resources of 
structure by agents who, in this way, reproduce these very rules and resources that mediate 
institutionalised patterns of interaction (Turner 1986: 973).   There are then institutional 
patterns that develop in terms of how the State, Lenders, mining corporation and communities 
operate and therefore why experienced social practitioners who work with communities and 
mining are so valuable.  ANT approaches are useful in supporting the containerising of this 
agency-structure argument in a manner that gives it utility for analysing social conflict notably 
giving the non-human mine actant, a role.  These actants are themselves assemblages but are 
herein defined as actants when they have agency with other similarly dualistically defined 
entities.  The whole time the mine is or could be operationalised is referred to as the life of the 
mine, illustrated in Figure 3-3.    
 
Figure 3-3 Life of mine diagram      
This language is significant in that the power or realities that flow through the mine, 
shapes the assemblage that is a social licence.  The language of project management, of life 
cycles and phases, developed from engineering projects, shapes the construction and 
perception of risk and the delivery of projects globally, see van Staalduinen, Khan, Gadag and 
Reniers, (2017) for an excellent example of how quantitative security risk assessments are 
intellectually framed.  It is driven by a specific type of regime of rationality, and this is critical 
to understand given that Foucault said, “because it’s true that ‘practices’ don’t exist without a 
certain regime of rationality” (1991: 79).  This regime of rationality is reflected in financial 
investors using the language of engineers to produce the knowledge they use to determine and 
manage risk.  The production of knowledge within the mining sector, its predilection for 
quantitative metrics, is addressed many times in this thesis.  For a look inside the industry see 
Retfalvi detailing that, “Effective risk management is critical to project success and must be 
forward looking and continuous” (2011:2).   
In developing an effective risk management strategy, determining what one considers as 
part of the mining project and developing an ability to understand, recruit and deploy necessary 
resources, as well as interpret the consequences of for example relationships between the mine 
and the local population, depends on one critical factor.  Unless one can understand the social 
relationships of the host community, for example, as an anthropologist might do, there can be 
no effective risk management strategy and no sense of project complexity.  Abdou, Yong and 
Othman on page one of their conference papers define the current relationship between risk 
and complexity. “The project complexity has a negative influence upon project management 
process particularly on the project performance.  The lack of consensus on project complexity 
is a crucial problem as project complexity is closely correlated with the project management 
process as well as the project management performance” (2016:1). 
Failure to deploy adequate resources to access the social context leads de facto, to poor 
project performance.  Inherent to creating an institutional way of operating is a range of shared 
value, shared experience, and shared practice globally and more pointedly for this thesis, within 
Europe.  Notably, existing concepts of SLO define and produces the knowledge that drives the 
decisions made by the mining corporations.  This sense of agency of stakeholders, where 
‘stakeholders’ refers not just to corporate stakeholders but those are defined as critical at the 
start of the mine project, to delivery of the project, remains at the core of the discourses 
undertaken in both the academic and grey literature about a social licence to operate.  This lack 
of clarity on the importance of the totality of relationships drives flawed attempts to construct 
resolutions between and across a range of stakeholder.  The mixing of social theory 
terminology with business terminology relating to agency and stakeholders is, this thesis 
contends, a factor in the social licence as a term becoming an increasingly debased.  Kemp and 
Owen recognised, what is now seven years ago, that the social licence term was more of a 
signalling device than a concept driving types of behaviour or agency on behalf of those 
seeking a social licence, “there are companies and industry organisations that appear to 
recognise limitations in the social licence construct, but continue to use it when referring to 
external expectations more generally” (Kemp and Owen, 2013:30). 
Mine corporations do not unpack the meaning of SLO, rather they use it to refer to 
external expectations as a virtue-signalling device.  For any construct or model of social licence 
to function (have utility in the real world), it must move beyond utilising the normative 
conceptualisation of "good" and "bad" concerning mining corporation actions and instead view 
the activities referred to as effective or not effective, with regards to relationship building 
across a social licence settlement.  How actively actions are engaged with and perceived by 
other actants across the social licence settlement, is more important than intention.  These 
normative, good/bad terms are concepts embedded in the terminology currently utilised to 
discuss social licence relationships, along with trust and engagement and are used to signal to 
those external to the social licence settlement.  The good/bad terms only work if they are agreed 
across the actants involved in the social licence settlement.        
3.4 Political Settlement, a Theoretical Perspective.  
      Building on the logic of ANT theory and poststructuralist theory and coalescing with 
the scholarly and practical research in the field, Political Settlement as a concept, outlines the 
argument about its exclusivity of use within a national setting, detailing how that argument 
although coherent, is redundant given the subsequent use of the term by the very government 
around which the original term was developed.  It details that political settlement has been 
represented diagrammatically within the literature and as such, the new model displayed later 
in the chapter has a pedigree.  Recognizing the importance of the totality of relationships with 
a political settlement, details how it might have utility with regards to both wider 
poststructuralist theory and ANT.  Despite ANT being almost the antithesis of a model-making 
toolkit given the static nature of any snapshot in time, the chapter asks for recognition that the 
model, although a construct to be viewed within a context of time and space, is constrained by 
neither.  It is trying to illustrate the interrelatedness of relationships between actant, within 
what one could call the assemblage of a social licence situation.  The flexibility of all three 
residents for the theoretical paradigms, linked with the research and practice related to SLO, 
give the model an opportunity for existence.    
     The second part of the chapter deals with describing the containers utilised in the 
model.  It then goes on to demonstrate how the model works and relates that to real-world 
situations.  Containers as introduced earlier have been used to build the model and their 
anatomy will be defined in later.  The model’s utility, as a tool for both academics and 
practitioners will be to force the further unpacking of these containers in the empirical world.  
These containers explored here, have been purposely kept broad, as this Social licence 
Settlement Model is attempting to represent a range of locations/situations and are unpacked 
only as far as necessary for a working construct to be created, recognising the immense bodies 
of academic work dedicated to defining each.  Containers representing the community, state 
and a range of others are defined by their position with a seesaw type model that roughly 
appears to obey Newtonian physics to demonstrate their relationship within the whole.  If this 
model is to be used to try and understand social reality and deliver change to mine management 
perceptions as is envisaged, portraying the totality of relationships, and representing the pivotal 
position of the state on moderating those relationships is critical.   
Similarly, if the model gets used it will establish that state support is critical to social 
licence and become the basis for a legal defence for corporations being sued by states for failing 
to obtain a social licence.  Similarly, being able to convey the move in understanding social 
licence from a binary relationship towards something that those not versed in social theory can 
engage with, is important.  The mine icon represents the totality of the mine and its 
relationships, and the construction of the avatar is unpacked.  Similarly, community, 
relationships, Lenders, money /capital, regional development plan and related governance, 
international NGOs, international rights framework, the state and international arbitration are 
similarly "containerised' although less comprehensively dealt with.  I make no apologies for 
schematising the major components of society engaged in a mining project.  That in a sense is 
the very point.  Moving away from the binary into the totality of relationships provides an 
opportunity to experiment with "what ifs" from a management perspective.  It also them 
requires clarification, "what does that mean or how could that happen?" 
3.4.1 Summary of Political Settlement in the context of SLO.    
     Defining political settlement in terms of social licence to operate in mining, requires 
the unpacking of the origins of the political settlement concept, its usage with a national forum 
and the debate on the appropriate usage of the term within academia.  There some signs of its 
considerations as a concept within the academic literature related to SLO (Fredricksen 2019) 
but that has been in the field of political science.  There has been resistance to deploying the 
term outside a national political contextual analysis.  A caveat here in diverging from the 
traditional use of the term in that field is it is the structure or a balancing proposal that is being 
borrowed from the political settlement concept, not the relationships between elites and those 
that govern nationally.  Within the model ascribed in this thesis, it is the translation or 
assemblage that is an SLO, for it is both these things simultaneously.  The new model must 
contend with the actants being continually redefining and sitting within a balanced proposal 
but for the purposes of the model, we will assume that they are trapped within their proscribed 
"containers".  All "containers", mine, community, State and Lender, utilised in the model are 
essentially volatile and change over time.  The new model is moving away from current 
debased binary analyses of corporation community relationships defined through social licence 
and there is recognition within the academic literature relating to the sector that this is needed.  
There may be a need for a new model of social licence as the present representations of it 
appear impotent at supporting fruitful analysis f but the term is still useful.  Boutilier (2017) 
supporting the utility of social licence stated, "[n]onetheless, it has a clear, useful, measurable 
meaning to professionals in community relations, particularly in the extractive industries".    
       ANT analysis provides an opportunity to move beyond the mine versus community 
binaries projections of social licence to operate towards recognising the importance of all the 
relationships in the network.  Bruno Latour (1993) outlined the flaws of this creation of binary 
propositions in representing social reality.  In the deliberately rhetorical, We Have Never Been 
Modern, he deconstructs the concept of 'modernity', suggesting it is deeply fragile.  This act of 
undermining the binary, also asks how binaries are constructed by paying symmetrical 
attention to the semiotics of language and materials.  Latour's concern is that modernity has 
never been pure (Law et al.,2013:173) and that the inherent reductionism in social science 
might be what Latour (1988) refers to as Purification, becomes a way of characterising 
something very complicated and composite, as simply and easily communicable by packaging 
it into a binary construct.  This issue, for this thesis, is the core of the problem of existing 
conceptualisations of social licence.  The mine and the community and the relationship between 
those two, driven by the corporation half of that relationship, is seen by the industry, as a binary 
to be maneuvered to assure social licence.  This is patently flawed theoretically proposition 
that underpins the majority of models (except MacCallum that includes the State) and that 
might be one factor driving the high level of social licence failure.   
For a model of social licence to be useful, it must demonstrate the critical role of the state 
and societal elites as well as other actants and their relationships.  It must also demonstrate the 
precariousness or lack of stability within the network where social licence might apply.  
Representing social licence in this thesis has necessitated reached into the realm of political 
science to borrow "political settlement" as a concept for that purpose.  Mushtaq Khan and his 
seminal work on the matter defined the concept as, "a political settlement is a combination of 
power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic 
and political viability" (Khan, 2010: 4).  Political settlement is a term used to define solutions 
in State level conflict yet instead of a utilising the term exclusively at a macro level tool, in the 
case of this thesis it is being deployed at a meso level, as explained earlier.  This thesis uses 
the concept of political settlement as a mechanism to display the relationships between several 
containerised entities, the State, the mine, the community, those representing NGOs and those 
representing lenders as well as indicating the wider regulatory and cultural aspects.   
Political settlements have traditionally been used to understand the relationships between 
the State and societal elites in a national or regional context.  This thesis contends that social 
licence is anchored in a sense of locality and accommodation of elites who are defined by 
factors relating to the locality of the mine operations, as elites.  Social licence is the result of a 
meso level political settlement model with its locus, not at a State or para-state level but at a 
local level, although they may have national ramifications and certainly regional significance.  
In developing a political settlement model, it is important to recognize that all actants as 
defined, have choices.  Kelsall (2018) with echos of Giddens proposed that, “A settlement in a 
human context implies some degree of agency, even if heavily constrained.”  
For any political settlement to be resilient to change, it must encapsulate what could be 
called the actor's "dunamis', their potential or capacity to act.  Actors or their proxies may not 
be able to demonstrate agency when the political settlement is forged but it may be possible to 
predict or even facilitate that agency.  Khan's analysis of the need to evolve the political 
settlement or suffer the consequences, resonates with the reality of social licence failure.  He 
said, "No political settlement is static, and all settlements are continuously evolving.  But the 
evolution can sometimes be gradual; at other times stability or economic performance can 
collapse as a result of incompatible evolutions of power relationships or institutions and lead 
to a crisis.  In the latter cases, stability and growth are only likely to recover when a new 
political settlement defined by a different combination of institutions and power emerges, 
possibly at the end of a period of significant conflict "(2010:4).  
That "continuously evolving" aspect of social licence underpins one to the main 
conclusions of Proctor and MacCallum (2019) paper which details that there is a need for 
mechanisms to be developed to support emerging voices of dissent in situations where a social 
licence may come under threat.  It also underpins the temporal and spatial aspects of a mine, 
given that here the national level is not the focus, the spatial is not delimited by national 
boundaries but by the effects and influences of the mine.  Thirdspace, defined by the mine is 
where the model is operational.  Operationally if progress on the mine is to be made, in ANT 
terms, there is a need to develop spokesmen to shape translations of reality and communities 
need to be supported to become obligatory passing points (OPP) as they have the likelihood to 
become such at some point in the process if not at the start of the mining process.  This 
interventionist proposal and the practicalities of how that might be done could be the subject 
of numerous thesis and will be parked here within this one.   
      The debate around the ability to use the "political settlement" concept not with a 
national model (macro) but at a sub-national (meso) level is one which is still is a discussion 
within the political philosophy field.  The key papers on this subject relate to the discourse 
between Kelsall and Khan.  Kelsall (2018) critiques Khan's (2010) seminal paper which 
appears, much to Kelsall's indignation, to move towards detailing the expansive utility of the 
political settlement concept.  Kelsall takes issue with: 
 "Khan's equivocation between defining the political settlement on the one hand as a 
macro-political societal feature, and on the other hand as the distribution of organizational 
power relevant to the analysis of specific institutional and policy issues.  The latter move, in 
our view, dilutes the concept, mixing it up with lower-level political dynamics, which, while 
relevant to the study of institutions, maybe more-or-less autonomous of the political 
settlement" (Kelsall 2018:658).  
There appears to be confusion here as Khan is still talking about national level 
settlements but this paper queries that the term should span how power is distributed across 
organisations and not just elites within a national settlement.  Whilst understanding Kelshall's 
protective stance to the debasing of the Political Settlement concept, the term has wider utility 
than that of a national settlement.  In this thesis, rather than challenging the scale and inclusivity 
of the concept, it is the representation of a balancing of interests and relationships within the 
concept of political settlement as a term, that defines the concept's utility with a social licence.   
        The origins of the political settlement term may indicate why it is so entrenched 
within the political science realm.  It was first used as a term to define the mechanics behind 
the English Williamite settlement of the Glorious Revolution 1688 with a shift of power from 
elites to an organisation, in this case, Royalty to Parliament.  Its usage by that very national 
government continued to evolve, given that its subsequent use in 1972 by Her Majesties 
Government (1972) in the title of an ultimately unsuccessfully document aimed at attempting 
to construct peace in Northern Ireland.  This document looking to encapsulate at least some of 
the grievances of those community based, self-appointed elites, who were engaged in violence 
in a settlement that was not, for the British at least, about national-level governance.  Arguably, 
this was another example of addressing conflict requiring a political settlement at a national 
level as, without Irish republican violence, there would have been no proposed "Political 
Settlement" in 1972.  Nevertheless, for the British, the political settlement in question-related 
to the governance of only a part of the UK, at a sub-national level.  A proposed sub-national-
level political settlement was a response to regional and local manifestations of power 
expressed through political violence.  There is then precedence for local-level actors being 
central to a sub-national settlement defined as a political settlement and that reflects what is 
being undertaken in this thesis.    
      We can see from the analysis of social licence failures in mining, that at a local level 
there can be compelling reasons to encompass newly defined or emerging elites in a political 
settlement involving the various levels of the State institutions and the private corporation.  The 
creation of new social, administrative or governance institutions/actors or the evolution of 
existing institutions /actor, means that mechanisms for maintaining social licence need to have 
an adaptive capacity if they are to survive.  If the political settlement underpinning the social 
licence to operate on a mine site, does not enable both the potential for changes and reallocation 
of resources and opportunities in that locality and provide systems to anticipate the need to 
evolve the settlement, the social licence will fail.  Political settlements are never fixed and what 
could be called the "dunamis", the potential or capacity of actors or in this case actants, to act, 
needs to be continually reflected upon.  Fredericksen (2019) is one of the few to apply a 
"political settlement" approach within the mining context with his analysis of the "political" 
nature of allocation of resources to communities, specifically in Zambia.  Addressing the use 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) within the context of mining and what factors 
determine the allocation of resources, Fredericksen had this to say: 
"The resulting pattern of inclusion and development is argued to result from the 
interaction of two processes - elite bargaining and coalitions within exclusionary political 
settlements on the one hand, and CSR practices shaped by risk management on the other" 
(2019:169).  These concepts need interrogating; what is an elite, how are they defined and by 
whom, what is a coalition and why is CSR being deployed as a risk management strategy?  
Bargaining, for example, implies an ability to be heard and the perceived or demonstrable 
capacity to articulate an argument towards an enforceable consensus by representative elites.  
There is a temporal aspect to this perceived or demonstrable capacity.  Addressing the potential 
for situations to change, Kahn (2010:4 ) outlines the dynamism of political settlements, "No 
political settlement is static and all settlements are continuously evolving.   " 
A community engaged in the early stages of a mining conflict may not have the capacity 
to develop a consensus given that the community is very often highly fractured internally and 
may not understand the implication of proposed mining development.  Once they are faced 
with being relocated and having to deal with negative environmental impacts, they are more 
likely to organise, particularly if supported by external expertise.  Failing to capture those 
representing the community in an evolving political settlement will mean that the original 
settlement will come under pressure and collapse.  Similarly, if the political processes or 
institutions change the original settlement is likely to not be fit for purpose.  As Kahn says, "A 
political settlement is, therefore, a dynamic and interdependent set of variables and our first 
task is to make these interdependencies analytically tractable" (Kahn 2010:4). 
Fredericksen, in this 2019 paper, looking at economics and what he frames as 
"development", draws attention to the potential fluidity of outcomes from political settlements.  
Khan (2010) sums this up by highlighting political processes and incentives even in the same 
institutional forms, will produce different economic and developmental outcomes.  Khan is 
much more concerned with showing the relationships between the distribution of benefits and 
the stability of the political settlement.   Kelsall has defined the uses of political settlements in 
terms of encapsulating restless elites for the end of state-building,"[p]olitical settlements 
analysis has been used to explain why some states endure while others break down 
(Lindemann, 2008; World Bank, 2011; Jones, 2012); why some peace processes result in more 
inclusive patterns of politics and development than others (Rocha Menocal, 2015)" (Kelsall 
2018:1).   
        For this social settlement model to be of use it must demonstrate the relationship 
between the community and other actants, to establish a "balanced" or stable settlement.  The 
community are analogous to these "restless elites".  Defining the community in a manner that 
can be used within a working model of social licence in mining presents some difficulties.  
Community is socially constructed and as such can be contested.  Again, rather than delve into 
the sea of literature on definitions of communities this thesis will give recognition to the core 
constructs and use a composite to work with the new model.  Panelli, (2005:) detailed that issue 
of difference in within community (for example, Rose, 1997; Secomb, 2000; Young, 1990), 
and others had concluded, some fifteen years ago, that community is a social construct to be 
variously and continuously negotiated, for example, Cloke et al, 1997; Day, 1998; Goodwin et 
al, 1995; Mackenzie and Dalby, 2003.  This model of a community as a network, constructed 
through numerous factors resonates easily with an ANT perspective.  Panelli (2005) is 
convinced by the commonality at the core of the community and identified that some authors 
concentrate on place-specific or territorial communities (for example, Mackenzie and Dalby, 
2003; Rodriguez, 1999; Staheli and Thompson, 1997), whereas other authors have focused on 
communities that can be stretched beyond immediate, single, place-specific locations (Allen 
and Hamnett, 1995; Gandy, 2002; Miller, 1993).  She also draws attention to the imagined 
community, the State, ethnic and sectarian affiliations.   
Herein the SLSM model needs some construct that can be operationalised within the 
model.  Only by containerising the multiplicity of definitions of community and yet 
acknowledging the inherent flux with those many and varied manifestations, can this be 
achieved.  In a mining context, all of these categories as outlined above apply and all have a 
relationship to the mine.  As we have seen represented by the representation of Bear Creek 
previously in this thesis, corporate sector refers to directly and indirectly affected communities.  
The binary division has, as supported by both the author's direct experience and the broad swath 
of academic literature, often represents a narrative designed to reduce financial liability on 
behalf of the mine corporation.  The problems inherent in defining community can be 
illustrated by some of the author's experience working on a mine in northern Liberia.  
Discussions with the tribal landowners who own the forest in which the mining concession was 
based, had to be postponed.  Some of the local forest people could attend but two of the key 
tribal chiefs had to fly in from the USA on their private jets to undertake the negotiations.  
Seeing the community as simple uneducated forest people would have been challenged again 
when one of the negotiators turned out to be a professor in mathematics.   
Relationships and affiliations are complex.  The forests in question contain great wealth 
not just in terms of land but in terms of the timber assets and threats in terms of zoo viruses.  
Similarly, in Somaliland, the issues around land and the wild camels roaming the desert had to 
wait on the arrival from Canada of those that own the camels.  Camels represent a lucrative 
industry in terms of being sold to the middle east.  Even relatively poor communities in the 
global south should be assumed to have aspects of their community that are not spatially located 
on-site.   
The difficulty with communities is that they are hard to define, and they sometimes are 
stable before a mining corporation arrives with extensive resources and capabilities of 
removing extensive livelihood resources.  Sometimes communities are not stable, and this 
presents another type of problem for the corporation.  This thesis needs to acknowledge the 
role of elites and elite "capture" of community in social licence conflict.  Enabling and 
supporting communities to create institutions is a "critical process" in stabilising social licence 
as argued by MacCallum and Proctor (2019).  This is a process, not an event and the difficulty 
here is that this has a temporal as well as a spatial component.  They detail some of the 
complexities recognising that elites must form part of any social licence settlement.  This 
results in terms of building a functional relationship between the mining corporation and 
communities depend on the quality of the institution-building as these institutions are the 
mechanisms to encapsulate and accommodate community elites.  The institutions must be 
protected from total elite capture, although it is inevitable elites will be involved and 
functionally an imperative this is the case.  Elite capture occurs when these powerful 
individuals take control or alter the delivery of public goods and services, usually at the expense 
of others (Araujo et al, 2008 in Kita 2019).   
Kita describes two separate types of elite capture in terms of community process, elite 
resistance, where there is elite co-option or control; and elite capture, where there is elite 
exclusion.  Kita's concise synopsis of the typography of attitudes to elite capture in delivering 
public goods and services delivers a series of dichotomies, they are either bad or good, seen as 
useful or divisive and cites Wong (2010, 2013) in asserting, " that the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, since elites can be co-opted and challenged in the same setting" (Kita 
2019:138).  This is the key to the "critical process" working, local elites must be involved and 
to work transparently with less powerful actors in the community a mechanism that meshes 
with the creation of iterative translations in ANT terms.  There must be benefits for all and 
communication must be of high quality both ways between institution and mine.  To enable 
this to happen requires a significant investment from the corporation over an extended time to 
ensure they remain flexible should elite categories slip or shift.  There must be a strategic 
commitment to this approach and support for those tasked with implementing it.  Creating 
mechanisms for dealing with elite resistance may be best done in practical terms before they 
have something to resist.    
      The political settlement as a concept can be utilised at a non-State level and has 
intrinsic, continual change built in.  As such it is a more concrete analytical framework to 
represent SLO that ANT alone, although the use of ANT moves us away from what has been 
the traditional techno-scientific frameworks for analysing SLO failure, augmented by a range 
of normative terms.  Fredricksen (2019) identified the innovative use of a political settlement 
framework in terms of mining in Zambia.  That Zambia is a developing nation recovering from 
colonialism may be not insignificant.  The political nature of SLO may be more exposed in 
localities with such history.  Similarly in Peru, Pósleman and Sallan's (2019) work reference 
the Confederación Campesina del Perú, a political movement of which mobilised rural 
populations over the last 40-50 years.  That kind of institution is priceless in terms of preparing 
communities to engage in meaningful dialogue with the State and mining corporation.  
      In detailing both the limits and the opportunities for creating a new model of social 
licence predicated on the "political settlement model", the range of relationships between 
actants, to represent a stable "social order" within a nation-state are framed.  Having established 
the potential utility of a new conceptual model for a social licence, even given its many inherent 
failings, the actants and the relationships that drive the model are defined. This new "Social 
Licence Settlement Model (SLSM) builds on current, established approaches to determining 
the components and relationships of a political settlement.    
Khan says clearing in terms that illustrate the utility the term might have within the 
context of this thesis that "a political settlement is a description of the "social order" that 
describes how a society solves the problem of violence and achieves a minimum level of 
political stability and economic performance for it to operate as a society"(2010:20).   Khan 
(2010, 2018) uses political settlement as a platform for illustrating the relationships of key 
groups within society and drew criticisms form those who viewed political settlement as 
exclusively applicable term, to national-level relationships within the state.  This criticism of 
using the term to explore a range of relationships and defining an outcome other than relating 
to the nations state was crystallised in Tim Kelsall's critique of Khan's 2018 paper.  Kelsall 
criticises Khan's position that “[a]ll that is required for the existence of a political settlement is 
that the system is able to reproduce, which by definition means that the levels of economic 
performance or political violence are sustainable in that system” (Khan.  2018:636). 
Largely the criticisms are semantic, the Oxford English Dictionary definitions of 
‘politics’ and later ‘settlement’ (Kelsall 2018:659) being applied to dismember Khan's use of 
the political settlement term.  Also, Kelsall's critique fails to acknowledge that violence is ever-
present to some degree within every political ecosystem and that its presence does not negate 
a political settlement, dependent of course on one's definition of violence.  Kelsall rejects the 
proposition that the ‘Political Settlement’ term can be utilised to imply a situation where 
violence is "sustainable" but does accept that, “[a] settlement in a human context implies some 
degree of agency, even if heavily constrained” (ibid:660).   He offers up a definition of Political 
Settlement as, “(1) an ongoing, conflict-ending agreement among powerful groups, around (2) 
a set of political institutions and a distribution of power, expected to deliver, (3) an acceptable 
distribution of benefits” (Ibid:662). 
      This conceptual framework works within the context of this thesis, if we were to 
envisage the settlement as a mine obtaining and retaining a social licence to operate and 
bastardise the concept of political institutions, replacing it with defined entities which are 
engaged spatially, financially, or politically with the mine.  In doing this, it becomes then a 
"social licence settlement".  The difference between Kelsall's construct of political settlement 
and the social licence settlement model is only that of how one defines political institutions.   
Kelsall's representation of his model of political settlement (Ibid:667), is illustrated in Figure 
3-4.  It offers few clues to the balancing process necessary within the defined political 
ecosystem and very little representation of the relationships between actants, or no doubt as he 
would prefer, political actors.    
 
Figure 3-4 The social configuration of the political settlement  
     This current debate about the structural components, the social configurations, and 
relationships in an established academic model of political settlement, illustrates the potential 
currency in the approach used in this thesis of defining entities and then creating a framework 
for them to be represented in relationally.  It also points to such a visual model not necessarily 
having to be a mechanistic, determinative device but rather a tool to represent complex 
interrelations.  As stated at the beginning of this chapter this thesis will detail assemblages, 
actants and critical relationship aspects within a model and they will be represented by a range 
of icon.    
     In dealing with the construct of Political Settlement in the context of an SLO and 
demonstrated that there is precedence within the academic literature for using it to try and 
explain SLO.  It details that an SLO settlement model is an attempt to represent an assemblage; 
a way to represent the dynamic change of continual social interaction in a given space, moving 
beyond tired theoretical binary propositions in representing social reality.  Social licence 
arrangements, like the rest of social reality, are continuously evolving.  That has implications 
both for the construction of the Social Licence Settlement Model (SLSM) and in the 
management approach needed to address real-world social licence situations if this model is to 
be used to try and understand social reality and deliver management.  ANT theory gives an 
opportunity through the fusion with a political settlement framework to move beyond either a 
reductionist or binary approach in addressing social licence and represent this complex reality.  
The fusion of ANT and an established political settlement concept, move the new model 
beyond most models, most obviously, in that the State plays a pivotal role.    
    In scoping political settlement, the thesis refers to the seminal works of Mushtaq Khan 
on the definition of political settlement and the challenge from Kelshal.  The challenges by 
Kelshal on the scope of the political term demonstrate that within both the academic literature 
and political practice there is precedence for local-level actors being central to a sub-national 
settlement defined as a political settlement.  That reflects the position taken herein.  The 
position taken in this thesis is that the new Social Licence Settlement Model (SLSM) is set, as 
discussed earlier, at a meso level but that all actants have agency if heavily constrained in their 
choices.   
      The theoretical approach herein will never arrive at a perfect representation of reality 
and certainly never be beyond reproach or challenge, given the width of the theoretical net 
needed to catch the totality of social realities.  An example of this is Kita's (2019) work 
representing how within one of the adopted theoretical "containers' used in the model, that of 
communities, elites although critical to communities' agency can take on a range of different 
forms of relationship with the wider body.  Similar argument tearing at the fabric of the model 
can be made for all the other containers used in the model.  The model does however serve to 
represent, the structured and multifaceted relationships between containers.  This in turn 
provides an opportunity for these relationships to be challenged and explored.  From a 
theoretical perspective within the social licence literature, this represents a new starting point 
and one which has the potential to offer a range of new areas of investigation.  As a concept, 
social licence settlement model has also the potential to be taken out of its heavy theoretical 
heavy setting and applied by practitioners that offering utility to the mining industry.    
3.5 Opening up Notions of Space. 
     The constraints on mining company agency in the field, what they do operationally 
and how, concerning the securing of and then the maintenance of a social licence, reflects on 
what might be termed as institutional constraints or those that are intrinsic to the process.  These 
constraints are not just fiscal but are also created and framed through the received wisdom of 
threats to social licence and ontologically in terms of how information from the field is 
collected, processed, and understood by the mining corporations.  This section identifies the 
temporal aspect driving flawed assessments undertaken by the mining corporation for making 
decisions around the social licence.  Through introducing the imperative to resolve social 
licence failure in the EU, this section has defined the context for the doctorial field research 
which has been used to test an aspect of the new social licence settlement model generated in 
this thesis.  Through detailing some of the most prescient pressures on the social licence 
assemblage there is an introduction to this new model as a meso level political settlement.  
Looking at the potential utility of this approach to generate a tool to enable industry and the 
state to understand social licence failure, through the balancing of the many 
interests/relationships of the various containerised participants or actants, it explains that the 
totality of relationships, drive agency.   
By investigating and demonstrating that there are precedents for using an ANT approach 
to investigate industrial performance problems, this section attempts to knit various theoretical 
concepts together so that it might illustrate how the presently referenced social licence 
conceptual frameworks, fail to enable effective analysis.  Thus, the need for the pyramid of 
theory approach and the deployment of a political settlement type framework.  This meso level 
theoretical model is justified and by identifying the critical aspect in the Bear Creek tribunal as 
a failure on behalf of the corporation to recognise the critical nature of the indirectly affected 
communities, points to the definition of the project boundary as problematic.  This justifies 
further the utility of an ANT approach which pitches the model at a Meso level, represents 
actants operating (exhibiting agency) with links between local and national level politics, yet 
opens up the notion of "boundary" or physical space.    
3.5.1 Starring into the abyss.    
   In reframing SLO and utilising a framework grounded in social theory, building on the 
mixed theoretical approach of the defined pyramid, rather than a business theory analytical 
approach., there are benefits for academia and industry.  Project complexity is a subject for 
investigation within the academic business literature yet, although recognising the importance 
of social context, these approaches are ill-equipped to either portray or investigate it.  
Poststructuralist geography approaches with a focus on polysemy, provide a means of 
investigating this phenomenon.   More specifically the utility of Assemblage Theory can 
support the analysis of critical relationships to a mine operation.  Such an approach enables 
non-human actors to be considered within a meso level model of agency, reflecting Gidden’s 
view, in a new political settlement model of social licence, taking cognisance of Turner’s 
synthetic model for conflict.   
The new model for social licence needs to present a mine project or operation as an 
assemblage/or punctuated network and explores the iterative nature of the renewal of the 
relationships that create that assemblage.  This then illustrates that the other components of the 
social licence settlement model, Community, State, INGO and Lender primarily, can be 
similarly represented and crafted.  It is important to define why this type of poststructuralist 
geography approach is utilised rather than an engineering, business or some orthodox project 
management or scientific methodology to investigate social licence in mining.   
The dominance of tactical approaches to achieving and maintaining a social licence is 
increasingly accepted as ineffectual (Thomson, Kemp, Owen).  Corporate mining’s tactical 
engagement in "development" of localities or communities where they are involved, has 
traditionally had a focus on productivity and economic growth locally. This echoes the failed 
neoliberal overseas aid programmes in the Global South, of the 20th century, similarly 
"delivered" by those oblivious to or contemptuous of indigenous knowledge systems.  In 
contrast, an emerging approach to SLO is for the mining sector to assume the role of a 
"development partner" notably in the Global South (World bank 2018).  That said, the 
"development" approach within the aid sector, is being increasing superseded by a more 
human-centric position based on influential thinkers like Sen (Deneulin and Stewart 2002), 
who stressed the need for development assistance to focus on supporting people's capabilities, 
where their lives unfold.  Understanding capabilities is about understanding the relationships 
between communities, livelihoods, culture, and the locale.   
3.5.2 A question of complexity. 
Abdou, Yong and Othman’s (2016:1) address the notion of project complexity from a 
traditional business management perspective.  They detail project complexity through a 
technological and organisational prism and recognise that project complexity has a negative 
influence on project management processes, particularly on a project's performance.  Their 
paper is very useful, in that not only does it precis numerous business models for managing or 
mapping complexity but it recognises that context and temporal aspects are critical to 
measuring project complexity.  It is useful to recognise that within traditional business models 
this field is rarely considered.  As discussed previously, the temporal aspect is significant in 
terms of mine site development.  None of the models used in Abdou, Yong and Othman's 
(2016) paper appear to be engendered with a tool to map social context nor its relationship to 
the project.  Their paper highlights several truths from the business world about risk 
management that must be reflected on, firstly recognising that mapping communities and social 
realities are outside the business realm of management.  The business sector is not equipped to 
evaluate nor understand the relationships that are critical to social licence and they have no 
effective framework for understanding even what to measure.  This failure is significant in the 
real world.  Communities are part of "the project" and understanding communities and their 
relationship to the locale, is critical to being able to understand project complexities where 
mine corporations are embedded and reliant on the consent of the communities.  From a 
management perspective and to subsequently understand project risks, so that they might be 
mitigated, some form of metric needs to be adopted.  Current failures of SLO and the need to 
address it from a business perspective may be the driver to develop social specialists within the 
mining sector and for corporations to start taking social specialists seriously.  Ongoing work 
by the author and colleagues in terms of defining social parameters for risk within the mining 
industry and linking that to mine valuations systems are the start of an industrial process.  The 
industry needs to both recognising that aspects of social licence are beyond the control or 
comprehension of the company and that to maximise financial value from the asset, requires 
the involvement of social specialists.  If community voices are not heard and understood, 
logically the mine corporation in trying to create the balance necessary for a social licence 
settlement, is in effect a hostage to fortune.  Community voices that are "external" to the 
corporate table, appear to be significant to outcomes regarding mining profitability and 
viability.    
3.6 A Poststructuralist Paradigm.    
     Thompson and Joyce (2016) addressed the changes facing society and the mining 
sector as a part of wider society adjusting to new concepts of sustainability.  Sustainable mining 
is an oxymoron, yet in terms of sustaining the lifestyle and global economies, mining is 
something society cannot do without.  Given the decay or failure of many of the sureties of 
business analysis around mine production, reflecting changes brought about, through a range 
of international, social and governance changes, wider poststructuralist geography is the 
perfect tool of choice for developing a working model of social licence to operate.  The 
engagement of human beings within space, often with very diverse perspectives on the use of 
a specific geographical space, mean that poststructuralist geography is an appropriate tool to 
analyse the interrelatedness of the attendant concepts to the matter in question.   
William’s (2005) elucidates this position of the poststructuralist investigator, “the 
assumption that scientific method is somehow pure, or objective is contrasted with values still 
at work in that assumption.  For example, the language of science and the forms used to justify 
it are analysed for false presuppositions, with respect to time, space, and reality (Deleuze), with 
respect to narratives of progress (Lyotard), with respect to ethical or epistemological neutrality 
(Foucault, Kristeva)” (Williams 2005).   As William’s indicates, the tools offered by 
poststructuralist geography are appropriate in terms of their, malleability, adaptability, and 
conceptual flexibility, whilst still offering us the possibilities of being able to draw conclusions.  
In addition to this overall approach, as defined earlier, this thesis clusters actors or rather actants 
into assemblages that incorporate people, practise, and non-human components (the mine 
itself).  It does this so that it is possible to create identifiable blocks of interest and make 
manifest the dynamic nature of the relationships involved in mining project development in 
terms of a social contract between key actants, defined in a wider web of relationships.  Using 
a paradigm from the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) approach, Assemblage theory, to create 
building blocks for social licence model, gives us a new lexicon and framework to understand 
what creates failure.  It also allows us to analysis aspects of what frames any such contract 
between parties.  As Demuijnck and Fasterling (2015:677), represented Kant’s view stated, 
“the contract metaphor is merely a hypothetical device designed to test the legitimacy of the 
government or of a particular rule.” In this case, the contract metaphor is a device for testing 
the legitimacy of the SLO for a mining company and recognises that that legitimacy is not a 
binary relationship with the community and Mine but part of a more complicated social system 
or agreement.    
Assemblage theory in unison with poststructuralist theory promotes an ontology that 
challenges the concept of systems as stable, organic wholes; besides, ANT offers an alternative 
ontology for understanding and defining entities that are composite in nature, bonded together 
in the fabric of impermanent relationships, see Cicmil, Hodgson, Lindgren, and Packendorff, 
(2009) and Latour (1987) for examples.  The mine as a conglomerate of all its relationships, 
equipment, capital governance of space, is an example of this.  Earlier discussion details the 
opportunity in this case for using such a "flat" ontology rather than exclusively working within 
a hierarchical theoretical paradigm which recognises the structural aspect to relationships.  This 
thesis conceptualises “the mining project”, with all its tendrils connecting component entities, 
many not located spatially in the project (mine) area, both as an actant and an Assemblage.  
Anchoring the analysis of social licence in this thesis to commonly understood coalitions, such 
as 'the Mine' "the Community", supports the potential for industry and government to use this 
form of analysis to develop recommendations for more effective Good International Industry 
Practice (GIIP), the standardised guidance that has emerged over the last few decades.   
This thesis gravitates towards Håvard and Wanvik (2017:437) on the utility of 
Assemblage Theory in terms of its supporting of, the levering open of conceptual space to 
facilitate the exploration of discourses underlying the project process.  There is opposition to 
this position, referencing Brenner and co-authors (2011) suggestion that utilising building 
block such as assemblages, blunts critical sensibilities.  The author rejects this position and 
echo’s Sage, Dainty, Brookes (2011) in that actors/actants/assemblages are defined by and 
through their networks.  There is a utility in applying this type of wide-ranging analysis and 
changing the very language of the analysis of conflict in mining.  The high levels of failure of 
existing risk assessment systems in mining, call for a new approach that can deliver remedies 
useful for the mining industry to obtaining and sustaining social licence to operate.  
Assemblage theory breaks from the established socio-scientific system approach underpinning 
business risk analysis.  It also contrasts with existing linear conceptualisations within the 
mining sector of the development of conflict around social licence, see Vanclay and Hann 
(2019).  This combination of post-structuralist geography with its core tenets, that reality is 
created through language and practice, combined with an aspect from Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT), Assemblage theory, provides a platform to analyse the manifold concepts underpinning 
the creation of knowledge informing critical decisions within mining sector operations.   
Portraying the mine as an “Assemblage” or indeed a network is recognising it as a 
complicated, multifaceted social and physical construct and consequently social licence, as one 
possible outcome or translation.  Defining what has been and is being iteratively created, in 
terms of relationships forged by corporate action but also in part by a range of external factors 
beyond the mine corporations’ control, is very useful in understanding some of the difficulties 
that arise with a social licence in the sector.   In ANT terminology, building on the inherent 
assumption that all networks are unstable, Punctualisation occurs.   Punctualisation refers to 
the concept that the whole network is greater than the sum of its constituent parts and as the 
networks build, synergistic capabilities are enabled; as networks fall apart, de-punctualisation 
refers to the collapse of networked capabilities as individual components struggle to pursue 
their individual goals separately.   
The mine as defined in this thesis is an actant when it acts, but simultaneously is a 
composite, an assemblage or network of interest, people, systems, objects, and places.  Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) elucidates the heterogeneous nature of actor networks.  Building on 
its semiotic origins, ANT grants all entities of a heterogeneous network the same rational, 
"semiotics is the study of order building and may be applied to settings, machines, bodies, and 
programming languages as well as text [because] semiotics is not limited to signs" (Akrich and 
Latour 1992:259).   
This ANT feature of attributing agency to non-human “things”, echoes a much earlier 
term that was introduced to English by Ralph Cudworth in 1678 as “Hylozoism”; the 
philosophical point of view that matter is in some sense alive although the concept dates back 
much further back into time, at least as far as the Milesian school of pre-Socratic philosophers 
(Long, H.S.,1980).  A common notion of both this concept and modern ANT theory is that of 
inanimate objects or articles having a connection to that around them.  With ANT, this is more 
of a collective, self-supporting yet transient connection rather than anything "hardwired" as 
with the earlier term.  There is a spatial component to a mine but within Assemblage Theory, 
the mine itself can now be examined as a social construct, more than a large hole in the ground, 
extraction business, investment or community boon or malady.      
     The mine’s existence is internationalised through a variety of processes, due to 
lenders, consultants servicing the sector or the endpoint for the commodity, to name but a few 
examples.  These international consultants produce Texts, which in ANT terms are documents 
used to support the techno-scientific realities.  ANT refers to obligatory points of passage 
(OPP) that are critical network channels.  They are often designed by the primary actor, the 
lenders, the mine, or the State, to ensure communication must pass through his or her domain.  
That is, through obligatory passage points, actants become functionally indispensable to the 
network.  Only when the social licence to operate fails do key OPP within the community 
reveal themselves.    
3.7 Failures in the Assessment Process.    
    Local consent or social licence to operate is amorphous and granted on an iterative 
basis, by initially identified, directly or sometimes indirectly affected communities (See Kemp, 
Worden and Owen 2016, Conde and Le Billon 2017, Andrews et al 2017).   There is then, both 
a temporal and spatial aspect to the relationships underpinning social licence to operate, yet 
assessment of social risk is generally frontloaded in terms of mining projects development.  By 
this it is meant, the social impact assessment process is one that begins after mine plans have 
been developed and before major operations begin to construct the mine.   In some ways, the 
extractive industry could learn from the security sector, undertaking rolling threat assessment 
reviews, across time, encompassing the behaviours and exposure of adjacent similar or 
analogous industries (Reniers, Herdewel, and Wybo, 2013).  Currently, within the mining 
sector, there is an industry approach that makes a social risk assessment as a snapshot in time, 
anticipated "flare-ups" for the community in response to environmental impacts which have 
social ramifications.  Failures in social licence illustrate the inadequacy of current forms of 
pre-commencement analysis and present forms of mitigation of this type of risk, however one 
might define it.   
Andrews et al (2017) in the Canadian International Resources and Development Institute 
(CIRDI), is possibly the most comprehensive study to date on social licence conflict in the 
mining research is consistent in defining the conflict around a mining site as a process rather 
than an event.  One problem then is defining the temporal epicentre of the risk, when is the risk 
of failure most likely to impact.  The second problem is what assumptions to use in developing 
a useful model for understanding the anatomy of risk in general.  An early-stage risk 
assessment, undertaken when tensions are recognised, leaves us more properly referred to the 
conflict issues at hand as not risk, which is quantifiable and can be commodified, but 
uncertainty.  Whereas risk can be commodified and insured against, uncertainty has no value.  
There has already been extensive discussion in this thesis as to the issues raised in the 
definitions of both social risk and social licence to operate within current models.   
The conflict between communities and mines which are backed by reputable 
international investors, can produce reflected reputational damages on those investors.  As well 
as damaging the mine companies' reputation it can affect their ability to borrow from new 
lenders, potentially destroy the mine's viability and reducing its resale value and reduce 
associated reputable lenders proclivity to invest in that sector.  The mining products can be 
tainted and lose value; conflict minerals/gems are a well-established concept in popular culture 
with the likes of the 2006 Hollywood film Blood Diamond starring Leonardo DiCaprio and 
well documented (Amnesty International 2015) by civil and human rights NGOs.   The mine 
itself is a commodity and the value of that commodification depends on the success of a techno-
scientific packaging of factors that drive the social licence.  Slowly the sector is being 
compelled by economic drivers, towards encapsulating business risk from social aspects of 
operations.    
Examining the temporal aspect or relationships between actants is crucial to 
understanding how SLO is created and maintained.  Exploring how ANT can be used to 
introduce a temporal dynamic will support this thesis in introducing a concept of change related 
to the securing of, maintenance of and loss of SLO.  ANT engages with the heterogeneous 
nature of actor-networks and building on its semiotic origins, ANT grants all entities of a 
heterogeneous network the same rational; "semiotics is the study of order building and may be 
applied to settings, machines, bodies, and programming languages as well as text [because] 
semiotics is not limited to signs" (Akrich and Latour 1992:259).   
This order, the assembling of the physical and the social, are all created in both space 
and time and change continually.  The Assemblages as discussed earlier, within Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) are defined or expressed as "translations” (Sage, Dainty, & Brookes.  2014) 
where different actors engage with others and build alliances in the process defining their goals, 
opportunities, and risks.  Punctuation of the network is the result of an assembling or translation 
of reality that holds all the parts cohesively together.   In a social licence situation, it is arguable 
that that communities could be defined in ANT terms as obligatory passing points (OPP).  The 
OPPs are essential nexuses of the network process.  Setting for example early and sustainable 
discussions between Mine, State and Community from early in the establishment of the mine, 
is likely to be an OPP that supports the development of long-term settlement.  To reach this 
point would be a step to ensure the communities discussions and their introduction as an OPP 
does not disrupt the networks.  Similarly ensuring that the Community is a cohesive entity 
would logically protect the integratory of the system.  Shocks to any system that appears to 
offer a social licence, the entry of external actors, new technology, new events are all likely to 
disrupt the network.    
      Translations as expressions of existing Assemblages are subject to constant change 
with contemporaneously a process of both social and physical displacement.  In ANT, 
relationships exist between actants, and as defined earlier, these are not necessarily individuals 
or aggregated individuals (groups) but can also be inanimate objects or processes (Latour 
1987).  The use of ANT to look at a mining project from a project management perspective 
pulls on ANT's ability to map objects and processes as "real" entities.  "Real" in this case 
means, objects and processes are not just conceptualised but recognised as directly affecting 
the outcome of processes, they can create and contribute to change.  With an ANT analysis 
perspective, project management, as in the unrolling of a mining project, is considered a 
complex situation where relationships are enacted to achieve stability (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1987; Sage et al., 2011).  An important feature of ANT is that the actants play a prominent role 
in the 'translation' of processes, creating change.  Some of the defining points of ANT are that 
humans, objects, and processes play a part in the struggle to achieve resolution in the conflicts 
within a project and that actors are defined by their network (Sage et al, 2011).   
Changes over time, in whatever aspect of the network, resonate throughout the systems 
which explains why networks are critically dynamic and we experience this through the world 
being dynamic and changing.  Changes anywhere in the network have the potential to lead to 
major changes, not just in relationships of actant but to collapse of the existing status of the 
network.  Callon characterised this, “for example when actors in the network refuse to 
cooperate.  This leads to the destabilization of alliances as “translation becomes treason” 
(Callon 1986:15).  Callon here draws on a common maxim detailing, that when we try to 
translate words and phrases between languages, translation is in theory, impossible.  One 
cannot convey all the meaning(s) in the original text whilst also transferring all its aesthetics, 
because there are too many differences of meaning between languages.  In a sense, Callon is 
detailing that once the relationships that create meaning change, translation of the existing 
situation becomes a process which ends with a new result, a new reality, or the web of 
relationships.    
Within the complex web of relationships, the process of alliance-building is further 
carried on with the crumbling of existing networks.  The “liberated” actors, those freed from 
the gravity of previous events and networks, like electrons from and nucleus, tend to construct 
their own (new) networks.  This dynamic of, new order creation, whilst the old order crumbles, 
explains the processes which this thesis contends can be characterised as the interaction of 
actors in and around the mine project.  In ANT theory, network elements that change or diverge 
are converted to inscriptions or immutable mobiles.  These are textual, cartographic, or visual 
representations that, remain relatively stable through space and time, define, and assign roles, 
and create new realities through being mobilised and/or circulated through translation.  
Inscriptions or immutable mobiles may, for example, be narratives about the situation 
previously, that can be passed around the network, in turn being assigned new values and 
meaning.   
As some networked possibilities are realised other sets of networked possibilities always 
become unrealised or unrealisable.  Translations order and produce society and agency, nature 
and the machine of reality.  The process of translations which occurs over time drives the 
machine that is reality, through a process of converting entities, and/or generating new entities 
capable of substitution or simplifying and condensing, while retaining difference.  Translation 
is both a practice of making equivalents and an outcome with realised effects and the 
displacement of alternative possibilities, comprehended from the perspective of the translator.  
This can result in what is called a   simplification.  These simplifications or black boxes, 
translate network elements into a single block while retaining difference, support actors to 
determine their relationships to the network.   
Networks characterised by a high level of convergence amongst actors are those that 
demonstrate agreement resulting from similar translations.  In an SLO sense, a community that 
is happy to have a mine extract resources and where all actants feel there is a significant mutual 
benefit, new translations of reality, will result in little change.  All the main 
actants/assemblages are seeing a similar world, or all are seeing versions of reality that coalesce 
and underpin the stability of the system.  Converged networks are both highly aligned and 
coordinated whereas divergence of translations amongst actors, augers conflict.  Alignment 
describes the level to which networks are defined by a common history and a shared space.  
Coordination refers to the processes that develop a shared adoption of the convention, 
codification, and translation regiments.   
Networks which are closely converged may also demonstrate strong irreversibility.  The 
level of irreversibility demonstrated in a network defines actors’ capacity to occupy a previous 
iteration of the network, as well as determining how valid are the subsequent translations for 
participating actors.  Tightly converged and highly co-coordinated networks are, in other 
words, those that are simplified through translation.  Simplified networks resulting in single-
point actants are characterised as being punctualised or black-boxed.  Punctualisation, is 
similar to the idea of encapsulation in object-oriented programming.  Only when the network 
breaks down do individual components come into view.  A positive relationship between 
communities and mining corporations in a locality with a shared history of low impact, high-
value mining and stable society might be characterised in this way.  Depunctualisation – is the 
opening of the box, the collapse of the established order, perhaps only when a social licence 
settlement breaks, does it become apparent what was keeping it in existence.   Punctualised 
networks are considered only in terms of their input and output and are an established reality 
or are counted as an asset.  All established reality, Black boxes included as a component, can 
be revisited, opened, and revised.   
ANT terms as we can see here, deal with the constant change in realities and attempt to 
package up generic factors that support that change process.  Networks require continual 
maintenance as the order is always provisional and changes in one aspect of the network can 
sweep through a network system.  Networks are dynamic alliances and subject to possible 
actors or actants, leaving or joining.  Temporary stabilisation of a network, which is all that is 
possible temporally, involves the ability to dismiss alternative anti programs which arise 
through testing of the validity of claims and the effectiveness of a spokesperson.  A 
spokesperson is an actant that can speak on behalf of others, animals or machines who cannot 
speak, or groups of people defer to the spokespersons.  Deferring may be active, passive or just 
non-contested and utilised by the spokesperson.  Spokespersons simplify networks of and to 
others, by articulating their interests, attributing roles and identities, and proposing courses of 
action.  Outside actants can challenge a network's spokesperson on grounds of validity, 
reliability or on the grounds of their legitimacy to represent or on the grounds of truth.   This 
strategy suggests that to understand how actor-networks are formed, the researcher must 
examine how the trajectories of (sociotechnical) encapsulations enable (or prevent) specific 
types of knowledge (literacy practices) within specific contexts.  By this is meant, how the real-
life processes surrounding mining in a specific locality, enable the processes of getting 
environmentalists, geologists, engineers, and occasionally social scientist on-site to create 
knowledge.   
The key idea is that if we understand literacy as the ability to enact, perform and engage 
in coordinated practices that recruit both social and technical resources (Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Hutchins, 1995), sociotechnical encapsulation reveals itself as a fundamental characteristic of 
literacy.  Socio technical encapsulation is the process of how those with accepted technical 
expertise package up the locality.   Callon draws attention to how significant the role of 
technologists can be in defining the truth, both in encapsulating and as spokespersons.  
Working with the mining sector, it is difficult to not think of those international contractors 
known as FIFOs (Fly in Fly out) undertaking scoping and environmental and social impact 
assessments as contractors to the mine corporation and lenders;  “[m]ore than any other kind 
of actor, technologists maybe sometimes endowed with the capacity to construct a world, their 
world, to define its constituent elements, and to provide for it a time, a space, and a history” 
(Callon 1986b:21).    
Whether or not that sociotechnical version of the truth resonates with those living locally 
will determine how successful translations are or if they can be suppressed.  Horowitz (2011) 
applied this analytical framework and used the sociology of translation to account for the 
shifting and conflict-ridden relationships between an indigenous protest group in New 
Caledonia on the one hand, and urban-based, environmentalist grassroots organisations, a 
human rights lawyer, the mining company, and the provincial government, on the other.  
Horowitz’s article expands ANT capabilities by showing how it can be used to analyse the 
power dynamics demonstrating on how translations are successful or get suppressed, and how 
the success or failure of their alignment, shapes the alliances created by these translations.  The 
basic insight offered by Horowitz demonstrates the utility of an ANT ontology for studying 
conflicts which are driven by different views of a threatened ecosystem by actants, brings 
together a dynamic interaction of a variety of actant, is the following: T 
his tension between a desire by one actant to achieve their aims, and the necessity of 
working with those who do not share them.  He demonstrates how making alliances, and the 
power they entail or contain, is a tenuous and fluctuating process, and is at constant risk of 
collapse (Horowitz 2011:5).   Meaning in ANT theory is created through network interaction.  
Latour (1996) utilises the notion of quasi-object as something that is created through 
interactions and holds meaning.  He said, “If choosing words for the network-tracing activity 
has to be done, quasi-objects (Serres 2007) or tokens might be the best candidate so far.  It is 
crucial for the definition of the term that what circulates and what makes the circulation be 
both co-determined and transformed” (Ibid:16).  Returning to the spatial component and 
recognising, that for the mining corporation as well as, directly and indirectly affected 
communities, location is central to how social licence in mediated.   
      Current practice in utilising a social-technical assessment methodology constructed 
to investigate the impacts radiating out from the proposed or existing mine maps the social and 
environmental landscapes, utilises a Cartesian analytical format, even when measuring culture.  
A focus on the quantitative; how much, rather than how important and to whom, underpins the 
metrics utilised through this sociotechnical lens.  There is little opportunity to capture beliefs, 
values, traditional practices, or concepts of how space is governed but rather a focus on how 
an already defined project will impact on the locality, who owns it and financial compensation.  
The impact is viewed as quantitative and usually environmental in nature.  The closer to the 
centre of the mine project a community lives, the more legitimacy is attached to their views on 
impacts.  Yet as we have seen with the Bear Creek determination in the previous chapter, this 
does not mean those further away have no legitimacy.    
3.7.1 Concepts of space and place. 
      A geographic community or network linked to a mining project generates tokens or 
quasi-objects through interactions and the process of generating a punctuated network.  A token 
in ANT terms is something that transforms those it engages with it and crucially is moved 
around the network.  Similar, to how a football might be used in a game between teams.  
Without the ball the game would be meaningless, engagement with the ball transforms the 
actants who are the teams and the players.  Engagement with the token offers opportunities and 
risk for actants.  If the local issues, social and environmental concerns, and factors around 
mining legitimacy create a token which legitimises, for example conflict, that token has the 
power to transform all those that engage with it.  The further that the token can move away 
from the spatial nucleus of the network and retains its currency or potency, by linking into 
other networks, the more risk there is to the stability of the network.  An example of this would 
be when a geographical community manage to engage an international NGO through a conflict-
related issue around mining and the environment.  The conflict token becomes part of a wider 
network and the risk to a mining settlement is increased.  In ANT terms, this provides an 
opportunity for a new spokesman.  Environmental, economic, and social justice issues that 
drive anticipated gains or anticipated losses by the community, are constantly redefined within 
the new narratives emerging from the network.  Reality is redefined/remade through the 
reification process as the token moves between actants.  Aspects of the narrative become 
increasingly punctualised within the translations and are harder to depunctualise the further 
away, in spatial terms, the token is used.  Narratives developed with local legitimacy are 
difficult to challenge, the further on is from the epicentre, spatially or temporally.    
       Physical space and its conceptualisation concerning the mining project is important 
as outlined in the previous chapter and the example of Bear Creek Corporation.  The latter’s 
failure to engage with indirectly affected communities cost them some USD 504million.  This 
notion of direct and indirectly affected conceptually opens of a range of theoretical constructs 
of the mine boundary.   Challenging established reality is harder the further one moves from 
the epicentre of creation, possible why a prophet is never welcome in their own land, where 
the challenge may be easier.  Escobar (2001) beautifully outlines the exclusion and 
reintroduction of locality and ‘place’ into wider social theories, demonstrating the link between 
culture, self and location as outlined at the start of this chapter.  Moles (2017: 2), crystalises 
the importance of place in recent social theory; “As such, we should understand Lefebvre’s 
lived spaces (1991), Foucault’s heterotopia (1986), bell hook’s homeplaces and Bhabha’s 
(1991) third space as part of the Third-space adopted” and utilises Soja (1996) concept to build 
a space defined to the actor by engagement on numerous levels.  There is no direct translation 
between the Third-space concept and Foucault’s heterotopia but there is a coalescence of 
purposes that may be useful here, to illustrate that place, culture, identity, and sense must be 
seen by theorists as integral.  Mining projects and those working within that assemblage and 
its translations, see their project as "central" and other spaces as marginal.  This notion of 
marginality for some and not for others is well highlighted by Hetherington.    
‘… [T]hese may be places on the edge of things … but they can also be spaces right at 
the centre of things, spaces in which the State or big business may … choose to surround … 
with barbed wire, police dogs and tear gas.  They may also be insignificant, everyday sites that 
are only made visible by what unusual goings on may be seen to occur there.  In other words, 
they may be margins at the edge, margins at the centre, or transparent margins that are 
normally hidden from view.   ’ (Hetherington 1998: 130) 
This view of knowledge puts it beyond that which is captured by the practices of the 
‘FIFO’ transient workers on mining projects, feeding a standardised Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment.  Undoubtedly ANT through the associated lexicon has significant utility 
in describing the complex and multidimensional relationships and how they change over time.  
The difficulty is unless that is shackled or anchored to concepts which are less mutable the 
thesis could end up without a working model or a model that at least can be used to represent 
relationships.  Horowitz's (2011) research defined the tensions between actants and the process 
of brokering precarious alliances.  It is arguable that balancing acts allow a social licence to be 
part of the continual translation or assemblage can be best portrayed in terms of a meso-level 
political settlement made visual.  Knowledge creation from a techno-scientific perspective 
utilising 'external" people, results in static assumptions that do not represent the relativity of 
local people.  Political legitimacy and the complex web of relationships derived from a close 
spatial connection to a locality, enables the generation of tokens surrounding the environment.  
This is highly likely around environmental conflict in the mining sense.  In more globalised 
work, conflicts over visions of reality between communities and corporations, indigenous 
knowledge and techno-scientific knowledge are inevitable.    
3.7.2 International knowledge creation.    
      Investigating the operations of mine corporation and developing a model to 
encompass a range of mining situations, requires us to recognise that there is a wide range of 
sites or operation, varying differently from continent to continent.  Developing a model that 
can operate across these multiple domains, compounded by mine corporations themselves often 
being complex multi-continental entities, is only possible if we utilise types of ontologies that 
can function across these domains.  It is also important to recognise that a locale in the case of 
the mine site, is usually in some remote rural venue, becomes the centre for major international 
investigation usually by external actants.  This internationalisation brought about as capital, 
knowledge creation practices and people from outside the immediate vicinity of an ore body 
or whatever other substance is being mined, has the potential to link “the mine” into a range of 
conflicts as well as opportunities well beyond the local.  Mining in states other than those that 
are despotic, supports states to make manifest their hegemony with regards to regulating or 
permitting activities.  Most states have, if not exclusively owning it, a significant call on the 
underground minerals/resources, what we can represent here as the sovereign wealth.  This fact 
permeates all the literature on social licence and the existence of national and transnational 
“codes’ for determining the value of mining requiring state endorsement, supports this.  
Agyemang, Fantini and Ansong (2016) illustrate how in Africa the effectiveness of the state as 
a regulatory body will often be one of the major determinants of foreign ownership of mines.   
There is always a role for the state to play in articulating and modulating the relationship 
between those digging up the resource and those that are impacted on by that process.  Both 
the State and the Mine that rely on external investment capital, through the creation, 
deployment or representing of scientific knowledge, engage in an annual reification of science 
and truth of the mine locations reality, a reality endorsed by the state and lenders such as the 
World Bank, in a manner consistent to that defined by Latour.    Bruno Latour’s work, drawing 
on the work of Foucault, addresses both the, “epistemological and ontological problems in the 
production of scientific knowledge by interrogating how such knowledge is negotiated and by 
challenging the limited, anthropocentric domain of agency in accounts of materiality” 
(Woodward, Dixon and Jones 2009:7). 
Latour’s scientific truth, as all truths are, is invented and continually reworked and 
validated through iterative exchanges by those within the scientific community and in the case 
of mining and associated finance, that community is predominantly situated in the "global 
North".  Latour’s truth, like all, must be defendable and uncontestably, reified through 
engagement between those inventing the truth and those viewed as powerful and legitimate.  
As with all knowledge systems, any subsequent emergent challenges discourses are dependent 
on the existence of other forms of similarly manufactured pieces of knowledge which have 
been similarly validated.  If there is scientific evidence that noise from the mine is not damaging 
local people's health, any challenge to this truth must be supported by suitable evidence.  An 
inability to secure the resources to build such a case leads to challenges being largely ignored.  
New knowledge manufacture requires both time and resources.  In the event, that truth cannot 
be challenged by communities through their lack of access to appropriate resources, the roots 
of community conflict and social licence withdrawal are formed.  Models of conflict within the 
social sciences are as old as a social science.  Marxian, Weberian, and Durkheimian sociology 
have informed a range of more modern social theorist such as Bourdieu and Talcott Parsons 
and conflict has traditionally offered a rich platform for a range of analytical positions.  Turner 
developed a synthetic model, illustrated in Figure 3-5(2013:41), for conflict based on these 
forerunners, see Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-5.  They are particularly useful for understanding how 
communities responded within a mining context.   
 
Figure 3-5 Flow diagram of Turners synthetic model  
The key starting point in terms of this thesis from the above diagram is: "Level of 
inequality in the distribution of valued resources".   Within the terms of this thesis, his diagram 
might support the new model more if "perceived inequality" were to replace the level of 
inequality.  It is the perception of inequality and the relationship across all actants that 
destabilises the relationships that hold the social licence settlement together.  An increasingly 
robust global mining regulatory framework for undertaking social and environmental mapping 
of new and existing mine sites has developed in the last ten years (World Bank 2017, Costanza, 
J.  2016).  This framework sets the scene for the production Texts which we might define as 
acceptable narratives and these frameworks drive the creation and shape Texts for interpreting 
impact and risk are techno-scientific and highly internationalised.  These texts however can 
also be used as Tokens within an ANT analytical framework.  Tokens as described earlier are 
the quasi-objects created through the synergy of network punctualisation.  Their repeated 
creation strengthens and reifies the network.  Failure of constituent parts to perform their roles, 
whether material or human, and whether through incapacity or disinterest, leads to network 
breakdown and de-punctualisation.  Most recent advances by the likes of the influential, The 
London Metals Exchange, producing publications and guidelines on mapping Environmental 
and Social Governance (ESG) factors, utilise a range of existing risk mitigation methodologies 
(See FT1) that seeks, as those before, to identify drivers of potential conflict.   Conceptualising 
conflict as a Token explains how their repeated creation and use, strengthens, and reifies the 
network.   
Failure of constituent parts to perform their roles, whether material or human, and 
whether through incapacity or disinterest, leads to network breakdown and de-punctualisation.  
As tokens are quasi-objects, they are objects that are neither quite natural nor quite social and 
that derive their meaning with the network from their relationship with others.  The cascade of 
reports (texts) that move throughout the life of a mine (network) are also Tokens that, through 
their use are reified and represent a techno-scientific truth.  This sole truth is only broken when 
there are challenges to the social licence by the local community as the network fails to stay 
punctuated.   With nearly all project management and delivery approaches in the mining sector, 
stakeholder analysis, usually only happens at the commencement of projects or when there is 
a need to re-evaluate failing social licence processes.  It is interesting that the language of 
business, that of stakeholders, is used to capture communities which are external to the 
corporation.  Sage, Dainty and Brookes (2011:209), quoting Jepsen and Eskerod (2009) 
typified this failure to build a platform for relations within the project approach as, “mainstream 
stakeholder analysis usually only operates at the front-end of the project, as a basis for on-
going decisions and planning (Jepsen and Eskerod, 2009).”  
This approach is personified in Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) (see Owen and 
Kemp 2014) as GIIP (Good International Industrial Practice) and is driven by the need to 
legitimise mining against the challenge of the global indigenous movement (Sawyer and 
Gomez 2012 in Owen Kemp 2014:91).  That FPIC is the result of organised local protest on a 
global scale is held up by the evidence and the lawsuits.  Bear Creek Corporation Vs Republic 
of Peru (2018) is an excellent example of the financial imperative to driving both a clearer 
definition of SLO legally across jurisdictions and the penalties for failing to be seen to seek it.  
The corporation and its associates claimed damages of $522m but were awarded $18m because 
they had not gained a social licence with indirectly affected people.  This underlines the 
importance of undertaking and documenting measures to secure and maintain a social licence.  
Significantly this judgement was based on evidence that the company had not sought to gain 
access to, engage and effectively consult those indirectly affected communities.  By focusing 
on indirectly affected people, the judgement raises significant questions as to where the 
boundary of a project extends to.  With the FPIC protocols, consent is given at the start of 
mining operations and that consent is then used as a totem or Token, in ANT terms, to support 
the delivery of social licence throughout the life of the mine, with no need to revisit that consent 
given, unless the community threaten to revoke the SLO.  The reality of practice would likely 
mean there would have to be an ongoing process to placate lenders and possibly the State.  
FPIC is a requirement for GIIP where there are "indigenous peoples", and that definition is 
nationally given.   
This creation of reality through relationships is at the heart of a Social Licence Settlement 
Model, yet to try and create a useful tool rather than an amorphous network, a political 
settlement model framework has been adopted.    
3.8 Theoretical underpinnings of a new model. 
     This chapter in focusing on the need to address the widespread failure of existing 
social licence conceptualisation has constructed a whole new set of foundations for a new social 
licence settlement model.  The foundations have drawn on the strengths of the four defined 
theoretical positions that make up the pyramid to frame this new model.  Before detailing the 
reasons for a juxtaposing of industry produced and internationally validated techno-scientific 
quantitative truths with indigenous knowledge delivering social licence failure, there is a 
clarification on why it is essential to approach the issue at hand using a poststructuralist and 
ANT augmented framework.  Although sides of the pyramid are distinct, they all crucially 
connect and are interconnected.  Using aspects from the pyramid, constraints on mining 
company agency in the field can be outlined, illustrating how that reflects on established 
approaches to delivering a social licence.  Unpicking the temporal aspect to assessments 
undertaken by the mining sector for making those decisions, the combined theories suggest a 
social licence should be based on a political settlement paradigm, should be pitched at a meso 
level.  Regarding physical space, by identifying the critical aspect in the Bear Creek tribunal, 
as a failure on behalf of the corporation to recognise the critical nature of the indirectly affected 
communities, it points to define the project boundary as problematic.   
A mining company is, just like states and communities, constrained in its agency by 
factor outside of its control.  An industry such as mining, where mine company ownership is 
highly dispersed through stock bought and sold through, London, Toronto, and Sydney 
exchanges, has a range of constraints on long term agency.  As Fauziah, Yusoff and Alhaji 
detail clearly, “[i]n countries where ownership structures are dispersed, if the investors 
disagree with the management or are disappointed with the performance of the company, they 
use the exit options, which will be signaled through reduction in share prices” (2012:54).  If 
we look at how this western model of corporate governance effects mining companies’ ability 
to function, it effectively means that the sector is wedded to a business model that can only 
commit to short term engagement with the State and Community.  It is referred to here as 
“western” to identify that, it is by no means ubiquitous and that a Chinese and other State-
sponsored models of corporate governance also exist.  Once significant impediments to short 
term financial returns emerge within the western model, capital flight is almost inevitable once 
the share price starts to tumble, and investor's confidence departs.  Similarly, building a 
relationship through many years of investment in a rural community with the possible prospect 
of obtaining mining consent, is unlikely to support the company's share value.  Time matters, 
the temporal aspect to defining agency is a critical factor within an ANT analytical framework 
as there is a recognition of the lack of permanence within any social system.  Reflecting on 
reality within the mining sector; it takes time to build relationships with communities and to 
develop an understanding of critical issues for both the community and state.  It takes time for 
communities to process information, particularly about issues that which they may never have 
been exposed to.  The internal processes within communities that determine who has a voice, 
are significantly less proscribed than similar debates within a corporation or indeed a state.    
   More problematic with mining is that very often the major decisions in terms of how 
minerals might be extracted, are taken by those accessing the value of the mine as a mineral 
asset, many years before any engagement with local/host communities has occurred.  In 
practice the type of mining process used, underground or open caste, will be driven primarily 
by cost and only if there were substantial environmental or social challenges, is there likely to 
be a revisiting of the mining methodology.  Underground mining is generally seen as a more 
“acceptable” approach to communities compared to pit mining, however, the costs are higher.  
The selection of an approach may be driven by the marginal value of the minerals underground 
with little reference to the social acceptability of the approach.  It may, for example, be deemed 
by those constructing a mining project business plan, too expensive to employ a mining process 
that would have less social impact.  Within the EU, the increasing common failure of social 
licence by mining exploration companies trying to exploit State sovereign wealth has been 
linked to a variety of factors.  As has been reiterated again and again in the literature and this 
thesis, standard factors are driving SLO failure.  Notably the inability of mining corporations 
to invest in initiating early in the project development, long term dialogue designed to hear, 
capture, and develop over time, the voices of the civic challenge to the proposed mining 
activities.  This approach is documented as a process to positively shape the necessary 
relationships for a social licence settlement, leading to secure social licence and ultimately 
mine success (MacCallum and Proctor 2019).  The design of the field research underpinning 
this thesis, draws lessons from the conditions and necessary engendering factors that enable 
those community actors opposing the operation of a mine, to bring about the conditions where 
mine development or mineral production is stopped.  Setting the analysis of participants semi-
structured interviews within a post-modern geography framework of discourse analysis, whilst 
borrowing tools from Actor-Network Theory (ANT), this research aims to support the 
construction of and test a new model of social licence that can introduce a new lexicon and 
open discourse between those involved in mining, in a new direction.   
 
In constructing a model that supports a definition of social licence to operate that 
encapsulates some of these existing analytical concepts.  Such a definition for a social licence 
needs to move beyond present conceptualisations, away from one predicated on normative 
terminologies such as "trust" and away from theoretical approaches which view the social 
licence as the result of a dichotomy of relationships between a mine and a community.  
Mentioned before, divergent themes emerge within the literature on a social licence as it tries 
to incorporate these important but amorphous concepts such as trust, social acceptance, and 
risk.   The proposition to be harnessed is that those contingent events, actor perspectives and 
circumstances, are assembled and utilised by actors to both define their goals, opportunities, 
and risks.  That assemblage (social licence) is related to something that could best be defined 
as a political settlement at a meso level, rather than political settlement as it is normally applied 
at a state level between elites.  Menocal (2015), referencing Putzel and DiJohn (2012) draws 
heavily on the concept of the political settlement in defining policy frameworks for 
peacebuilding in a range of locations.  These are national settlements, but the policy framework 
analysis focuses on challenging elite linkages to violence at a community and State level and 
the balancing act between opposing elites deliver a political settlement.  The use of political 
settlement frameworks to analysis the agency of local actors within a wider context of national 
politics opens the door clearly for a political settlement to be used in defining relationships 
generating a social licence, particularly since the state is a pivotal and every present actant.    
  The poststructuralist analytical framework enables the recognition that language, wider 
society structure and social practice create the reality being investigated.  The nature of a 
poststructuralist geography approach focuses on polysemy, that is the plurality of meaning but 
specifically focusing on meanings and identities.  This section demonstrates why these types 
of ontologies are utilised, rather than an engineering, business or some orthodox project 
management or scientific methodology.   Those who utilise these other approaches have tried 
to design a regulatory framework to support social licence in mining and have been regularly 
unsuccessful.  This thesis touches on some of the inherent reasons for this failure, linking it to 
their choice of ontological framework.  This section demonstrated how others have also used 
an ANT approach to enable investigation of an industrial problem, the approach in that sense 
is orthodox.   Utilising ANT concepts of assemblage, actants, texts, punctualisation, obligatory 
passing points (OPPs), tokens and translations and unpacks them to define how they are being 
deployed herein, this section gives some examples of how this might relate to mining, notably 
around community conflict with the mine, that which is at the core of social licence.   The 
research details the aggregating of interests around the mine locality and operations and 
explains these in terms of an assemblage, defined as a meso level, political settlement.  The 
thesis moves on in the next section to deal with the political settlement concept in more detail.  
Social licence is neither purely local (micro) nor purely macro as an established political 
settlement model would dictate, yet has elements of both levels of institutional interplay, as 
well as being embedded locally in the social fabric of society.   
    Physically the model for a social licence needs to combine the variety of actants 
conceptualisation of space and embody an option for change linked to change over time.  The 
model can only be set in Thirdspace if it had to embrace the breadth needed for a model 
representing both a global and specific context.  The mine is an actant, when it acts but also a 
composite, an assemblage of interest, people, systems, objects, and places.   In its current form, 
the techno-social approach by the mining sector to dealing with potential social licence failure 
is evidently not capable of capturing or determining what is critical social data nor how to 
incorporate that missing form of knowledge into mine designs, to enable secure ongoing 
mining operations.  Admirable attempts are being made to design approaches for engaging and 
supporting communities hosting mines, to benefit from mining operations through notions of 
"shared value".  Whilst being useful in a practical sense, these approaches are hard to integrate 
within any viable theoretical model of social licence or indeed development.  The notion of 
"shared value" is very much a neoliberal, business approach to supporting local economic 
growth, echoing the failed aid delivery approaches to the global South.    
Chapter 4 Methodology and Research. 
4.1 Introduction. 
Underpinning the choice of research methodology was the desire to be able to utilise the 
research from this thesis to develop through its analysis, a more comprehensive and usable 
abstract model for social licence. Experience from the field made me aware that the lessons 
that were developed in locations that were not within what could be defined as the Global 
North, find little currency with those who hold the majority of capital within the mining 
industry who are based in the Global North. Developing a model using examples from the vast 
continent of Africa would have such a model labelled as “African.”  In a sense the choice of 
research locations was a happy coincidence of being able to tap into existing ongoing research 
across Europe with colleagues working on a European Union Horizon 2020 project (INFACT) 
exploring barriers to mining, and some great advice from Jon Russill (SRK Exploration), who 
pointed me to critical zones for minerals in Europe. Europe, at least partly dominated by the 
EU, the world biggest market, was preparing to launch a major investment framework aimed 
at decarbonising their economy (EU Green Deal), and would need to square the circle of 
increasing citizen militancy against with the need to extract critical minerals to drive their 
economy. The southeast of Europe with several countries at various stages of hatching from 
oppressive central controlled states, also happens to be a location rich in critical minerals. I 
was aware from previous work in the region, that mining had become, for some of those states 
a political “hot potato”. This prompted investigation which quickly crystalised around the 
difficulty that appeared to have developed around mining companies’ social licences, in what 
I term here as “new member states”, basically those recently joined to the EU. There was 
obviously some change in the social texture of society, and this appeared to coincide with the 
process of joining of the EU.  
4.2 Case Study Methodology. 
      In selecting a multiple case study approach supporting the analysis of broad societal 
factors driving loss of social licence, it was necessary to recognise certain constraints and 
opportunities.  Like so much in social science the very roots or values underpinning the concept 
of “case study” have been challenges.  Punch (2005:144) states that the case study ‘is more a 
strategy than a method’ and accepts that: almost anything can serve as a case, and the case may 
be simple or complex.  Vaivio, (2008) identified that during the writing process theory, 
research questions and data can seem detached.  There is little doubt however that the case 
study is a useful and widely accepted methodology in social sciences and despite a range of 
distractors or critiques, it persists as a methodological approach.  Punch (2005:144) describes 
the range of diversity regarding how the case might be defined.  It could be any congregation 
of people from an individual to a nation or indeed may be bounded by an event, process or 
decision, the range is boundless, so it is necessary for this thesis to create those boundaries, to 
define what we are looking at. 
      Stake (2005: 445), a leading proponent of the case study identified three main types 
of case study.  Intrinsic focusing on better understanding a particular case. Instrumental, 
creating the basis for a deductive logic to provide insight directly into an issue or as the basis 
of a generalisation. The last criteria, that of multiple or collective, focuses on more than one 
case simultaneously to investigate what he terms a “phenomenon, population or general 
condition’ (Ibid 445).  In a sense this thesis uses a hybrid between a multiple approach, as it 
uses two case studies, and instrumental, as it seeks to define, predict, and confirm a number of 
expected outcomes from the research data. The deductive aspects from the first case study 
frame and are challenged in the second, with the aim of verifying a particular aspect of social 
licence. 
4.3 Case Study One. 
This thesis uses two case studies.  Firstly, Rosa Montana mine development, set within 
the wider context of Romania and adjacent Bulgaria, both of which were either in or in the 
process of joining the EU, during the historic period under study.  This later factor is critical to 
the case study analysis.  The richness of material, academic, grey literature and legal documents 
released as part of an ongoing multibillion US dollar lawsuit between the mine developer and 
government of Romania provided a rich seam of evidence.  Romania and Bulgaria are seen as 
similar although they are very different jurisdictions politically and historically, but they are 
both now in the EU. Romania transitioned in during the Rosa Montana mine conflict, under 
investigation herein. 
4.4 Case Study Two. 
 Serbia mining sector in 2019 with a particular local focus on the mine complex at Bor 
and to a less extent the anthracite fields of Lavinitza, encapsulates Case Study two.  The period 
of study was as has been discussed later, during the initial period of EU ascension for Serbia. 
The case study boundary then is looking at the relationships identified as crucial in case study 
1 and this drove the field research Serbia.  The underlying question for participants was: as 
social licence issues manifested in Bulgaria and demonstrated through extensive 
documentation in Romania largely through the arrival or supranational environmental and 
social regulations, during the later stages and full implementation of EU legislative systems, 
are similar political, social, and ultimately social licencing challenges likely to arise in Serbia 
as it aligns with EU regulations? Yet another question: is Serbia as a nation prepared or 
equipped to deal with the challenges? 
 
4.5 Analytical Framework. 
     Ragin (1992:1-2) in his exploration of the case study in ‘what is a case?’, argues that 
the response to criticisms of the case study, that it is implicit to most social scientific notions 
of case study analyses, is that the objects of multiple case study investigation are similar enough 
and yet separate enough enable them to be treated as comparable of the same general 
phenomenon under study. He argues and this thesis concurs that social scientist conducting 
case studies, frame their cases as typical or otherwise and as “theoretically decisive” in some 
other way. In this case as part of the research, participant involved in various ways in the mining 
sector were asked, did they see similar factors and processes at play to what had happened in 
their neighbouring country? Did they anticipate a different outcome, and did they accept that, 
irrespective of the underlying mechanisms, social licence for mining was now problematic in 
those new adjacent member states? 
      The first of the two case studies in this thesis, the desk research, uncovering a link 
between mining companies’ difficulties in one or two countries at one period of time and 
delineating that time in relation to highly important contextual aspects regarding the nation 
state transitioning to transnational social and environmental regulation. The social phenomena 
brought about by these changes are intricately related to how social licence is delivered. The 
second case study uses the first to identify target locations, participants and issues. The research 
from both case studies is then fed into an analytical framework or a new model for social 
licence that has developed from noting the deficiencies of other models currently used in 
academic and industry. 
  In analysing the results from both the desk research and that of which took place across 
a broad range of stakeholders in Serbia there was an opportunity to explore similarities and 
differences. Utilising this desk and field research and exploring how it might support a new 
model of social licence or might challenge it offered a number of challenges, not least how to 
“fit the pieces” together. The research data is explored in detail through the new model and the 
model as a new theoretical proposition can be said to be a product as much as a lens for the 
research.  
4.6 Summary of Methodology. 
  Whereas below is detailed the case research in detail, including the develop of research 
tools and their application in situ in Serbia, it was necessary to define what type of research 
methodology was going to be used and why that particular form of methodology was selected. 
Defining the historical framing of the research in the Global North and as one which emerged 
from both the support from colleagues across the EU and specifically identifying critical areas 
for mining in Europe. The context of the rising tide of mining protest, notably in southeastern 
Europe and the development of the question, was this linked to EU enlargement with these 
former central controlled states and those states relationships with their respective citizens. 
Finally, the analytical framework for exploring findings from both case studies took the form 
of a new theoretical model for social licence. This model was a pliable emergent tool but 
underpinned by very solid theoretical propositions such as relationships between key actors 
and institutional factors. 
Chapter 5 Retrospective Desk Based Case Study. 
5.1 Introduction.  
       This chapter details the explorative, comparative research undertaken as part of this 
thesis.  It utilises a desk-based retrospective case study method, focusing on the changes to 
civil society and the subsequent impacts on the mining sector within a European national 
jurisdiction.  It does this focusing on a period reflecting a specific political nexus, the process 
of that country joining the European Union (EU).  The themes that emerged from this desk-
based research, were used to construct a semi-structured interview tool to investigate the 
likelihood of similar outcomes for the mining sector, in a neighbouring state, at a comparable 
time in that same political process, that of preparing for joining the EU.  It is in that sense part 
historical, given that the desk-based study in looking retrospectively at recorded processes and 
impacts through the literature.  It is investigative in that it is exploring participants’ views on 
something that has not yet happened.  Although the process of joining the EU may differ in 
some ways other than temporality, key aspects of that joining process are standard, notably a 
regulatory harmonisation with the Aquis Communitaire (Acquis), the rules governing 
admission to and the operation of the EU.    
       The primary purpose of the research and focal point was to investigate, if the changes 
that occurred in one country, might be anticipated as likely to occur in another country.  Those 
participants in the field research were all Serbian nationals and through their positions either 
spatially, regulatory or within the industry itself, were likely to have views on mining in Serbia.  
The secondary focus of the research was to test some of the assumptions used in the 
construction of the Social Licence Settlement Model (SLSM), concerning the critical nature of 
the qualities attributed to the Regional Development Plan and Related Governance container.  
These qualities, such as meaningful long term economic and spatial planning that includes 
affected communities and high levels of institutional and community capacity with regards to 
state community engagement, are critical within the model in securing and retaining social 
licence through an overall settlement.  If the SLSM can capture some of the complexity of the 
relationship between civil society, communities, the State, and mining projects, through 
synthesising a new tool or lens, this thesis contends it has utility for the sector beyond that of 
the predominantly binary-based social licence models, discussed.    
 
The desk component of the research, investigates the closely documented failure of the 
Rosa Montana mine development in Romania, drawing parallels in timings to between 
Romania’s ascension to the EU and changes in civil society that gave rise to a range of mine 
failures.  Neighbouring Serbia is at a similar point in terms of aligning their environmental 
governance systems as a necessary part of their ascension to the EU Acquis.  As stated, from 
the desk research, an investigative framework and questions for semi-structured interviews 
were developed and targeted at key participants concerning the Serbian mining sector.  
Outlining the interview process and context herein, in the next chapter analysis of the data from 
participants will be examined concerning the SLSM.   
5.2 Rosa Montana Mine Project, a Case Study. 
     Having explained briefly why Romania was selected as part of this case study, more 
detail of the reasons for the case study selection are outlined below.  It may be prudent to 
introduce the Rosa Montana gold mine project (RM) in Romania’s Transylvania which has 
been used as a lens to both examine and explore the wider relationships between mining, 
communities, the state and external NGOs.    
     Rosa Montana mine is in the Central-Western part of Romania, in Alba County in the 
South Apuseni Mountains of Transylvania, Romania, in an area known as the Golden 
Quadrilateral that has a mining legacy that dates back more than 2000 years.  Within the 
proposed mining development at Rosa Montana, which is investigated here, are ancient mine 
workings (Roman galleries) in various states of decay.  The proposed mine-affected four of 16 
villages in this district in an area all of which have lived with pre-existing mining legacy of 
pollution, with heavy metals discharged into the local watercourses.  The area has high levels 
of unemployment largely due to the cessation of the socialist state style mining operations 
during Romania's accession to the EU.  Gabriel Resources (GR) launched its mining project in 
1997 at the beginning of Romania's accession to the EU.  The Rosa Montana Gold Company 
(RMGC) was born out of the original conglomeration of entities that held the mining 
concession (giving the right to mine).  Shares were then split with the Romanian state owning 
Minvest Rosa Montana S.A. holding 19.31%, and Gabriel Resources (GR) having the 
remaining and majority share of 80.69%.  It is worth noting that the Romanian state had a 
financial stake in the mine's development.  This process of effectively privatising State assets 
was a necessary EU compliance requirement and the steps to effectively privatise the mine 
were early compared to other necessary EU compliance actions taken on behalf of Romania as 
it edged towards joining the EU.  Up until 2006 Minvest, the state mining company, was 
engaged in state-funded mining operations by way of a large pit (open cast mine) but its 
socialist state era mining activities, with low levels of environmental regulation and protection, 
were, as Romania moved towards European Union accession, forced to stop.   
     GR’s plans for a new mine at this site included proposals to preserve the cultural 
heritage of the area where possible and to incorporate treatment of the extensive legacy 
pollution as part of its planned operational procedures.  Mapping the steps and timescale taken 
by GR in ensuring regulatory compliance so that it can be viewed along that ongoing process 
of Romania joining the EU, has value in terms of this research.  It illustrates the importance of 
temporality and how GR followed and complied with the then-existing Romanian mining 
regulatory procedures.  This compliance involved the production of a Terms of Reference 
(TOR) for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, and these were subsequently 
approved by the necessary State bodies.  (See paper on GR website).  Due to the adoption of 
EU EIA legislation into Romanian Law in 2003 creating a procedural anomaly, this consent 
was subsequently withdrawn by the Government and GR subsequently complied with a revised 
version of this regulatory tool that encompassed EU EIA guidance.  Besides, Gabriel Resources 
undertook a more comprehensive Environmental Social Impact Assessment ESIA guided by 
World Bank (IFC) Performance Standards that was required by the Romanians yet ensured 
compliance with GIIP as Romania was not an OECD member country.  The ESIA report was 
modified in 2005 by Romanian Consultants, in Romanian, to deliver an EIA report that met 
the revised EIA Terms of Reference (TOR) guidelines (Source GR website).  Numerous 
Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMP) were undertaken (ibid), likely due to 
GR wanting to both comply with emerging regulation and to illustrate to existing and potential 
lenders, the quality of their social risk mitigation in the project.  There were some objections 
to their plans both from within the government and the local community.   Similarly, there were 
nationally external entities supporting those objecting, practically, politically, and financially  
(see BIT transcripts on GR website).   
     Alburnus Maior was a small local NGO and the focus of much of the objections.  
Established in 2000 by ten locally affected people, it was created to oppose the project.  It 
appears that the State mining entity Minvest SA representatives and government officials 
reached an agreement with this local NGO group regarding zoning of future mining operations 
and purchase prices for houses from those in the communities who were to be relocated.  This 
would indicate that local organisation was not ideologically driven and opposed to mining per 
se but rather practical in nature, a form of locally grown institution developed to support local 
voices.  From the literature, the change in the relationship between Alburnus Maior and GR 
occurred in 2002 contemporaneously with the arrival of a French-Swiss, Cambridge university-
educated environmental activist, named Stephani Roth.  Roth appeared to have a connection to 
the Soros Foundation, and it is arguable from looking at the changes in the representation of 
the conflict post-2002 and the production of what could be called anti-mining propaganda, that 
the local NGO was effectively utilised by this international NGO (INGO) influence.  The Save 
Rosia Montana campaign, consuming Alburnus Maior, was by this time supported by more 
than 40 international environmental NGOs (Source German Media 1).  It also had an award of 
$426,800 for the Environmental Partnership of Romania through the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States (Source Capitol Research article).  The ‘Save Rosia Montana’ campaign 
misrepresented the state of the environment with legacy pollution.  In an interview with Serbian 
man who had attended the Save Rosa Montana festival in 2006 (Source interview Belgrade:4). 
It was apparent that he was not made aware of the wider pollution in the area, just the "beautiful 
valley" the festival was held in that would be "destroyed".  Similarly, an iconic picture of a 
church submerged in toxic water as a legacy of past mining processes was used to represent 
what was being done to communities and the environment by GR in both online and hard copy 
publications (Cuestas 2013).   The representation of the conflict and area on social media 
(Source: Wikipedia Rosa Montana) still presents images which in no way reflect either the 
reality of GR mining proposal or the legacy of pollution.  No indication was given in any of 
the social and print media that GR had committed to pursuing the new mining project in a 
manner that had them commit to cleaning up the huge legacy pollution issues.  Bearing in mind 
that GR had not undertaken any mining at the time, environmental investigations in 2003 for 
the EIA process indicated that the Roşia and Corna Rivers in the Rosia Montana area and 
downstream Abrud River were heavily polluted  (source BIT documents).  This was attributed 
in the EIA to the State-owned and operated open-pit copper mine, Roşia Poieni, 4km from the 
planned GR project.  Its image used inaccurately on the previously referenced Wikipedia page, 
as an illustration of what GR was proposing.  Potential environmental damage on the GR mine 
project was a central focus of the ‘Save Rosa Montana” campaign and this is what was used to 
effectively mobilise public opinion and civil society across Romania and internationally.   
     Notably, when reflecting on the SLSM, the focus for conflict was relocated from the 
local to the international stage.  GR actively engaged with the matters raised by the targeted 
international campaign through their own media programme, and this was essentially reactive 
in nature.  It was not until 2006 that GR decided to address the narratives and tropes of the 
NGOs by commissioning a documentary Mine your own business (2006) directed by Phelim 
McAleer.  Phelim McAleer is an experienced investigative journalist and New York Times 
best-selling author.    
     GR also, as shown in the publicly available documents (BIT), acknowledged the 
political and transboundary concerns given the possible environmental and political concern in 
neighbouring Hungary.  The open evidence from the ongoing international trade tribunal, 
suggests GR made considerable efforts to communicate and build open and transparent 
relations and develop broad community support for a new mining project.   Within the changing 
environmental regulatory landscape over the next few years (Ref GR website), GR met all calls 
for environmental planning and monitoring, and this is not contested by the Government of 
Romania in the tribunal (Ibid).  GR engaged with all the identified stakeholder groups and 
undertook extensive consultation and engagement processes associated with project 
development and GIIP, as was required to be in accordance with the IFC Performance 
Standards and other international codes and measures.   During this period Romania faced a 
series of governance issues and was acknowledged as having limited capacity to administer the 
EU regulatory process (DANCCE 2003) required to comply with the 31 Chapters of the EU 
Acquis.  One of the legacies of communist rule for communities was a distrust of all aspects of 
government and outsiders (Alexandrescu 2012:61). 
Alexandrescu’s exploration of trust in the Rosa Montana area with field research in 2007 
and 2008 is revealing in that there was a very low level of trust in international NGO.   Another 
was the general lack of governmental capacity in building locally grounded institutions such 
as would be characterised in the SLSM as Regional Development Plan and Related 
Governance.  This lack of trust and capacity of the State were issues that inhibited GR’s from 
effectively developing institutionalised (authorised) plans with locally grounded actants about 
income generation, jobs, locally accrued environmental and economic benefits.  Failure to 
capture and institutionalise the potential social and environmental conflict enabled other 
actants to shape and utilise the conflict within the SLSM.  The INGO and others inability to do 
wrestle legitimacy from the community turned the mine into a political football using a Token 
representing legitimate conflict.  Conflict surrounding the project became a Token passed 
between and across a range of participants ranging from Romanian politicians, civil society, 
international NGOs, billionaires and even those concerned with perceived historical 
transnational boundary inequities.  Eventually, when we look at the openly accessible evidence 
at the ongoing (GR website August 2020) tribunal dealing with the case between GR and the 
Government of Romania, the political classes aligned with the conflict disregarding the 
possible environmental and economic benefits.  Both sides agree in the ongoing tribunal (ibid), 
that despite GR spending many hundreds of million dollars meeting Romanian government 
environmental standards and Romania promised both an expensive environmental clean-up 
and the realisable promise of economic development locally and taxes to be paid, politicians 
stopped the project from commencing.  They did so by moving out of their statutory systems 
and by holding a vote in parliament.  The no vote in the Romanian parliament effectively ceased 
the possibility of GR being able to continue with the mine project.  Whether the Tribunal finds 
this in contravention of a particular international trade agreement is irrelevant in terms of the 
arguments used herein.   
5.3 Relating to the Serbian Context. 
       Rosa Montana mine in Romania was a particularly useful component of the case 
study, given that the wealth of academic and grey literature available, enabled detailed 
investigation of the challenges facing nation-states, undergoing transition through joining the 
EU and adopting transnational regulatory systems.  (Pop 2016, Alexandrescu 2012, Parau 
2006,2009).  Rosa Montana was useful as a case study because the start of the process that 
stopped the mine’s development began in a period in which Romania's EU ascension, is 
comparable with where Serbia is now with regards to their joining the EU.   In responding to 
the legal action by GR the Government of Romania’s main defence at this tribunal is that GR 
lost their "social licence" for the Rosa Montana mine project.  Presently both parties appear to 
accept in the legal discussions that no such legal term exists (GR Website).  As mentioned 
earlier, GR has posted an extensive array of project documents on their website, some of which 
have emerged from discussions during the ongoing tribunal.  The in-depth analysis of the Rosa 
Montana case reflects on wider regional patterns of mines losing their social licence in newly 
EU annexed countries.  It is well documented that pressure from EU institutions and 
transnational environmental expert networks in these countries at this time, energised domestic 
environmental non-governmental organizations in terms of policymaking.  The nexus between 
the expanding EU and national politics changed the relationship between the state and non-
state actors.  (Börzel et al., 2006; Carmin, 2010, Sotirov, Lovric and Winkel.  2015).   This 
drives the assumption that the process of aligning with the EU, affected civil society in 
Romania and challenged State capacity to protect or enable mining.  Alternatively, something 
was released that enabled or possibly even encouraged civil society to challenge mining 
successfully in this period in Romania.  Parua (2006,2009) found from her research focusing 
on Rosa Montana and Romania's transition to EU membership that it was certain elites within 
society and state that became empowered through the transition.  It could be argued that 
through this lack of capacity to aggregate local voices, the Romanian State failed to engage 
positively with the new opportunities and relationships, which are presented concerning 
mining, through the EU ascension process.    
 
      This aggregating of elite voices relating to governance and space can be represented 
in the SLSM by the Regional Development Plan and Related Governance container.  Using 
semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups of participants in the mining industry 
and those that are or might be affected by mining in Serbia, was designed as a method to 
provide insight into how effective participants felt the state might be at dealing with these 
emerging challenges to mining in Serbia.  This type of mixed-method case study offered the 
opportunity to identify who might be critically groups to target with regards the probable 
impact on mining activity in Serbia, based on what had already happened in Romania.  
Engaging with organs of the Serbian state relating to mining, key mining sector people and the 
wider community was an attempt focus on key groups with similar functionality who had 
played a role in bringing Rosa Montana to a halt in Romania.  It was also an attempt to 
triangulate the research evidence, effectively trying to avoid being locked into one set of beliefs 
and offering the opportunity to compare views across a range of interest groups.  As has already 
been stated, reflections from the desk-based research on what had happened to the mining 
sector and related civil society in a neighbouring nation-state that had already undergone this 
transition process in joining the EU (Romania), supported the framing of questions for those 
in a neighbouring nation-state, the temporal nature of the investigation relates to time within 
the EU ascension process.   
     Themes that emerged from the desk-based research, the challenges facing the mining 
sector, changes brought about in civil society, challenges to State and the levering in of external 
actants (INGOs), appeared because for their temporality to be outcomes of the Europeanisation 
process.  Within the SLSM these relationships are modulated through Regional Development 
Plan and Related Governance container and were therefore likely to unfold similarly in Serbia 
as they had in Romania.  Comparisons of the neighbouring countries note that both were post-
socialist States emerging into neoliberal capitalism towards and ultimately in Romania's case, 
into EU membership.  A "shaking up" of relationships between the range of actants in the 
SLSM model occurred as Romania went through the EU ascension process and has been 
mentioned already but is outlined in more detail in the literature below.  This directly impacted 
on the mining sector’s ability to secure and retain social licences.  The Serbian interviews were 
consequently focused on the State’s capacity to develop Regional Development Plan and 
Related Governance and the role that the wider community was likely to play in those 
processes.  The organisation of communities and their ability to engage in constructive dialogue 
with the State and others through institutions is an important aspect of what is defined in the 
SLSM by the Regional Development Plan and Related Governance container.   
         Reflecting on the Romania case study, it was apparent that the target interviewees 
in Serbia should be community members including marginalised groups, representatives of the 
State (regulatory function) and key people within the private mining sector.  The research 
endeavoured to open-up and anticipate how the gradual and inevitable imposition of 
supranational environmental regulation through Serbia moving towards Europeanisation, 
might cause a change in relationships as defined in the SLSM model.  The interviews for the 
case study provided a mechanism for Serbian based informants to unpick what they anticipated 
would be the critical factors/processes which would likely affect mining in Serbia in the next 
10 years, with the assumption Serbia continues to move towards EU membership.   Gathering 
this data and trying to make sense of it was an attempt to understand aspects of the dynamic 
relationships between Community, State, International NGO, International Regulation, and 
other parts of the SLSM as defined by the community, State, and industry.  The "container" 
within the SLSM model, labelled Development Plans and Related Governance, represents that 
critical nexus of land-based livelihoods, formal community engagement processes, formal and 
non-formal spatial governance, civil society development processes and how they together 
relate to the State.  Gauging the quality of the content/capacity of this icon within the SLSM is 
perhaps a mechanism for accessing the level of stability of the whole Social Licence Settlement 
but that is a doorway for future research.  Linking as it does within the model, the State, to 
International Regulation, the Community and International NGO, Development Plans and 
Related Governance underpins institutionalised civil society capacity.    
5.4 A Regulatory Perspective. 
      In the European Union (EU), the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process is 
regulated by Directive 85/337/EEC which came into effect in July 1998.  Consequently, it was 
amended by Directive 97/11/EC, Directive 2003/35/35/EC, and Directive 2009/31/EC and 
these three directives then consolidated into one Directive 2011/92/EC5, two of these 
subsequent amendments consider public participation.  The first amendment in 1997 brought 
the Directive in line with the UNECE Espoo Convention on EIA in a transboundary context 
establishing minimum information requirements (Directive 97/11/EC).  The second 
amendment in 2003 aligned provisions on public participation with the Aarhus Convention on 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters 
(Directive 2003/35/EC).  Notably, the impact of these changes would have been felt in the 
processes driving harmonisation and Romanian compliance with the Acquis.  The Aarhus 
Convention stipulates the specific procedures and actions regarding public participation in the 
EIA process and as expected, that is reflected by the directive.  Romania filed its application 
to join the EU in 1995, commenced formal negotiations in 2002 with 2007 endorsed as the 
indicative year for accession by the European Council, in Copenhagen in 2002.   As discussed, 
the ascension process involved negotiations regarding 31 chapters of the EU Acquis.  The 
environmental chapter of the Aquis was considered by the European council as one of the most 
difficult for accession countries to implement.   The Romania Ministry of Waters and 
Environmental Protection (MWEP) had the responsibility of addressing all the environmental 
considerations and the timeframe for completing adaptation of Romania's legal framework to 
the EU requirement was the end of 2003.  To put in terms of the EU’s perspective on this matter 
at the time DANCEE (2003:21) as a text representing the official stance stated that: 
“The MWEP considers approximation with EU obligations in this area as a short-term 
priority to be achieved between 2002-2004.  Similarly, the recent roadmap for accession has 
explicitly established as a short-term benchmark the need to adopt secondary legislation on 
environmental impact assessment and access to information, and to improve public 
consultation with all relevant stakeholders at different stages of the legislative process”. 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) with adequate public access to environmental 
information were a priority requirement.  Similarly, an EIA with public participation was an 
eligibility precondition for EU funding for infrastructure projects.  Concerns raised in the 
DANCEE 2003 report regarding Romania’s administrative capacity which said,  “The adoption 
of legislation on environmental impact assessment represents a significant step forward.  
However, to achieve full implementation, it will be necessary to strengthen administrative 
capacity, especially at the local level” (DANCEE 2003:97). 
Reported in the official documentation at this stage, was a concern that local level 
administrative capacity was not up to the job of being able to discharge aspects of the newly 
prescient regulations.  The EIA Directive was transposed in the Romanian legislation by 
Governmental Decision (GD) no.  1213/2006 and implemented by the following legislative 
acts: 
Order no.  860/2002 on the approval of the environmental impact assessment procedure 
and issuance of the environmental agreement modified by Order 210/2004 and Order 
1037/2005 
Governmental Order no.  863/2002 for the approval of the methodological guidelines 
applied to the environmental impact assessment framework procedure, 
Governmental Order no.  864/2002 for the approval of the impact assessment procedure 
and public participation in the decision-making procedures for projects with transboundary 
impact.   
Before being transposed into Romanian Law in 2006 the environmental permitting 
process for mines involved applying for an environmental agreement at a regional level to 
initiate a project development process, preparing an EIA following ministerial requirements 
and submitting it as part of the application for an Environmental Permit (EP) to commence 
operations.  This relates specifically to Development Plans and Related Governance container 
within the SLSM.  Parua (2006:54) defines the nature of the earlier consultation in that the 
Romanian public was informed that a project development process was starting but opinions 
and or complaints were only to be received by the relevant bodies once an EIA Report was 
prepared at the final state of the environmental permitting (EP) process.  It is fair to indicate 
that across the EU, Public participation requirements and implementation vary widely, 
depending on the national EIA system.  Building on significant evidence internationally, as 
outlined in previous chapters, resources need to be committed over time to build capacity for 
communities to negotiate, as a fait accompli is difficult to negotiate.  Referencing the 
arguments put forward by Parau (2006,2009) regarding both the state of Romanian civil society 
and recognising the relative weakness of state institutions, prior and during the ascension 
process, it is interesting to reflect there was a legal requirement for just one public consultation 
during the environmental permitting process.  The EU EIA directive, as well as the Aarhus 
Convention (1998), requires that, “The public concerned shall be given early and effective 
opportunities to participate in the environmental decision-making procedures”.   
This means that appropriate and effective measures should be implemented by 
developers and respective authorities to enable the public’s involvement in decision making.  
The EU EIA directive stresses, that national legislation should stipulate, “The detailed 
arrangements for informing the public, for example by bill posting within a certain radius or 
publication in local newspapers, and for consulting the public concerned, for example by 
written submissions or by way of a public inquiry” (EU1:6).    
The authorities are obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure that relevant 
information is, “electronically accessible to the public, through at least a central portal or easily 
accessible points of access, at the appropriate administrative level” (EU1:6).    This means that 
the public is entitled to see both the non-technical summary and the full EIA document by 
relevant means and at a reasonable price.  Additional public consultation is required, in line 
with the Espoo Convention (1991) should there be the possibility of transboundary impacts.    
       In 2004, Romania began the process of applying to become a member of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), citing it as a strategic 
objective of the country’s foreign policy.   This objective still has not been achieved, even 
though, through becoming a member of the EU, Romania fulfils the OECD criteria.  The 
country’s non-membership means it is regarded as a non-designated country by the Equator 
Principles, a World Bank risk management framework, adopted by the majority of international 
finance institutions (IFIs), for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social 
risk in projects.  This has been referred to in earlier chapters.   Non-designation means that 
Romania is not regarded as having robust environmental and social governance, legislation 
systems and institutional capacity designed to protect its people and the natural environment.  
To secure international finance for a project, in addition to complying with national and EU 
laws and regulations, a large-scale mining project seeking funding in Romania would also need 
to comply with Good International Industry Practice (GIIP), as defined by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank.  An Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) would need to be prepared in line with applicable IFC Performance 
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability and the World Bank Group 
Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines).  In the case of GR, these were 
undertaken and delivered.   
       These World Bank groups processes designate for non-OECD members, in turn, 
requires consultation with project-affected communities, other affected and or interested 
parties and regulatory bodies.  These are known as stakeholders at the scoping phase, during 
baseline data collection, during disclosure and once the report has been finalised.   Public 
consultation, disclosure and engagement with stakeholders is guided by a stakeholder 
engagement plan that describes what, how and when consultation is required and stipulates 
how grievances and complaints are received and managed along the process (OECD).  All of 
these regulations and processes are agreed and accepted by signatory countries.  Interestingly, 
nowhere do these signatory countries mention SLO.    
Reference has been made earlier to Bear Creek Corporation versus the Government of 
Peru which has the international tribunal refer to SLO, conflating it with Free Prior Informed 
Consent (FPIC).  It has this been utilised as a term by an international tribunal but in the case 
of Rosa Montana, it was the failure of GR to gain social licence at Rosa Montana that is the 
defence of the Government of Romania from the action brought by GR against them.  Social 
licence is not a term currently used in a European mining context and as illustrated by the many 
research projects currently funded by the EU on the raw material potential within Europe 
(INFACT, 2019), it is not even endorsed by the international civil society organisations that 
lead many of the protests against the European mining sector.  In 2017, the European 
Commission recognised that popular support for mining projects requires effective engagement 
in 'Western democratic jurisdictions' alongside functioning government and sound institutions.  
To better understand how this can be undertaken, the EU Horizon 20:20 research initiative has 
been supporting consortia to investigate strategies on how civil society can be engaged to build 
public acceptance and trust in the mining and recycling sectors in Europe.  There is no agreed 
definition within or across these consortia as to what SLO is and this has been accepted by both 
sides in the tribunal (BIT GR Website).  
5.5 Compliance, Politics and Non-Governmental Organisations.    
      Gabriel Resources began to develop the Rosa Montana mining project in 2002, at the 
beginning of Romania's accession to the EU.   During this period of transition, Gabriel 
Resources followed the given procedure, applying for and being issued with an environmental 
agreement, preparing an EIA that complied with Romanian requirements.   
 In 2003 the Terms of Reference (TOR) approved by the MEWM was withdrawn by the 
Government, due to the adoption of EU EIA legislation into Romanian Law.   A revised TOR 
was issued in 2004 that complied with the EU EIA Directive.  In parallel, Gabriel Resources 
prepared an ESIA that complied with the IFC performance standards.  This ESIA was modified 
in 2005, by Romanian Consultants, in Romanian, to meet the Romanian EIA TOR 
requirements and submitted to MEWM in 2006.   Through this process GR navigated the 
challenges presented by the administrative capacity issues identified in the DANCEE 2003 and 
EU progress reports, to maintain effective and transparent relationships with the project 
affected communities and the regulatory bodies.  This was over and beyond the statutory 
requirements, defined by Romania and the EU EIA Directives although compliant with GIIP 
in non-OECD countries.  Concerning public consultation and stakeholder engagement, GR 
followed GIIP as defined by the IFC performance standards and had a Public Disclosure and 
Consultation Plan (PDCP) providing a comprehensive overview of consultation activities 
undertaken since 2000 as well as ongoing consultation activities.  The level and amount of 
consultations and engagements with project-affected communities, other interested parties and 
regulatory bodies by Gabriel Resources, was in line with GIIP, exceeding consultation 
requirements of both the Aarhus and Espoo Declarations and within the EU EIA Directive.    
     This period is significant and Parau’s (2006) detailed how there were significant 
changes to the drivers of civil society over the period that GR was involved in Romania.  She 
recounts how: “‘Shell’ NGOs were also set up by political entrepreneurs scrambling for funds 
which they would not otherwise have been eligible for”.  (Parau 2006:232) She expands, 
“Political parties, Members of Parliament, even central and local administrations were reported 
to have set up their own NGO partners to grab EU funds” (Parau 2006:234).   She recounts that 
this phenomenon was increased in 2003 when the Nastase government introduced the Act on 
Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, (No.  43/2003).  The function of the Act 
she details as one which dismantled all limits on the funding of political parties and electoral 
campaigns by civil society organisations  (Parau 2006:234.). The co-opting of civil society as 
with all revolutions favoured those with power.  Civil society organisations were utilised as a 
funding mechanism or device not for developing an agreed consensus on social and 
environmental issues but to galvanising existing power blocks in society.  Parau (2006:234) 
makes the point that this did not go unnoticed or unpredicted and that it; “raised the concern 
expressed in 2003 by the Romanian Ministry of European Integration-that it might be used by 
political parties for partisan purposes”.    To contextualise this, Prime Minister of Romania 
from December 2000 to December 2004 was Adrian Năstase.  He was later the President of 
the Chamber of Deputies from 21 December 2004 until 15 March 2006, when he was forced 
to resign due to corruption charges.  Sentenced to two years in prison in July 2012, he attempted 
suicide before beginning his prison term.  Released in March 2013, he was sentenced to four 
years in another case in January 2014 but was released that August  (The Economist 2012).  
The very top of Romanian political and civil life was infected with rampant corruption.  
Within this context, it is notable that GR managed to operate in an apparent transparent manner 
dealing with civil society and communities as well as the political system.  As mentioned 
earlier, during this scramble for new forms of influence and resources in 2000, Stephanie Roth, 
a Swiss, Cambridge educated environmentalist, arrived in the community near Rosa Montana 
and was fundamental to developing an international NGO response against the GR proposal.  
She detailed the start of the protest as, “[i]n 2000 the locals refusing to remain silent united to 
form Alburnus Maior, an NGO consisting of initially 350 families or local property owners 
opposing the mine on social, environmental, economic and heritage grounds” (Cuestas 2013).    
Local voices were subsequently effectively utilised by a range of ideologically driven 
international NGO actors and the misrepresentation of the environmental case against GR’s 
proposal, went on to see the company pilloried through social media.  By 2010 however, there 
was significant local support for the mining company.  The “Support Group for Rose Montană 
Mining", a multi-stakeholder platform that had among its members over 40 mayors from the 
local communities, as well as unions and confederations of unions, local non-profit 
organisations, and universities, was created to support the mining project.   The author contends 
that Stephanie Roth facilitated both the overshadowing of local voices at a critical period of 
transition and utilising a flow of external influences into the local area.  The developing 
Romanian environmental regulatory system, necessarily incorporating EU compliance, created 
the conditions where an under-capacity Romanian establishment faced conflict with 
sophisticated international lobbyists who understood the legislation through previous 
engagements.   Never having dealt with these types of regulation or indeed this type of 
manifestation of civil society, the Romanian establishment was inevitably under capacity for 
the situation.    
5.6 Political Considerations. 
      It was mentioned earlier that there was a historical backstory that GR appears to have 
neglected to engage with.  Similarly, there were what can best be described as “irregularities” 
developing in civil society which supported political capitalisation and GR appear to have been 
able to avoid this.  The is no evidence GR have even been accused of political impropriety.   
The mine, however, is situated in an area of Transylvania which had been part of a larger 
Hungarian Empire and was ceded to Romania as part of the settlement following World War 
1.  There are still native Hungarian speakers in the locality although their number has been in 
decline, and they are now a minority.  Within Romania at the time of GR’s attempt to develop 
a mine, the Hungarian Minority Party UDMR exerted great political leverage in keeping 
various governments in power.  There is a further Hungarian aspect; George Soros is a high-
profile Hungarian billionaire who uses his international NGO, The Soros Foundation, to 
promote a certain type of neoliberal political and economic interest globally.  The contesting 
of legitimacy over even the very name of Rosa Montana by elements of the Hungarian minority 
party made the case a platform for his involvement.  This in turn provided opportunities for 
international NGOs to engage in challenging the environmental and social proposals of GR, 
for their ideological purposes.  The Romanian chapter of the Soros Foundation raised questions 
about the legitimacy of the mining concession, “Our biggest concern is that the Romanian 
government is not going to take responsibility,” (Henisz and Dorobantu 2012:7) said Gabriel 
Petrescu, executive director of the Soros Foundation Romania.  “It lacks the capabilities and 
resources to monitor and enforce the actions of Gabriel Resources.  I’m afraid of corruption, 
especially petty corruption of those supposed to monitor the gold mine” (Ibid).   This 
politicising and the subsequent political capture of the environmental regulatory system, 
through the institutional capacity being unable to resist and the accumulation of Hungarian 
pressure, can be seen, according to the Ecomagazin website (2011); 
“77 Hungarian NGOs from Transylvania issued a declaration against the exploitation of 
the mine resources on 3rd of August 2011 and 240 Hungarian NGOs have sent an open letter 
to the Romanian Minister of Environment.”   
More than 110 NGOs from the European Union (Greenindex, 2010) empathised with 
the anti-cyanide cause after the Baia Mare incident and solicited the European Commissary 
on Environment Janez Potocnik to take measures regarding the EU vote on using cyanide in 
mining. (Source Rosa Montana, A Step toward Peace).  The NGO internationalisation 
became not just a platform for those large NGOs to voice their ideological opposition to 
mining but for Hungarian NGOs to have a voice for the first time in a location that some see 
as a dispossessed homeland with a religiously and culturally oppressed Hungarian minority.   
The proposed mining project development became a touchstone or those seeking political and 
environmental change, as one can see from this 2013 poster (Source indyrikki 1). 
 
Figure 5-1Hungarian poster 
5.7 Loss of a Social Licence. 
    The prism for the viewing of some of the changes in relationships between the 
regulatory body, the State, the mine, INGOs and the community are framed in the detailed 
procedural mining technical matters and regulations.  It is, however, necessary to labour the 
point, that in the case of the mine developer GR, it is agreed by both parties in the ongoing 
tribunal dispute that GR complied with all the necessary Romanian national and European 
regulations and still did not manage to secure a permit to mine from the government.  The 
decision by the Romanian government to move outside their regulatory processes, decide a 
national parliamentary vote and ultimately turn down the mining permit request because the 
mine developer, ostensibly (GR), did not have a Social Licence to Operate, stopped the mine 
from being developed.  The dispute, as mentioned, is ongoing and this conflict and subsequent 
failure of the mine to be able to operate is a useful petri dish to examine a range of regional 
themes, in terms of developing the SLSM.  The SLSM demonstrates the relationships between 
all the actants are what needs to be considered and how a failure to build institutional capacity 
with communities led to local conflict not being captured by those who might benefit from a 
resolution of that conflict.  Although local conflict issues were ultimately largely resolved at a 
local level, the conflict was utilised by an international NGO as a form of currency or as a 
Token in ANT terms.  The result for those trying to develop the mine site was that no final 
mining permit was issued by the State.  The Romanian parliament declaring this was because 
the mining company had no social licence to operate.   
     With this outcome, within the SLSM it would have been logically impossible for them 
to be able to have a social licence given that State and necessary permits are part of that 
balancing act that is a social licence.  A footnote to the argument herein is that unfortunately 
since the Rosa Montana mine development stopped, the local community continues to suffer 
from the huge environmental legacy of contamination related to previous mining.   
To determine if similar relationships and capacity exist in Serbia now to that of Romania 
in the period specified, the research needed to access people within and related to key 
government ministries, the mining sector and the local population who are or might be affected 
by mining.  Field research needed to explore the views of the targets towards the EU, 
government capacity, anticipated changes, pressures and what might be the outcome with 
regards to the mining sector in Serbia, if Serbia continues on its journey of Europeanisation.  
Exploring participants’ views of the likelihood of a similar set of constraints and outcomes for 
the mining sector allows focusing on the utility of applying a political settlement-based model 
to the mining sector, particularly when reflected on with regards to neighbouring Romania.    
 
Chapter 6 Field Based Case Study. 
6.1 Introduction. 
     The field case study research took place over several months in Serbia and in South-
eastern Europe between 2018 and 2019.  Outside the formal semi-structured interviews, of 
which more later, this extended time with communities, the mining sector personal and others, 
enabled the author to explore and reflect on assumption underpinning the SLSM, through 
discussions with both communities and those associated with the mining sector.  The research 
focusing on Serbia for reasons indicated earlier.  In addition to those factors, discussions with 
partners to the INFACT EU Horizon 2020 project, who were looking at barriers to mining with 
Europe, identified Serbia as critical to the future development of mining in that region.  As well 
as a long history of mining, Serbia was recognised as having rich mineral deposits potentially 
critical to the future economy of Europe (Proctor and MacCallum 2019).  Though INFACT the 
author was able to secure the support of an esteemed professor of geology at Belgrade 
university.  His support and endorsement made aspects of the formal research possible, notably 
with the State and mining sectors.    
6.2 Selecting Stakeholders or Model Components.    
     A stakeholder analysis was undertaken to identify research participants.  This was in 
a sense teleological with regards to the SLSM with different stakeholders identified as 
belonging to Community, State and Mine presenting an inherent critique of traditional 
stakeholder analysis.  The traditional notion of a ‘stakeholder analysis’ runs counter to the 
SLSM model in that within most frameworks for analysing there are assumptions made as to 
the nature of the relationships, power and influence that are used to justify inclusion or 
exclusion.  With SLSM the framework it is the model, and the level of power and influence 
cannot be predetermined.  The challenge is in determining where individual actants sit- notably 
for example with quasi-state bodies.   
       To briefly demonstrate this research approach as divergent from traditional 
stakeholder analysis, concerning whom should be included and the preselection of whom is 
powerful and less powerful, the author has drawn on the works of Phillips (1997, 2003).  
Working on what was even in 2003, an ageing, or established broad body of work on 
stakeholder analysis, Phillips developed the dual categories of normative and derivative 
stakeholders.  Normative stakeholders are distinct from derivative stakeholders in that Phillip’s 
utilising John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, to define them as entities which organisations have a 
moral obligation to consider within a scheme of works.  Derivative stakeholders were on the 
other hand to be considered due to their potential to affect the business or organisation and 
potentially, its normative stakeholders.  This notion of stakeholders falls in the trap of engaging 
with a binary perspective within which the analyst has already assumed and allocated what the 
level of influence will be before analysis as well as concepts of justice and fairness.  We could 
label normative stakeholders as secondary, value-driven in their inclusion, whereas derivative 
stakeholders are viewed as primary and directly powerful concerning the project.    
The request for participant contacts was for 50 people to interview and courtesy of 
Belgrade University, 10 were initially identified, mostly in the categories of State and Mine.  
Further participants were identified from the time in the field and interviewed over the period.  
In total, five formal interviews were undertaken with people from the State a total of nine 
people were interviewed.  With the community a series of formal interviews took place with 
20 participants.  Interviews were also undertaken with 15 people from the mining sector.  
Despite efforts, it was not possible to include representatives from the Serbian INGO sector. 
In total 15 interviews took place with a total of 44 participants.  The length of time spent in the 
field talking to a range of people with strong views who refused to participate formally in the 
research, made the interviews more targeted and ultimately more fruitful.    
6.3 Research Tools.  
     Initially, when considering the application of a semi-structured interview process it 
was envisaged that there would be two components.  The first was to be an ArcGIS based 
survey tool a computer tablet series of questions where respondents could answer, and their 
responses would be both geotagged and sent back for analysis to a central server in a manner 
predetermined.  The second was to be a semi-structured interview.   Like most good battle 
plans, this did not survive the first engagement.  Asking people to think about questions without 
engaging them in dialogue, was not fruitful and trails indicated participants did not want to 
have that further conversation, to clarify and unpack answers.  Building trust quickly on a topic 
that was certainly contentious, had implications for the research, not least that the author was 
asked numerous times if statements would be attributed to them.   
     Culturally the author would consider Serbia a “high context culture”, which is 
supported by research by Podrug, Filipovic and Stančić (2014).  Their research uses a definition 
for the term attributed to Hall, who said, “Context is the information that surrounds an event; 
it is inextricably bound up with the meaning of that event.  A high context communication or 
message is one in which most of the information is already in the person, while very little is in 
the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message.  A low context communication is just the 
opposite, i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code” (1976:91).   
Treating Serbia as a high context culture where there is less explicit coding for the 
message, it was, therefore, necessary to engage effectively with participants to understand their 
views.  Given the short introductory period, this presented a challenge.  Having a conversation 
in the context of a semi-structured interview made it easier to unpack statements, than asking 
a participant to answer questions and give assertions or values.  Although the consent form 
(Appendix 1) details a multiple-choice type of survey and then a semi-structured interview, the 
former was abandoned as a data collection method.  It was anticipated that anonymity would 
be an important tool for enabling discussions, given that the issues were likely to relate to 
people’s livelihoods.  Semi-structured interviews were carried out with individuals and with 
small groups, the latter being recorded as one interview with a consensus.  This was not ideal 
in terms of the research methodology but given the time and resource constraints it was 
necessary to be adaptable in the field.  This type of field research is also one which the author 
has considerable experience of, through delivering participatory research in high context 
cultures over many years on several continents.    The five questions asked are detailed in  
Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1 Research Questions 
No Question 
Q1 What do you think of the European Union? 
Q2 What do you think are the biggest national challenges facing the mining sector in 
the next 5- 10 years? 
Q3 Is Serbia a good place to do mining and do people benefit from the mining sector? 
Q4 Will moving closer to the EU change the relationships between the mining 
company, the local people, the state and International NGO? 
Q5 If you know what the issues were in Romania for mining companies as it joined 
the EU, do you think it will be different in Serbia? 
6.4 Field Research Limitations and Considerations.    
     Working in a country not previously visited by the author offers a range of logistical 
as well as epistemological challenges for the field research.  Language issues are commonly a 
limitation in social science fieldwork as outlined by Bogusia Temple and Young (2004) and 
have implications for the ontological integrity of social science research.  Mitigating against 
this methodological stumbling block were several factors.  Initially, for the interviews arranged 
by Belgrade university, many of the interviewees spoke good English and the said professor 
assisted in translation.  Techniques such as seeking clarification, rewording, and ensuring a 
third-person stance was taken by those interpreting, as well as recognising the limitation and 
focusing less on the meaning of individual words and more on broader concepts that were 
clarified and reiterated, all supported data capture which had meaning.  After the research 
organised by the University of Belgrade, an interpreter was secured.  Initially, through the 
British government website supporting business activities (BritGov1), the author made contact 
with a range of translators and eventually located a suitable candidate, with research field 
experience and a social science background.  He accompanied the author on numerous 
extended field trips across Serbia.  In selecting a suitable candidate, some factors were critical; 
that they could cope with the rigours of travel, did they have the flexibility to travel and did 
they had the necessary English language skills and an understanding of social science.  In 
addition to that, as community members were a target category, the interpreter could not be 
seen to be an authority figure.  The gravitas brought to the government and industry discussions 
by the esteemed professor might dissuade some from engaging in a community context.  The 
interpreter was a casually dressed, Serbian man in his late twenties who was quite widely 
travelled across central Europe and interested in the research.    
For the research, it was important to access communities that lived adjacent to mine sites, 
given that with changing regulatory regimes, they would likely become more equipped to have 
their voices heard.  Two Roma communities were visited as they live effectively on the edge 
of or in, the Bor gold mine.  There was some unfounded trepidation on behalf of the interpreter 
as relationships between the Roma and the rest of society in Serbia are very poor.  Fortunately, 
the author had worked with Roma communities on projects in Slovakia and Bulgaria and 
valuable interviews were undertaken with large groups of Roma families.    
It would have been useful to have interviewed substantially more people and a range of 
approaches was made to people in communities.  Whilst they were happy to talk and discuss 
the matter, they were reluctant to take part in formal research and producing a consent form 
became an almost guaranteed way to end a conversation.  This was particularly the case in 
communities in both areas under investigation, where mining was still equated to the interests 
of the powerful (oligarchs).  The author was also given a sense from informal discussions in 
the community, that making too much of a splash or a noise with the research, in the 
community, might lead to some unwanted attention for those particular interests.  It must be 
said that during the time spent in Serbia the author never encountered any hostility nor anything 
but exceptional hospitality.    
6.5 Research Findings and analysis. 
6.5.1 Aggregated voices of the government institutions.    
    This section detail’s themes and perceptions that became apparent through the semi-
structured interviews.  Transcripts were analysed relating to the main themes in each of the 
questions and the responses were sifted into three categories, firstly institutions, secondly 
marginalised and/or those people who are likely to be affected by mining in the area due to 
their proximity and lastly voices from those in the mining industry.  Given that there was little 
divergence in views within each category towards the themes their collective “voices” are 
detailed below.  Where there was divergence, this has been highlighted.    
Q1 What do you think of the European Union? 
Aggregated response.  There was a positive general view of the European Union and a general 
belief that moving closer to the EU would be beneficial to Serbia in terms of raising the general 
standard of living.  Respondents viewed the EU as very bureaucratic and recognised that there 
were going to have to be changes made in terms of capabilities within government departments, 
particularly with concerning environmental stewardship and mining.   
Q2 What do you think are the biggest national challenges facing the mining sector in the 
next 5- 10 years? 
Aggregated response: Moving into the EU would bring change and some respondents were 
unsure if Serbia would be able to meet the demands that would be placed on it regarding 
environmental stewardship.  The wider political matters appeared to be given more concern 
than government or departmental capacity.  It was generally expressed that given the resources 
the government could meet any new demands but that wider political matters and the 
involvement of outsiders might cause problems for the mining sector.  The increasingly 
internationalising of what was once a State sector industry might lead to new challenges 
although it would also bring good mining practices.  Dealing with a legacy from the past 
without sufficient resources to invest in environmental remediation would be a challenge.  
Meeting the new regulations with current capacity would necessitate working collaboratively 
with existing EU countries to understand the processes and access the necessary resources.  
What was missing from all respondents was an understanding of a rolling consultation process 
and the level of transparency and challenges likely to arrive before joining the EU.  This was 
raised at each interview by the author and there was a very simplistic view of the practicalities 
and purpose of consultation.   
Q3 Is Serbia a good place to do mining and do people benefit from the mining sector? 
Aggregated response: Serbia was seen, with its relatively new mining code as having very good 
mining regulations although there was a recognition that systems can always be improved.  It 
was stated numerous times that there was significant expertise in Serbia, across the geological 
and mining sector.  Also detailed were rules, which had dictated financial benefits to local 
people adjacent mine sites but that those agreements had somehow gotten debased over recent 
years.  These types of approaches as well as a legacy of the high-quality training many of the 
older experts had received in former Yugoslavia, were seen as a solid platform regulatory for 
the mining sector.  New mining investment was a mechanism for generating the resources to 
enable the cleaning up of environmental legacy issues and creating jobs thus benefiting people.   
Q4 Will moving closer to the EU, change the relationships between the mining company, the 
local people, the state and International NGO? 
Aggregated response: Some officials returned a straight No as an answer.  Generally, there was 
very much a view of the primacy of the state and a rather scathing view of the International 
NGOs.  Everyone was aware of the high-profile attack on ERDB loan in support of the 
European Redevelopment Bank (ERDB), by CEE Bankwatch (2019).  International NGOs 
were viewed as ideologically based, outsiders and there was a general view that they would try 
and make trouble.  This was likely to get worse with the adoption of new regulations possible 
Natura 2000 (as discussed in an earlier chapter).  There were no attempts to explore new 
mechanisms for including people in discussions around mining projects and there was a general 
sentiment that consultation should be carried out by the mining company in the locality they 
are mining.  One official mentioned oligarchs as the tool used to get modulate community 
views in some areas.  Some would indicate that certain regions or areas where less robustly 
represented by oligarchs or significant people not necessarily politicians.    
Q5 If you know what the issues were in Romania for mining companies as it joined the EU, 
do you think it will be different in Serbia? 
Aggregated response: All were aware of problems in Romania and Bulgaria but there was no 
clear view of the causes of the problems faced by mines.  Some indicated that it could possibly 
be due to local political or regulatory failures in those countries.  Some did envisage similar 
types of issues facing new particularly mine development in Serbia, in terms of the local 
populations being used by “oligarchs” and possibly International NGO taking advantage of 
policy instruments like Natural 2000.   
6.5.2 Aggregated voices from marginalised and affected communities.    
Q1. What do you think of the European Union? 
Aggregated response: Overall there was a consensus that it would be a good thing if Serbia 
joined the EU in terms of the possible economic benefits.  Some thought that Serbia would not 
be able to join due to the legacy of the Yugoslav war and Kosovo.  Although not a data set 
collected, it was evident that there was more enthusiasm for joining the EU from both Roma 
people and younger ethnically Serb respondents.   
Q2 What do you think are the biggest national challenges facing the mining sector in the 
next 5- 10 years? 
Aggregated response: There were a couple of slightly divergent views characterised by the 
Roma and non-Roma people.  The former where very clear that the biggest national challenge 
facing not just the mining sector but the whole of Serbia was corruption.  The Roma people all 
recounted how they had their votes bought and objected to being paid 50% less than non-Roma 
locals for their vote.  Wider attitudes to Roma are very harsh but maybe no worse than in other 
EU neighbouring EU countries.  All self-identifying Roma people interviewed agreed, that for 
the mining sector there might be new rules, and all agreed that it was unlikely to benefit them 
or their communities in any way.  Non- Roma respondents expressed a sense of resource 
nationalism, a recognition that the resource if it were to be exploited, would likely be by some 
foreign corporation that would pay people in Belgrade and take the profit out of the country.    
Q3. Is Serbia a good place to do mining and do people benefit from the mining sector? 
Aggregated response: Interviewing people in the shadow of mine sites meant that all 
participants recognised that there was a long history of mining in Serbia.  Around the lignite 
mines, there was a recognition of the strategic importance of mining to Serbia and it was only 
those in this area that thought there was still some tangible benefit.  Here again, resource 
nationalism was evident but that the lignite mines were a critical energy resource in terms of 
electricity generation, was also important.  Participants did not know if Serbia was better or 
worse than anywhere else in terms of mining but there was a consensus that local people are 
going to get little or no benefits from the mining industry.   
Q4 Will moving closer to the EU, change the relationships between the mining company, 
the local people, the state and International NGO? 
Aggregated response: Participants felt it was unlikely International NGOs would get involved 
in their area and did not know what the effects of joining the EU would be.  The State was 
viewed as an interest to largely service the wealthy and powerful and rural areas would not be 
able to have their voices heard.  Some cited examples of the State bringing mine companies to 
explain what was going to happen in their area where helicopters were being used to carry 
scanning devices.  They did not believe either the mine companies or the State representative 
that this would not harm them nor their livestock.  Levels of trust and a sense that the State and 
mining corporations were colluding was underpinned by an all-pervasive smell of corruption.    
Q5 If you know what the issues were in Romania for mining companies as it joined the 
EU, do you think it will be different in Serbia? 
Aggregated response: Some participants confessed to knowing nothing about what was going 
on in neighbouring countries concerning mining.  Some had heard of Rosa Montana, their view 
of events being people stopped a terrible mine project and a couple of individuals were very 
well informed as to events in Romania and Bulgaria regarding protests against mining projects.  
Those who had no knowledge could not see any possibility of similar events in Serbia, but 
some well-informed participants were sceptical it could happen in Serbia.  On being challenged 
as to why they stated that they did not think the state and the oligarchs would let it happen and 
that any protests by the community would be crushed,  being in the EU would not, in their 
view, make any difference to how the state would operate with a mining corporation.    
6.5.3 Voices of the mining industry in Serbia.    
Q1. What do you think of the European Union? 
Aggregated response: Participants saw the EU as a very good thing from a regulatory 
perspective, driving environmental standards but also as a possible source of disruption.  There 
was a recognition that the transition period likely to be troublesome for Serbia and they, as one 
might expect from high ranking professionals, viewed the lack of resources at the State's 
disposal and a major challenge.  Many felt it was important for Serbia to retake its place in 
Europe although recognising that there were political issues that must be resolved.    
Q2. What do you think are the biggest national challenges facing the mining sector in the 
next 5- 10 years? 
Aggregated response: Two main challenges were reoccurring.  Firstly, there was specifically 
Natura 2000 and the regulatory burden that was going to come with EU alignment, possibly 
bringing with it, opportunities for International NGOs.  Secondly, there was the need for the 
state to become more transparent when dealing with licences.  They viewed the present system 
which makes industry lobbying illegal, a hamstring in being able to engage effectively with the 
state to identify potentially troublesome issues and provide a space to explore how they might 
be resolved by industry.   Similarly, the State system was viewed as a black box that 
applications went into and despite set timeframes for decisions, they might not get a decision 
for an indeterminate period.  This issue with the State, about to be compounded with the burden 
of EU regulation, was likely to make mining unattractive to external investors, apart from those 
that wanted to exploit the period in the very short term.  This in itself was seen as bad, given 
that mining is a strategic industry with environmental legacies.   
Q3 Is Serbia a good place to do mining and do people benefit from the mining sector? 
Aggregated response: Geologically and in terms of the new mining code, Serbia was a good 
place for the mining industry.  The uncertainty of moving towards the EU and the capacity 
issue with the state make it challenging.  People have benefited from mining but there is a 
recognition that historically although consultation and awareness of livelihoods in rural areas 
were taught to geology students, the community had very little say under socialism.  There 
were benefits for local people in terms of jobs but the processes for mining were old fashioned.  
Currently, mining companies, particularly the majors (RioTinto) are seen to engage with 
communities and give CSR benefits back to the community.  A recurring example of good 
practice was the Jadar mine in southern Serbia.   
Q4 Will moving closer to the EU, change the relationships between the mining company, 
the local people, the state and International NGO? 
Aggregated response: These well-travelled professionals all agreed that it would be foolish to 
think what had happened to the mining sector in Bulgaria and Romania would not happen in 
Serbia.  They anticipated the increasing penetration of Serbia by International NGO and 
thought that these outsiders would stir up local people around mining or prospective mining 
projects.  This would provide real challenges for the industry and although facilitated by Natura 
2000 was not about environmental protection it was about money and ideology.  There was a 
consensus that the state did not either have the capacity or see it as its role to facilitate any kind 
of capacity building with local people around mining or potential mining sites.  CSR from 
mining corporations would be the only source of benefits and the State’s role would be 
regulatory.    
Q5 If you know what the issues were in Romania for mining companies as it joined the 
EU, do you think it will be different in Serbia? 
Aggregated response: As said above it was reiterated, all agreed that it would be foolish to 
think what had happened to the mining sector in Bulgaria and Romania would not happen in 
Serbia.  All interviewed viewed the challenge to the mining sector as relating to poor 
environmental or regulatory compliance, International NGO activity promoting anti-mining 
and an increased regulatory burden as the cause of the woes in neighbouring counties, along 
with attendant political corruption.  Pressed as to the activities of local NGOs they saw local 
NGOs as weak and used by larger International NGOs to legitimise their campaigns.  Local 
NGOs were viewed as being involved only for what they can get financially.    
Chapter 7 Case Study Data Analysis. 
7.1 Shared realisations. 
From both the retrospective and field-based case study research there was a shared 
realisation across the government institutions and specialists in the mining sector that joining 
the EU would present a series of procedural and policy challenges regarding specifically 
environmental matters.  There was also an awareness with research participants that there was, 
due to precedent set with neighbouring countries, a significant likelihood as Serbia moved 
closer to the EU, of disruption to mining sector projects promulgated by the intervention of 
International NGOs utilising the disruption and new policy weapons such as Natura 2000.  The 
state and its relationship to governing mining projects had three distinct views from each group.  
Government Institutions whilst recognising some limitations appeared to see the major threat 
to mining projects to come from those outside, meaning International NGOs.      
   The responses from the communities appeared to represent two significant factors.  
Firstly, general powerlessness and acceptance of a wider political corruption, which to them 
would stop change from occurring with regards to mining.  If there was change it would not 
benefit normal people.  Secondly and this was notable with older interviewees, the change that 
has occurred in Serbia with a move towards a neoliberal regime with international companies 
was resented.  For communities, the Serbia State was not transparent in any of its processes 
they voiced allegations of Clientism with regard to the mining sector.   
     The mining sector, however, although thinking Serbia a good place to mine for 
geological purposes felt the state operated as a "black box".  Despite good legislation, the actual 
(as opposed to the written) processes and subsequent decisions concerning the approval of 
exploration Licences, were not easy to understand.  Their inability to legal lobby inhibited both 
transparency and their ability to augment applications with information that could support 
decisions.   
What was missing from all the interviews was a mention of dialogue between State, 
communities, and the mining sector, generally or specifically in terms of finding solutions or 
preparing the ground for solutions.  Civil society did not figure in the discussions and challenge 
for institutional and industry participants were seen as something likely to develop because of 
international NGOs, outsiders.  None of the participants envisaged any change to either the 
political system or to civil society but rather the main impact would be on the regulatory 
systems.  There was little understanding by institutional or industry participants of the need for 
their sector to preparing for wider forms of public engagement and the effects of joining the 
EU will have on existing regulatory systems.   
    The introduction of new formal frameworks for engagement around environmental 
matters, such as is occurring with the rolling out of European Union (EU) regulation in Serbia, 
will bring new actors/actants which can affect existing social licence settlement and shape the 
landscape for creating new ones.   New opportunities for existing actors/actants and a range of 
new relationships will be possible and that is likely to benefit new as well as old elites, within 
the community.  New elites will be those that can harness the technical requirements of the EU, 
probably mostly concerning the compliance with environmental and social regulations and 
articulate them in one of the official languages.   
7.2 Linking theory and research findings. 
In political settlement terms, the grounds for settlement will change or in Actor Network 
Theory terms, new actants mean new translations.  A lack of capacity with existing government 
systems concerning citizen consultation, environmental and social compliance within these 
former controlled economies transitioning to citizen-focused European Union based systems, 
is likely to be highly problematic.  Participants felt it was unlikely the existing mining and 
environmental framework were up to the job of enabling the ongoing production of community 
consent to mining operations, particularly around sensitive environmental or cultural 
landscapes.   
    As in Romania as well as neighbouring Bulgaria, these changes or disturbances to the 
social and political status quo, would it was felt by many, likely affect the perception of the 
wider political settlement in society.  Non-governmental respondents were not surprisingly, 
more likely to discuss, an acceptance that politics was inherently corrupt, with an elite who 
would likely resist “change”.  Numerous non-institutional participants identified “oligarchs” 
as a feature of the political landscape, key individuals in regions and localities who were not 
politicians but could muster votes and deliver power to those in politics.  Whether the system 
is any more corrupt than its neighbouring EU member states is debatable, the critical factor 
was that all participants in discussing mining, consent, and EU membership, all gravitated 
towards the relationship between the political class and voters.  This certainly fits with the 
research, Budak and Rajh (2014:38) detailing Transparency International’s report the same 
year as the field research stated, “[C]orruption in Serbia is present in all spheres of economy 
and society (Transparency International, 2018).” 
All perceived factors driving political change and factors that might resist those changes 
were identified and it was acknowledged that some form of impact on mining was inevitable.  
Participants felt that the inevitable introduction of new environmental and social obligations 
would effectively destabilise the existing mining social Licences or the social acceptability of 
how mines currently operate and make creating new ones more challenging.  Institutional 
participants saw the introduction of these new regulations and arrival of new actors, financed 
directly or indirectly by the EU, as potentially driving new wider political realities that would 
affect mining licence.  Numerous participants articulated that there may be a higher prevalence 
in Serbia of the external (not Serbian) anti-mining environmental lobby creating or at the least 
supporting community challenge to mining.  The rolling attention given by BankWatch (Ref 
BW1), an international NGO representing a European network of anti-mining NGOs, to 
European Regional Development Bank loans to the Serbian state mine industry in the Kolubara 
basin lignite mines, was known about by everyone I spoke with, except the Roma.   Some of 
the most marginalised participants to this research did not think that attention or criticism 
would bring change that they would recognise but if activities around mines became an 
embarrassment to the EU, it would threaten to cut off the supply of money to Serbia.  Serbia, 
as part of its harmonisation process was funded by the EU through its Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA) between 2014-2020 to the tune of over €1.   5B and reportedly 
through other channels nearly double that (FT1).  Nearly €3B of EU monies buys influence 
and attracts interests from elites trying to access it.    
Throughout there were peppered numerous responses, suggesting there were “oligarchs” 
who would use conflict around a mine to consolidate their power in an opportunity to extract 
forms of payment for aspects of community management or social licence management from 
external transnational mining corporations.  These were termed by some participants as the 
“Green Mafia” although when challenged participants made the point that they would not 
necessarily be criminal, just using the new systems to extract payment and this was disapproved 
of, rather than being interpreted as a mechanism promoting transparency, better regulation, or 
involvement of citizens in regulatory discussions.  The cynicism towards both the political and 
environmental NGO sector was universally expressed to a varying extent from all participants, 
underpinned by allegations of what one could describe as a corrupt form of political 
transactionalism.  External transnational corporations appear to be resented by local people as 
the sector continues to transition to a neoliberal model from a state ran model of mining.  In 
the towns around the Kolubara basin area, the changes in management processes through 
rationalisation and introduction of private sector partners surrounding the lignite mining 
operation was linked to a more distant and less accessible management style.  Decisions, it was 
felt, were taken in Belgrade and not locally.  One participant made the point, no longer could 
one access a digger to help build one’s house through the network of links to the mining 
operation.  Some non-institutional participants thought local people would be less liable to 
overlook the annoyances such as dust from lorries, given the involvement of foreign companies 
who were making profits and taking them out of the country.  This research in the area 
surrounding Bor, with the large gold and copper mine facility, took place before the Chinese 
Zijin investors bought and restarted operations at the facility in late 2018.  The arrival of a 
sizable Chinese workforce to the small town was predicted by participants of the Serbian 
Mining conference in 2018 and it was anticipated that this might be likely to become a 
significant factor in shaping local social licence difficulties.  Bor currently appears to be 
wrestling with high levels of air pollution, detected, and managed by a Serbian government 
environmental protection department being trained by Swedish colleagues through an EU 
funded programme (ref SW1).   As well as an influx of people from outside the local 
community and loss of informal benefit-sharing from connections to mining there is another 
significant factor at work.  Resource nationalism is that other factor, a potential driver of 
conflict and well documented as a prescient driver against the social licence in other European 
countries (Eerola 2017).  The resulting translations of the SLSM in both Bor and are likely to 
challenge traditional hegemonies within the mining sector, state and in communities.  Former 
certainties around the mine project are open to challenges, overturned and redefined, through 
the adoption of what ANT theorist may call coordination, new conventions, or codification.  
Power, generated as a relational and distributed manner flows from the “ordering struggles” 
within networks and the construction and maintenance of network centres and peripheries, 
establishes hegemony.  The introduction of these new processes, social and environmental 
accountability frameworks and attendant international NGOs ideologically conflicted with 
mining would create instability however one looked at the situation.  Couple this to an 
increased propensity for activism in Serbia, linked to establishing the shared EU policy and 
legal framework, and disruptive to the assemblage that is social licence within the SLSM in 
inevitable.  This disruption of the status quo around mining is confirmed as an assumption from 
most those interviewed.    
 
Chapter 8 A New Model Emerges.    
8.1 An overview of the Social Licence Settlement model.    
The theoretical and case study research undertaken has resulted in the theoretical 
underpinnings and temporal definitions of ‘space and time’ the model operates in, illustrated 
in   Error! Reference source not found.. All of the icons in the model represent assemblages 
or social constructions, defining outwardly the operational positioning of the assemblages and 
how the parts are likely to be seen by those external.   
Each icon represents the expression of the intense and complicated processes inside the 
assemblage that determine and define external relationships.  The totality of the mine project 
and how it is actualised as an assemblage in the words of Latour “All projects are still born at 
the outset.  Existence must be added to them continuously, so they can take on body, can 
impose their growing coherence on those who argue about them or oppose them.  No project 
is born profitable, effective, or brilliant, any more than the Amazon at its source has the massive 
dimensions it takes on at its mouth” (Latour, 1996:79) 
 







8.2 The role of the Mine.    
The ‘M’ icon represents not just the corporation that is involved in the physical process of 
exploring and extracting minerals but rather, captures all the relationships between that 
corporation and associated subcontractors, consultants, and operatives.  The icon represents the 
mining project as an assemblage in ANT terms.  For example, a mining company may 
subcontract security arrangements or any other operational activities to a secondary agency and 
they too would be captured by this icon.  Viewed from a community perspective this 
conglomeration of interests is a whole, as all parts link to the activities of extracting the 
subterranean resource.  The mine is represented as an assemblage of interests, extracting 
material to utilise its value.  This icon seeks to compartmentalise the actions of all of those 
sometimes disparate, internal departments and outward-facing corporate processes, such as 
licensing, compliance, and public relations.  The view of the community of who the mine is 
cannot be overstated.  The case study research, as with the work of Zhang, Measham, Moffat 
et al, demonstrated the criticality of trust and procedural fairness in building 
social acceptance, as a key component of social licence to operate.  This 
relates to ‘a mining project’ not individual activities of those involved with 
a mining project.  Whoever or whichever subcontracting company operate they do so on behalf 
of the mining project locally, they work at the behest of governance controlled by the mine.  
This is certainly a critical point for the mine corporation to understand and has implication 
when the mine life is discussed.  From discovery, through to operations and eventually, mine 
closure, can take many years.  The local relationship developed over many years by many 
people, companies, corporations are critical to operations but never get assimilated onto the 
balance sheet. This came through strongly in the research in Serbia, the mine as a concept had 
changed from a national, community enriching entity to one owned by foreign corporations, 
making profit. In terms of defining the rationale for what each icon "represents" within this 
model, this can only be determined including those not part (outside) of each of the 
assemblages. The community play a significant role in defining the mine.  Similarly, the 
artefacts relating to the Mine and its operations and how the corporation views itself are 
encapsulated in this icon, within this model.  The processes around the mine are, as Sage, 
Dainty and Brookes (2011) quoting Cicmil et al.  (2009) define in terms of relationships and 
other products, illustrate that concerning a "project", the mechanisms for constructing 
knowledge can be best understood by looking at their products and this is critical to 
understanding how the "project" operates. 
8.3 The Community perspective. 
 
The ‘C’ icon represents internal processes inherent in what we defined 
by the term Community.  Given the often extensive, spatial reach of 
mining projects as well as their wider impacts on regions, defining the community, as 
discussed, can be difficult.  Indeed, challenging the definition of what the community is and 
therefore who should legitimately represent that community, is a tool used by corporations, 
states, and others to challenge the voice of community protest globally.  The case study research 
from Romania and in Serbia, detailed the community being defined by various external entities, 
the mine, the Hungarian state, the EU, bureaucrats, and others- legitimacy is usually accepted 
by those engaged with communities, so long as they are compliant.  This process of challenging 
the legitimacy of challenging communities by those supporting a mining social licence is 
ultimately counter-productive to establishing a stable social licence.  Even without external 
influences, there is usually dissent within communities on whom should represent them and in 
mining it is normally more than one geographic community voicing concern.    
 Elite capture or the co-opting of the elites within communities represents a continuum 
and a range of shifting realities which is compounded within non-homogenous local 
populations.  Kita's (2019) details pragmatic issues of dealing with elite capture and the co-
opting of elites in delivering disaster aid and resettlement of communities in Malawi, illustrates 
the huge complexities of trying to unravel, engineer and deliver a "solution" that often fails to 
take cognisance of local culture.  He bemoans that the role of the Chief has largely been ignored 
in terms of research supporting the delivery of climate change adaptions in rural communities.  
His paper diplomatically pushes back on approaches that have been developed, often in Europe 
or America without understanding the social context, the political and cultural aspects of where 
aid delivery will take place.  This is echoed through the field research, the complicated internal 
nature of communities is further destabilised and exaggerated through the movement from 
existing governance mechanism to new ones. As such this imposition of prepackaged solutions 
to local communities is analogous to the mining sector designing community solutions or rather 
solutions to the problems being caused by host communities.  Kita (2019) in his abstract 
summing up the finding from his research, “'[t]he findings require that states focus on the 
cultural and political dimensions of rural life when designing climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction programmes”.  I would go further and suggest that institutional local 
people around local livelihoods and decision making is critical to assuring balance within a 
social licence settlement system. Form the Romanian case study, initial concerns from local 
communities were, I would argue, were not adequately dealt with by GR to lock out external 
agitators. Similarly, a failure to lock local communities into the mine process meant that their 
support could not be utilised as evidence at international tribunal. This was a similar mistake 
the Romanian government made to that same end. 
 Developing solutions either at a state or local level that are relevant to the local 
population required knowledge and skill.  Garzon (2018:25) in her handbook aimed at 
supporting local communities to engage with and advocate for their interests regarding Chinese 
mining and investment projects, defined seven international standards that apply to mining.  
All these standards have some form of definition of the community as a critical stakeholder in 
most of them, include definitions of both directly and indirectly affected communities.  The 
author chose Garzon's work to illustrate the point, for two reasons; firstly, Chinese international 
mining projects are often seen as the least regulated of all within the sector given their funding 
generally not from the heavily regulated global North banking sector.  Secondly, legitimacy of 
grievance of community voice is linked to the spatial relationship to the mine project- 
arguments from communities directly affected have more moral weight than from those that 
are being or have been indirectly affected.  This does not necessarily reflect directly affected 
or indirectly affected types of communities' ability to influence social licence provision, but it 
reflects an established view of environmental justice. Serbia has like the countries in case study 
1, been subject to some very restrictive protocols regarding civilian dissent and moving towards 
a more liberalised model supported through the EU is likely to highlight the lack of Serbian 
state capacity in that area. This is not only the lack of practitioners who can bridge that state, 
privates sector community interface, there is also the notion of political capacity.  
As with the mine icon, defining the community is defining the expression of the 
community as a single entity.  For the communities influenced by a mine, which may be 
problematic for a variety of reasons.  The defining of the community by the Mine and an 
understanding of the risks, not just to their mining project but to other stakeholders, is a central 
process in delivering a social licence settlement.  As Worden (2016: 386) put it, there is a need 
"[t]o move away from a self-referential perspective of social risk, mining companies need to 
understand the social, community and cultural context in which they operate.  They need to 
consider how developing new projects might generate risk to others, how these risks may be 
understood and experienced by others, and how these risks should be addressed".    
8.4 Defining who is involved.  Relationships.    
Relationships are defined within the model with yellow 
arrow icons. The model is generic, but it is clear to see that the relationships for example 
between Natura 2000 regulations, those using them as a device for a particular agenda and the 
state and society can be mapped in Romania and is anticipated to be replicated in Serbia.  These 
arrows can pull or push or indeed represent a relationship that fulfils both those kinetic 
processes.  Arrows, in representing relationships, illustrate a connection between those at either 
end.  Whether an actual formal communications channel or the potentiality of a connection, 
push or pull or one that represents relationships been law and governance is not defined.  They 
represent the ability to influence and to be influenced.  The thicker the arrow the more powerful 
the relationship could be.  Arrows can change in thickness and can be used to illustrate the 
potential for dynamism in the model.  Arrows are where, as discusses earlier in the thesis, 
"tokens" representing legitimacy can be generated by for example communities local to mining 
conflicts and utilised by others if a relationship is established.  There is a considerable utility 
in recognising the range of possible relationships between the various parts of the model in 
terms of ensuring the wider structure stays balanced.  The model is however representative and 
a tool to define relationships and interconnectedness. Once relationships can be conceptualised, 
they can be mapped and ultimately in some way captured in a quantitative sense. 
Conceptualising the relationship enables an exploration of the component of that relationship. 
relationships 
Once you are aware that the relationship between communities and NGOs has an indirect effect 
on other relationships it can be modulated. Conceptualisation drives new relationships.  
8.5 International Finance Institutions -The Lender. 
The Lender is present in many, if not most, mining projects and there are 
several reasons for their presence.  Their involvement facilitates those 
corporations undertaking mining activities, to borrow capital which enables the project to 
access the resources it needs to proceed.  It spreads the financial risk for the corporations 
through offlaying it on external institutions and the capital that has been accessed, can be used 
to amplify the corporation's capital investment, enabling it to take advantage of economies of 
scale.  The sums of money lent by the Lenders are usually very significant (100's of millions 
of UK pounds).  There could conceivably be numerous lenders on a single project, and this 
might change throughout the life of the mine, which might be twenty years or more.  This thesis 
has outlined in chapter two the changing parameters for evaluating the relationship between 
those controlling access to capital (Lenders) for the mining industry and those who own the 
capital.  The parameters of this new fruiting body of capitalism characterised as financialisation 
relies on the Lender being able to define risk so that it might become or be addressed by another 
financial product.  Most institutionalised lenders such as the World Bank, European Investment 
Bank or European Regional Development Bank and those elsewhere in the world, subscribe to 
the Equator Principles, a World Bank concept.  These Lenders are sometimes referred to as 
Equator Principles Financial Institutions (or EPFI) and represent financial institutions that have 
adopted the Equator Principles following the procedures produced by the International Finance 
Committee (IFC).  IFC is an arm of the World Bank created guidance to screen potential 
investments and there is a considerable weight given to proposed and ongoing projects 
environmental and social management (referred to as E&S or ESM) operations.  For example, 
“The contractor's existing systems, its capacity to implement E&S [Environmental and Social] 
requirements, and the contractor-supplied information on past E&S performance should be 
among the key criteria used to evaluate contractors.  Capacity may be judged by past 
performance, existing or projected management, technical ability, and resources” IFC 
(2017:130). 
There is also a reputational aspect for Lender and Mine company with expectation with 
regards to social and environmental management.  Corporations are required to utilise 
necessary expertise and the process needs to be adequately resourced, although in reality there 
is currently no globally accepted qualification criteria for those individuals contracted to 
undertake social assessments.  The Lender icon contains all those involved in the mine project 
under considerations, that are defined by function (what lenders do).  Lenders recognise the 
importance of relationships between mining projects, communities and others and have tried 
through the likes of IFC and others to institutionalise the conditions for those relationships, 
primarily to support social licence management and protect their investment.    
8.6 Influence of Money/Capital.    
Money/ Capital is a separate icon, as capital is 
utilised by Lenders yet in itself, money/capital 
does not have coherent institutional capacity 
although it has a range of behaviours.  As with all the icons, or containers developed herein, 
there is a range of conceptual positions concerning what money is and this thesis is not the 
place to unpack those various propositions.  Here it is a collection of "things, electronic and 
physical" and beliefs of shareholders, rather than a collection of social processes with agreed 
guidelines.  Lenders may facilitate Mine access to Money/Capital, yet Capital/Money can 
theoretically come from a range of sources other than Lenders, an example being mine projects 
income generation.  EY (2019:3) detail the critical nature of capital with regards to the social 
licence, "[l]icense to operate has evolved beyond the narrow focus on social and environmental 
issues.  There are now increasing expectations of truly shared value outcomes from mining 
projects.  Any misstep can impact the ability to access capital or even result in a total loss of 
licence." 
The ability to access capital is normally linked to how relationships with the community 
can be portrayed and the mine reputation defined through Lenders.  Defensibility of reputation 
is normally critical for any mine operation within the web of relationships to both enable social 
licence and ensure access to money/capital to enable wider corporate operations.  Problematic 
within the model is that the balance enabling a social licence settlement is dramatically upset 
if we remove or shrink this icon (see below).  Is it possible to have a social licence to operate 
if the mining company has no capital?  Within this model, capital is nearly as essential to the 
balance as the State.  This is because to operate, even if consent is given, money/capital is 
required.  One example of how Capital can exert pressure on a mine corporation Similarly the 
model can be used to underline that legality or state permission alone is no guarantee of have 
a social licence to operate.  Recent event at Pilbara in Australia where the London based mining 
company Rio Tinto, on the 25th of June 2020 knowingly and legally blew up a range of caves 
which contained archaeological evidence of some of the oldest habitation in western Australia 
are still at the time of writing resonating.  RioTinto had necessary permits to undertake the 
demolition, had been in discussions with the indigenous people and their representatives and 
went ahead with the demolition in the face of protests (Source Guardian1).  RioTinto are 
currently encountering major reputational damage, being aligned with the Taliban for their 
destruction of ancient artefacts and have come under massive pressure from a range of globally 
important investment funds (Source Conversation 2).   Some heads have rolled such as their 
CEO, but their activities will have the effect of driving reform both of the legal protections 
offered to indigenous peoples’ cultural artefacts and landscapes in Western Australia and their 
internal systems (Source: Conversation 1).  If an assessment of their projected activities, 
blowing up the caves to access $100m of high-quality iron ore had have been viewed within 
the SLSM Rio Tinto may have not proceeded.  The SLSM moves, by operating in Third space, 
away from the narrow geographical and business focus.  Significantly the pressure on Rio Tinto 
appears to be coming not from lenders or communities but from what has been defined 
separately in the model as Capital.  There was for no sustained loss in Rio Tinto’s company 
value on the stock market from the Pilbara episode.  17 Australian cents per share were lost 
and then recovered from the share price in a matter of days.  Rio Tinto’s share price appears 
then to have then steadily climbed.  If they are looking at short/medium term management of 
their financial performance, they would be correct to say it is better to ask forgiveness than to 
seek permission.   
 
Figure 8-2 Rio Tinto share values 
  
Nevertheless, major shareholders and investment entities have signalled both their 
unhappiness and their willingness to demonstrate their own values through applying direct 
pressure (Source: Guardian 3).  Capital as an entity has responded to forces within the SLSM 
and exerted significant effect on Rio Tinto who initially appeared to want to apologise and 
move on (Source: ibid).  
8.7 Regional Development Plans and Related Governance. 
The ‘Regional Development Plans + Related Governance’ icon, 
links environmental impacts and structures and systems that have 
been developed to engage the local community and this being used effectively within the model 
to develop trade-offs, remedies and "shared value" across the model.  An implicit aspect of this 
"icon" is that the regional development plans of all types are underpinned with effective 
community engagement, the community need to be significantly engaged in their governance 
for them to exist here.  Herein are the mechanisms for supporting communities to accommodate 
both the projected and actual impacts experienced by communities through a range of 
deliberative dialogues (Sen 1999).  Could there be Regional Development Plans and 
Community Development which are imposed on communities from the outside or developed 
outside the community? The answer is no as the model builds on the work of Proctor and 
MacCallum (2019) and Sen (1999) which represents the process of designing and modulating 
such plans in and through public discourse, as fundamental to dealing with conflict.  The 
strength of arrows between Mine and Community and between State and Community defines 
how this critical aspect of the balancing act plays out.  We know from the research that two 
factors: time (Zhang, Meacham, and Moffatt, (2018), Frederickson (2018, 2019)), Jijelava and 
Vanclay (2017) and others) and the impact on land use (Kemp, Worden and Owen (2016), 
Worden (2016) are critical to mine and community engagement and outcomes in terms of social 
licence.  Regional Development Plans and Related Governance as an assemblage in the model, 
define the critical forces that land-based livelihoods, community engagement and formal 
development processes of dialogue can potentially generate and are necessary for a social 
licence settlement.  Gauging the quality (community engagement, creativeness, time, 
appropriateness) of the content of this icon is perhaps one mechanism for accessing the level 
of stability of the whole social licence settlement.  MacCallum, Proctor and Kelly (2020) 
propose just such an approach with the creation of an Index attempting to qualify through a 
range of measures livelihood stresses and opportunities for actuation of community voices, the 
level of stress within this political settlement system.  This paper was the result of research 
undertaken as part of the INFACT Horizon 2020 program, examining barriers to mining within 
Europe.  Evidence from the field and academia would suggest that more stress running through 
the factors contained in this icon or assemblage, the more strain on the social licence settlement.  
The assemblage represented by the icon is where the opaquest aspects of social licence reside 
and where upstream investment by those seeking the minerals to be extracted, need to 
concentrate.  There is a wider debate here, already touched on in this thesis but too expansive 
for substantial engagement in this thesis.  The debate is around whether the existing business 
model for mining needs to change, given that large upstream investment in communities 
developing plans and capacity with a return expected over many years, does not sit with the 
short-term return model of capitalism.  This icon is an attempt to encapsulate the relationships 
and processes that are necessary to mitigate the negative impacts of a mining project on 
communities.  The impacts of mining projects on local communities' livelihoods, through what 
is often classified as "Environmental Impacts" or "community engagement" are critical to 
understanding the dynamic and potentially fluid situation that is a social licence settlement.  If 
realistic assumptions about the robustness of any social licence situation are to be developed, 
the totality of relationships at play, communities' ability to engage with and mobilise power 
and to potentially collapse an existing social licence situation must be studied.  Containerising 
or labelling an assemblage as Regional Development Plans and Related Governance, is an 
attempt to identify more concrete aspects for a model than relying on normative concepts such 
as "trust" for example.  Shifting from a fluid normative, time-sensitive process such as trust to 
creating formal social institutions supporting planning, shifts from the intangible to concrete 
relationships.  Within the model the "arrows" representing "the ability to influence and be 
influenced".  This thesis has detailed the attempt to move away from amorphous concepts such 
as "trust" which is detailed as critical to SLO.  Edwards, Fleming, Lacey, Lester, Pinkard, 
Ruckstuhl and Williams (2019:3),  
"Trust has been posited as a critical component of SLO; Thomson and Boutilier (2011) 
propose that trust is key to the highest level of social acceptance (underpinned by credibility 
and legitimacy10), while Moffat and Zhang (2014) propose that, acceptance of industrial 
activities is mediated by trust in the industry.  Trust is cemented in social relationships; founded 
on ways people experience their relationships with each other and the institutions or 
organisations they interact with.” 
The formalisations of institutions as outlined as within this icon, promote a transparent 
approach or a mechanism for precipitating amorphous concepts like trust and concretising them 
as well as detailing their more formalised state.  To resolve or mitigating potential and 
actualised conflict without the investment by the State, Mine and Community in the creation 
of such institutions risk those at work being a hostage to fortune.  The notion of "trust" is 
relationship based but if one were to take out a domestic bank loan one would want to know 
that there were institutions behind the conditions behind the loan.  Institution building and trust 
may seem, unusually bedfellow, until one realises this process of engaging with a corporation 
is not personal but corporate.    
It is questionable whether trust can be understood without understanding what influences 
peoples and communities’ values and how they respond to external influencers, such as mining 
projects (MacCallum 2014).  Amartya Sen, a Nobel Prize-winning welfare economist’s work 
on capabilities and development over the last 40 years, has focused on the importance of human 
freedom and capability to lead the kind of lives that people have reason to value (Sen.1999:56).  
Sen identified the importance of public discussion and social interaction when he stated, “The 
exercise of freedom is mediated by values, but the values in turn are influenced by public 
discussions and social interactions, which are themselves influenced by participatory 
freedoms”.  
Understanding what communities’ value about what they have access to or not, is surely 
a requirement for understanding how and if they can trust a mining project even before they 
interact.  The impact of mining projects on local communities’ livelihoods, through what is 
often classified as “Environmental Impacts” or “community engagement”, is critical to 
understanding the dynamic and potentially fluid situation that is a social licence.  Without 
social forums to unpack this and without data to understand what effect the Mine might or 
actually have on people’s livelihoods, it is doubtful any meaningful engagement between 
aspects of the social licence settlement can take place.  The totality of relationships at play and 
communities’ ability to engage with and mobilise power, to potentially collapse an existing 
social licence situation, is what must be studied if realistic assumptions about the robustness 
of any social licence situation are to be developed.  This icon then represents not just written 
plans and organisations but the mechanism for assessing and dealing with environmental and 
livelihood impacts of land use.    
Therefore, knowing and understanding what people value and why, is essential.  Proctor 
and MacCallum’s (2019) Canary in a Cage paper, points to how the extraction industry should 
be engaging with conflict and potential conflict, enabling dissenting voices at an early stage of 
project development, rather than trying to quell them.  It is through the co-production of aspect 
contained in this item that this can be achieved.    
     Aspects of this doctoral research focus on how changes in civil society mobilisation 
and the factors shaping local agency, during and following European Union ascension process 
in Bulgaria and Romania, are due to be replicated in Serbia.  These changes, brought about 
largely through the introduction of EU transnational environmental governance regimes, for 
which the existing government administrations were unprepared for, shifted the dynamics 
underpinning existing and developing social licence settlements.  Subsequently, Bulgaria and 
Romania became problematic countries for mining project development.  Given the attitudes 
and capacities in Serbia detailed in field research in the next chapter, it is probable this situation 
is due to be repeated if, as expected, Serbia moves forwards with EU ascension in 2024.    
As outlined for Community and Lender, there is a range of international protocols and 
regulations concerning environmental impacts and their subsequent social impact but protocols 
about mechanism relating this to community participation in shared decision making are 
lacking.  This icon also then represents those environmental impacts that the Mine creates or 
are envisaged to create, directly or indirectly and acts as an important nexus within the balance 
of social licence settlement.  The relationships environmental impacts have to social licence 
are well documented.  Sandy Worden (2016:375) linked the building tide of social licence 
failure in the last decade, to the conflict between those objecting to actual or perceived 
environmental impacts by the mining industry.  She states that the “origins of this hostility are 
diverse, ranging from the philosophical arguments of environmental activists to conflict over 
multiple land use and concerns about social and environmental impacts of mining.”   
In Ian Thompson’s (2017:6) paper The Rise in Conflict Associated with Mining 
Operations: What Lies Beneath?  In which he asserts: “The significant increase in conflicts 
associated with mining operations since about 2000 has occurred in the context of a general 
rise in large-scale protests globally, particularly associated with land and environmental issues, 
and an unprecedented increase in global exploration and mining activity during this period.” 
The establishment of well-defined and policed international environmental regulations 
and safeguards, ahead of robust social safeguard regulations, one might surmise, are 
contributing factors to increased levels of failure of the industry.  An industry that is not 
equipped to move beyond their preoccupations for quantitative data systems.  The mining 
sector is predominated over, at an operational and strategic level, by those trained as earth 
scientists and engineers.  They engage in a process of what Çalışkan and Callon (2009:369) 
characterised as economisation, that is the process of assembling and qualifying of actions, 
devices, and the analytical/practical descriptions of the mine as economic.  Modelling SLO 
failure within this social licence settlement model, it is apparent that understanding the totality 
of relationships and their interrelatedness is critical.  This is a shift from existing models of 
SLO.  Developing a social licence settlement through understanding and engaging with a range 
of relationships to create forms of shared spatial and resource governance, is an alternative 
approach to remediation of social licence issues supported by environmental monitoring 
mechanisms or indeed striking agreements with unorganised communities although both these 
activities will always be necessary.      
8.8 International NGO. 
The perceived increase of socio-political risk over the last decade and the 
rise in social licence failure, has been linked to the activities of NGOs. The 
“International NGO” icon as so very often with mining projects includes local and international 
NGOs or community based organisations.  These local NGOs are often seen as an 
“unrepresentative” or “non-democratic” pressure group and their leaders are viewed as 
mavericks.  Often local NGOs are ignored or attempts to are made to capture them are part of 
a community pacification strategy by the mine.  More fully this icon could be labelled 
international and non-local, large national NGOs.  Significantly international NGO’s (INGO) 
as the icon encapsulates, usually bolster their legitimacy engaging with a cause, which is often 
for them ideological, by supporting local protestors who are often concerned about pragmatic 
social and environmental issues.  Alexandrescu (2012a:35) details at length the lack of 
convergence between local and international NGOs. In a study Chimalapas, Mexico, Doane 
(2007: 460) identifies “some serious ideological disjunctures between the “local” and the 
“global” elements of transnational environmental movements”.    
 In the context of rural Malagasy society, Simsik (2002) criticizes the “conventional 
wisdom” of international environmental NGOs, which are out of touch with local realities and 
ultimately fail to prevent continued environmental degradation.  Similarly, in their study of 
mining in New Caledonia, Ali, and Grewal (2006), discover that environmentalists and 
indigenous groups do not always regard the impacts of a given project in the same way.  INGOs 
have the facility to bring not just financial resources to local actants but new forms of 
knowledge.  This can enable the wider “Community” to activate, ignored or dormant regulatory 
and rights systems which can shift the balance within a social licence settlement.  The more 
aligned the interests of the Community are to that of the INGO, the more effective the latter 
can be at supporting the shifting the balance within the social licence settlement.  The closer 
the ties between the Community and INGO the more legitimacy is inferred on the later.  The 
co-production of knowledge challenging the corporation is the idealised position for INGO as 
it can counter the argument from the mine that the challenge is purely ideological.  This is well 
represented in a paper by Leah, Bene, and Alier (215:25) entitled “Mapping the frontiers and 
frontlines of global environmental justice: the EJAtlas”.  The above refers to Casa-Cortes et al 
(2008) using the term "knowledge practices" to illustrate how the co-production of knowledge 
can be critical to reshaping the knowledge paradigm.  INGOs in mining can bring specialisms 
that can challenge, for example, aspects of a corporations social and environmental 
management plan.  Leah, Bene, and Alier 215:25 quote Porto (2012) in detailing the aspiration 
of the environmental justice campaigner as, “activists aim to make issues of risk and the 
uncertainties of knowledge explicit, and in the process to remove the legitimacy of specialists 
in defining, in isolation, the parameters of the problem and the arguments most relevant to 
decision-making.” 
Mining arguably has been very guilty of manufacturing environmental and social 
knowledge within a narrow quantitative, neoliberal economic framework for the justification 
of its own, already fully formed plans for a mine.  Understandably, a construct such as a 
company will try to deliver brokered deals with communities and the state within a framework 
that synchronises with its system.  The raft of “obligations” adopted by the company in relation 
to the community and their environments, through community management plan, resettlement 
action plans and many such other similar vehicles of intent would logically be the means of 
addressing concerns that might be mobilised by an INGO.  The creation of and the crystallising 
of these obligations are undertaken with respect to various abstract, legal, and good practice 
guidelines and reports created early in or before the operational phase of a mine, often a 
precursor by the state to a mining permit.  The implementation of these plans that relate to how 
the community will be resourced, supported, and enabled and how the actions of the mining 
corporations have been viewed in the delivery of the obligations, occurs throughout the life of 
the mine.  The plans are technical and very much embedded in the process of deliver.  Oversight 
and review of mine corporation compliance towards the agreed obligations by outside agents, 
usually by the lender, sometimes the state is augmented by INGOs.  This demonstrates that the 
community, INGO, lenders, state, and mine corporations are connected and that there are 
opportunities for specialist knowledge held within an INGO to support communities in 
understanding their rights and potentially their opportunities.  Leah, Bene, and Alier (215:25) 
describe a process which might represent an idea coalesce between INGO and Community.  
Conde (2014) used the term "Activism Mobilizing Science" (AMS) to denote the process 
whereby activists and scientists co-produce new and alternative knowledge that gives local 
organizations visibility and legitimacy and empowers them to challenge the manufactured 
uncertainty produced by the state or companies. 
INGO’s can, through bringing alternative ontologies as well as resources into play, 
support the development of the conflict between communities and the mine.  Arguably, the 
further the Mine moves from established frameworks of social and environmental protections, 
the more opportunity exists for INGOs and communities to find a shared alternative 
interpretation of reality.  It is difficult looking at the disparity of perspectives of reality in 
mining areas between mine and local communities, to argue with the assertion of Bruno Latour 
(2005:118) in a footnote in Reassembling the Social An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory.   He wrote, “I maintain the plural for ontologies to remind the reader that this unity is 
not the result of what the world is like at first encounter, but what the world might become 
provided it’s collected and assembled.” 
Ontological “performality”, is a contested notion yet between INGO and Community 
there has within this model, to be at least a sharing articulation of a rational, normative 
coalescence around change.  The importance of language and a shared sense of the grievance 
between community and INGO are usually easily found around poor environmental 
performance by mine sites.  Sage Dainty and Brooks (2014:289) detailed that “across diverse 
academic projects, the concept of ‘performance’ has oscillated between philosophical 
ruminations (Anderson & Harrison, 2010; Butler, 1990; Lorrimer, 2005; Schechner, 2003; 
Thrift, 2008) and the strict rationalist-normative maxims of management, sometimes even in 
the hands of critically minded authors.” 
Environmental issues are likely the most “concrete” communicable area for INGO to 
coalesce around with communities, the application of accepted models of knowledge creation 
by all technically equipped participants within the model gives a safe platform for INGO to 
work on the co-production of knowledge with Community.  Social knowledge is more 
contestable within a techno-scientific dominated forum.  In the same paper (ibid:289) they 
draw the nature of different perspectives to a head using Law (2006: 31). 
“It is not possible to separate out (a) the making of particular realities, (b) the making of 
particular statements about those realities, and (c) the creation of instrumental, technical and 
human configurations and practices, the inscription devices that produce these realities and 
statements.  Instead, all are produced together.  Without inscription devices, and the 
inscriptions and statements that these produce, there are no realities”.    
INGOs, through their connection with internationalised communities, can mobilise huge 
forces within the social licence settlement model and support a process of inscription.  They 
can exert forces within the model on other and through other actants, forces that have not been 
contained within the Regional Development Plan and Related Governance.    
8.9 International Rights Framework. 
This icon represents the range of rights, national and transnational 
that people have, and which can be engaged by mining operations.  
Many countries such as the UK, where many mining companies have their headquarters, see 
the application of these rights as legal obligations by such companies, wherever they operate 
in the world.  For example, the “Business and Human Rights Toolkit - How UK overseas 
missions can promote good conduct by UK” (HM.  2011) point to the rights frameworks.  
“The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”  (Source OHCHR1).  
Similarly, “ILO Conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182 (performality”).  
The “core labour standards” are a set of four internationally recognised basic rights and 
principles at work, covering freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of forced labour and child labour and the elimination of discrimination”  (Ibid:4).  
Lest we get too enamoured with the UK, especially given that there is a range of state 
entities to report bad behaviour to and legislation banning bribery overseas, it is worth 
recognising that there are numerous caveats with regards to how these rights frameworks might 
be actioned or ignored.  The same page as the above, quotes; 
“The UK takes a more nuanced view than John Ruggie about the State’s duty to ensure 
that companies act compatibly with the States’ human rights obligations.  The UK’s view is 
that this is not a blanket obligation but depends on the wording of the treaty obligation in 
question.  To the extent that there is a legal duty to protect, it only applies in respect of a state’s 
inhabitants.  The UK does not owe legal obligations to ensure that UK companies comply with 
UK human rights standards overseas” (Ibid:4). 
The UK is only one nation which offers potential legal recourse for members of overseas 
communities poorly treated by corporations and many countries offer more accessible in-
country rights frameworks, particular for recognised indigenous peoples.  Canada, Australia, 
Philippians, New Zealand, Chile, and Finland might be particularly good examples on States 
that assure national rights for indigenous people within a legal remittance.  Within an 
international context, the World Bank’s International Finance Institute Performance Standard 
7, obligates mining companies to undertake a range of prescriptive engagement processes with 
indigenous people likely to be affected by future operations, with the prerequisite of obtaining 
Free and Informed Prior Consent (FPIC) for the project.  Although powerful for communities 
and costly for the mine, historically it has not guaranteed local social licence.  Free and 
Informed Continuous Consent (FICC) arguably is what a social licence settlement is and there 
is no obligation to undertake such a rolling process.  FPIC then represents a carte blanche to be 
obtained at the beginning of a mining process and social licence settlement is a vital 
relationship.  A really good example of how this interpretation may be subject to creep is 
outlined below concerning the International Arbitration icon, and referenced earlier, the case 
of Bear Creek PLC versus the Government of Peru.  National and international rights 
frameworks do convey communities with the theoretical ability to assert their “Rights” and this 
is critical within a Social Licence Settlement Model (SLSM).  Given resources-both financial 
and knowledge-based are needed to enforce FPIC or any other legally based rights, poor rural 
communities are ill-equipped to develop such challenges.  INGO’s can play a significant role 
in developing the capacity of communities to action their legal rights.  Hence once again the 
relationship between icons is what is significant not just what they contain.    
8.10 The State. 
The role of the State with this Social Licence Settlement model is 
pivotal and represented as a mobile fulcrum icon.  The State can 
change its position and alter the relationship between the two other 
primary actants, communities and the mine, hence it is on wheels.  
The argument in this thesis is that without the participation of the State, there can be no social 
licence to operate a mine.  This icon is an attempt to embrace all of State governance processes 
including government and is emblematic of legislation, practice, and policy.  There are actions 
or roles that the State can pursue which will support or hinder social licence but more 
fundamentally without the issuing of consents, permits or Licences, there can be no mining 
activity, no operation, even if the community supports the principle.    
 Olsen (2017) examines the role of the State from a stakeholder theory perspective in 
determining who should be involved in delivering microfinance support.  This is, for Olsen, a 
way to challenge that there is an implicit logic rather than a political dimension to who is 
engaged in this form of social development.  This thesis argues that there are similarities with 
the process of mining investment within a locality.  Olsen says: 
“[t]his approach challenges the predominant perception that the “firm’s management… 
determines which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management attention” 
[emphasis original] (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997: 871) and instead points to,  “the important 
role the state plays in determining stakeholder legitimacy” (Olsen 2017:72). Olsen defines the 
regulatory framework utilised by the government through a range of standard processes, 
“Democratic states have many tools at their disposal—regulation, allocation of resources, 
taxation, monitoring, enforcement and, when combined, the creation of new industries” (Olsen 
2017:72).  
The reality of how the State works is influenced by numerous sub-systems ranging from 
political, legal, cultural, and economic and there are issues about how representative the State 
is with regards to particular groups within society.  Within the model, the closer (physically) 
the State icon is represented to the community, the more representative it is.  Conversely the 
closer the State is to the mine and the associated Capital/Money and Lender icons, the less 
representative it is of Community.  Yet there is no implicit criticism of the State in being located 
there at either position, the model is neutral.  The model cannot assume the reasons for the 
State’s location towards location at either end of the Lever as to do so would be a political 
statement rather than an attempt to represent reality.  There may be very good reasons, fiscal, 
social, economic, cultural and political in a variety of settings, for the State to be both where it 
is and for it to reposition itself.  This is one of the central dynamic functions of the model.    
Olsen, utilising Buchholz and Rosenthal (2004:149), made the point that the State is, in 
an ideal model, this thesis would argue, ideally placed to articulate a way forward across all 
interests.  “[T]he implementation of stakeholder principles depends upon government as it is 
the only entity that [can] speak for society as a whole and can thus change the way corporations 
are governed and managed” (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004:149 in Olsen 2017:72).    
It may be ideally situated but only if the State is not contested, as it is in some conflict 
and post-conflict zones with mining projects and this does not necessarily mean, the State can 
“speak for society”.    
Conde and Le Billon (2017:683) identify in their paper why some communities resist 
mining projects and others do not as well as a range of aggravating activities that the State can 
undertake, which can lead galvanising and driving mining conflict.  The State creating pro-
industrial policies, inadequate planning, corruption, repression, and criminalisation of protests 
all have the capacity.  Conde and Le Billon (2017:684) quoting Owen and Kemp (2015: 486), 
determine State capacity issues as being at the heart of some of the conflict around mining, 
“Rather than represent and assist affected communities, the state often delegates all 
responsibilities to the company, including for design and enforcement purposes, an attitude 
aggravated by an “internal capacity gap” in mining companies that have to deal with “complex 
issues relating to legacy, traditional forms of land ownership, multiple resettlements, and 
changed ownership” (Owen and Kemp, 2015: 486)”.  
This ability for the State to function is something we examine further on in this thesis 
when looking at State capacity and the introduction of new transnational environmental 
management systems.  The geography of mining and the presence or absence of the State from 
regions where mining is due to or is currently taking place can have a significant effect on the 
role the State can or cannot play.  State hegemony, that is domination authority of social, 
cultural, political, and economic life within a nation state can in practical terms be challenging 
in remote regions, their authority waning with distance, and this can affect the social licence 
settlement.  Conde and Le Billon (2017:685) investigating remoteness and resistance to mining 
by communities determined that, “resistance is more likely to emerge in remote areas precisely 
because of lack of effective state presence.  Ballard and Banks (2003) argue that when the 
state's capacity to deliver services is limited, communities have less regard to “the authority 
and claims of the state” (see also Scott, 2014).”   
Furthermore, their research illustrates that mining projects are located within a historical 
context.  This thesis contends that this historical relationship between the community and the 
State is an often ignored aspect on behalf of the mine developer investigating the potential to 
avoid conflict and “[m]oreover, relations between remote communities and the state, as well 
as a sense of ’citizenship’ (both on the part of indigenous communities and the state vis à vis 
these communities), are frequently embedded in historical relations of marginalisation, racism 
and various forms of violence including outright genocide (Martinez Alier, 2003; Ballard and 
Banks, 2003; Muradian et al.   , 2003 in Conde and Le Billon (2017:685)”.  
The essential brokerage role of the State in a potential Social Licence Settlement is one 
which requires the communities affected by said Mine to trust the State in that role.  Conde and 
Le Billon (2017:688) determine that, “[d]istrust has emerged as one of the main factors that 
generate opposition.  There is frequent distrust towards the mining company, but also towards 
the state as guarantor of environmental standards and appropriate revenue distribution, with 
local elites ’capturing’ opportunities and instrumenting conflicts for their benefits, as well as 
external expertise and hard to understand science-based findings (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; 
Le Billon, 2014; Conde, 2014)”. 
This is highly significant and emphasises the importance of the quality of engagement 
between the State and both Environmental Impacts and International Rights Frameworks in the 
model.  It also illustrates within the academic literature that current models are reliant of 
constructs such as “trust” which are amorphous, normative terms that are context and culturally 
specific.   
8.11 The Lever. 
The lever provides the basis for all the relationships between actants.  Social Context and 
International Regulations are two aspects of the assemblage of a social licence situation that 
have not been captured elsewhere in the model and both are outside the complete control of 
the other actants.  Social context is often characterised in mining project documents and 
conflict of various types is often central to the relationship matrix As Owen and Kemp 
(2014:98) point out “conflict is and will continue to be a constant force, both in the existing 
social context and between company and community, and should be characterized and 
accounted for from the outset of mining activities ”. 
Conflict, however one might define it, may be a part of the social context but there are 
also the myriad aspects of culture, history, recent and remembered experience with analogous 
mining type related activities that create social context.  Social context is the result of complex 
assemblages interacting over time and some of the responses from communities need to be 
understood outside the rational.  Some communities’ responses to conflict type situation are 
likely, if not understood, to be seen as guttural and brutal.  Unless these responses can be 
understood they are difficult to predict and mitigated.  Similarly, the term International 
Regulations defines not specific legislation alone but what Raufflet et al (2014) describe as 
those contained within a “regulatory scripts” framework.  “Regulatory scripts” were described 
as the practices shared by a group of organizations in an industry in response to international 
frameworks and standards (termed institutional expectations). Moran, Lodhia, Kunz and 
Huisingh (2014:5).    
This thesis argues that just as corporations have a range of regulatory scripts driven by 
shared practice, so do lenders and governments.  These may be based on shared understanding 
between or assemblages or aspects of this model but also the international frameworks 
subscribed to by actants.  In an increasingly accountable and transparent global marketplace 
there is likely to be an increased sharing of regulatory scripts that are defendable both within a 
legal context and to consumers and shareholders.    
8.12 International Arbitration. 
The ‘International Arbitration’ icon represents 
the range of international rules and processes that 
can be brought to bear on States, Lenders and 
Mine companies.  Barnes in her 2019 paper on international investment tribunals that regulate 
how States which have signed up to international trade agreement operate noted that: 
“that arbitrators may have to consider the social licence to operate as part of the 
applicable law, which could have significant effects for international dispute settlement in 
general” (ibid:1).    
Barnes’ (2019) analysis of research undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) into the language used in bilateral investment treaties 
(BIT) identified a proliferation of phases supporting sustainable business practices and aspects 
of sustainable development in recent years.  Barnes (ibid) states that, “[t]his indicates that 
investment tribunals are starting to recognize the ‘potential interactions’ between international 
investment law and other matter such as sustainable development, responsible business 
practices and human rights in general.” 
She drives her argument home, citing the findings of an investment tribunal arbitrating 
in the 2017 case of Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Republic of Peru (Bear Creek Mining 
Corporation v Republic of Peru ((ICSID Case No ARB/14/21).  The former was a Canadian 
International Arbitration 
investment vehicle seeking damages of USD522 million and were subsequently awarded 
USD18 million.  The central issue in the reduced damages was indicated to be the failure of 
the claimant to develop aspects of their SLO.  Although there appears to be no definition of 
SLO used in this finding, it does appear to have been conflagrated by the BIT with Free and 
Public Informed Consent (FPIC).  This later term refers to a requirement under a range of 
international conventions specifically supporting the rights of indigenous peoples.  FPIC is 
about ensuring consent at a particular point in time, and one could argue, SLO requires a 
continuous surety of consent, Free and Informed Continuous Consent may be more accurate.  
However, the utilisation of FPIC by international bodies that have the potential to impact 
financially significantly on both State and Mine illustrate the utility of this icon.   
Working towards a single temporal hurdle as defined by FPIC requires a different 
strategy and approach to developing a relationship capable of sustaining consent over the life 
span of a mine site.  FPIC is also something that must be negotiated before physical operations 
commencing.  During the production phase, the community will have a fuller understanding of 
the real issues likely to diverge corporation and community interests.  This international aspect 
related to how Lenders, Mines and States may all come under pressure to legitimise their 
mining activities.    
The evidence emerging from the latest BIT processes also sends a stark message to both 
corporations and international pressure groups and NGOs.  This relates to Gabriel Resources’ 
allegations of breach of the BIT arise concerning a proposed open-pit mining development in 
Roşia Montană, Romania which was not implemented and which this thesis looks at in detail 
in a chapter.  An “order” was issued from a BIT tribunal (7th December 2018) currently 
presiding over Gabriel Resources Ltd.  and Gabriel Resources (Jersey) Ltd.  vs Romania 
(ICSID Case No.  ARB/15/31) excluding the amicus curiae submissions from three 
international NGOs is significant.  Amicus curiae submissions are covered by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO1) and are a theoretical means for experts or interested people to be 
introduced as a “friend of the court”.  WTO describes recognises them as, “[a] controversial 
issue [which] has been whether panels and the Appellate Body may accept and consider 
unsolicited submissions they receive from entities, not a party or third party to the dispute.  
These submissions are commonly referred to as amicus curiae submissions”. 
There is space for this type of evidence to be more closely bound or excluded from the 
processes altogether as, “[a]micus curiae means “friend of the court”.  These submissions often 
come from non-governmental organisations, including industry associations, or university 
professors.  Neither the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)[ The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding is a legal text containing the rules for dispute settlement in the 
WTO]  [SS38]nor the associated Working Procedures for Appellate Review specifically 
address this issue.   ” 
The scope of these forms of evidence/brief appears to be defined by this recent tribunal 
order.  A briefing to the tribunal from three international NGOs, representing the local protest 
group in Romania, was excluded from the legal process on the basis that the three international 
NGOs were acting as a conduit for evidence from a local (to the conflict) organisation, rather 
than being local themselves.  On a practical level, this driving the need for the operator (mining 
company) to drive a wedge between external (non-local) environmental actors and for those 
international environmental actors to legitimise their activities through closer affiliation (work 
through, rather than with local entities), if they are not to be automatically ruled out from 
briefing future BIT disputes.  This again points to the relationships in the Social Licence 
Settlement model in terms of all assemblages ensuring their interests are preserved by being 
cognisant of International Arbitration and those bodies that can be engaged.  Similarly, World 
Trade Organisations (WTO) participating governments who consider that they may end up in 
a dispute with companies over issues such as social licence, need to integrate local 
organisations into their original argument if they wish their views to be considered.  WTO’s 
position on this is, “Amicus curiae submissions have frequently been filed in Appellate Body 
proceedings.  When these briefs are attached to the submission of a participant (appellant or 
appellee), for instance as exhibits, the Appellate Body considers such material to be an integral 
part of the submission of that participant who also assumes responsibility for its content”. This 
is rational given the tribunals need to weigh a final settlement decision based on a binary 
decision, responsibility for controlling the veracity of briefings will fall to one of the two 
partners and they will be held accountable for it accurately.    
What the finding does suggest, is that if the local organisation have had presented its 
argument directly it may have been included.  Local communities can then, represent a form 
of conflict capital within BIT but not if they are not direct contributors to the briefing and 
attached to one of the two sides directly.   
It is significant that to date, only a few panels have made use of their discretionary right 
to accept and consider unsolicited briefs and “[o]n the basis of the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation, panels have no obligation whatsoever to accept and consider these briefs.  
Accordingly, interested entities, which are neither parties nor third parties to the dispute, have 
no legal right to be heard by a panel” (WTO2). It would in practice have been politically more 
difficult to exclude evidence a briefing from a local protest group and one ponders as to why 
the Romanian government did not introduce the briefing as part of their evidence unless they 
had concerns about the quality of the evidence.    
 Other International Arbitration systems such as International human rights law could see 
mine corporations taken to court in their home jurisdiction for activities undertaken overseas.  
One example would a series of lawsuits of Acacia Mining Group in the UK by relatives of 
people killed through their activities in Tanzania  (Source Telegraph 1). 
8.13  Enabling a Social Licence.    
Social licence represents the ability of the corporation to carry on its 
mining operations without direct or indirect interference from a 
range of actors that could cause the community to withdraw their 
consent for those operations and force it to stop production.    
8.14 The Social Licence Settlement Model. 
The model “containerises” the Mine, the Community, the Lender, the State, and a range 
of another key, what he terms ‘actants” or “assemblages”, within a loose ANT framework, to 
set the scenario up for building a visual model of social licence settlement.  Pivotal to the Social 
licence is the State, without a legal licence and State consent, nothing can happen and hence 
no social licence is logically possible.  The relationships between the State and those acting on 
the Communities’ side of his settlement model and local and regional development capacity 
with their associated governance systems operating in geographical communities are critical 
for creating the space for “shared value” or “shared benefit” and delivering balance within the 
local geopolitical system.  “Shared” and “Benefits” are both contentious terms and the 
allocating of resources would as one might expect, often reflects the underlying power 
relations.  The aim of the model to become a theoretical tool for both academics and 
practitioners forcing them to further unpack these containers in the empirical context.  
The containers have been kept broad, in an attempt to represent a range of locations/situations 
and recognition is given to the immense bodies of academic work that are dedicated to defining 
container term.  Containers are located within a seesaw type model representing a social 
licence relationship and it roughly appears to obey Newtonian physics within a flat plane, to 
demonstrate their relationship within the whole social situation.  If this model is to be used to 
try and understand social reality and deliver change to mine management perceptions as is 
envisaged, portraying the totality of relationships, and representing the pivotal position of the 
State on moderating those relationships is critical.  The model has the potential to establish that 
State support is critical to social licence, and this could have significant implications for some 
international legal tribunals and is an attempt at conveying that social licence is not the product 
of a binary relationship between mine corporation and community.  No apology is made for 
schematising the major components of society engaged in a mining project.  That in a sense is 
the very point.  Moving away from the binary into the totality of relationships provides an 
opportunity to experiment with “what ifs” from a management perspective.   
  
Chapter 9 Scenario Testing of The Social Licence Settlement Model. 
This chapter presents five example or “ideal” types of social licence settlement (SLS) 
or failure of Social licence Settlement developed using these constructs.  They do not 
represent all permutations of relationships but provide a range of examples to demonstrate the 
interrelatedness of actants/container and illustrates the dynamics at work.    
9.1 A positive yet unstable example of social licence settlement.    
 
Figure 9-1 Positive unstable social licence settlement 
 
The example in Figure 9-1 represents a good SLS and the position of the State, which is 
closer to the mine corporation, for whatever reason, than its citizens.  The location of the State 
paradoxically enables the community to exert more leverage than they might otherwise as they 







good relationship between the mine and community yet weak regional development plans 
institutionalised systems and associated capital might indicate that this is an SLS in a country 
with a weak regulatory framework (smaller arrows) and scant regard for International Rights 
Framework.  The issue here for the mine and the Lender is that without institutional systems 
and strong engagement with international systems anchoring the State there is certain volatility 
inherent in the model.  In practical terms, the strong civil society influences could present a 
position where the mine and lenders are blamed for poor behaviour on behalf of the State.  Or 
when conflict arises between mine and community which introduces volatility into the system, 
the State responds in a manner, not in alignment an international rights framework.  This could 
represent a mine in a sub-Saharan African location with a ‘major” or large firm, putting 
significant resources into relationships with the community yet not recognising the underlying 
risks that could collapse their SLS and leave them dealing with international lawsuits.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 9-1.    
9.2 Positive stable social licence settlement. 
 






     
This is what the author would consider the ideal scenario- for all parties.  There are good 
relationships, strong ties between State and International Rights Framework yet civil society 
systems that ensure accountability.  Relationships between mine and community are there yet 
there is no need for this to be as strong as before because the range of checks and balances and 
the existence of strong regional development plans, indicated by the State’s engagement with 
them, mean that there are institutional systems to deal with issues.  A strategically planned 
approach to developing share “social goods” underpinned by compliance with international 
regulation and the State and community closely alighted, enable long term stability.  There is 
through institutional systems no longer a reliance on “charitable” shared benefit, there are 
systems in place to ensure it and for dealing with conflict issues.  This represents a mine site 
in a location where the State has a history of strong links to international rights frameworks, 
has developed regional development plans that communities have supported, and effected the 
creation of systems to create  high levels of accountability between the State and the affected 
community.  Creating an SLS in this format will take significant time.  Unless the State, their 
institutional capacity in terms of plans and governance, and community capacity is already well 
developed this may be a situation which cannot be achieved within the existing mining business 
model, for reasons explained earlier.    
We can see a similar iteration of this model in Figure 9-3.  This time there are weaker 
links between the State and Community and the link between International Rights Framework, 
Regional Development Plans, and International Arbitration, represented by smaller arrows and 
the State.  This is balanced by stronger ties between the Mine and the Community and a slightly 
weaker involvement of International NGO.  Comparing  
Figure 9-2 Positive stable social licence settlement 
     and Figure 9-3, the second is less stable and yet the mine is working harder to 
influence the community.  The State has moved closer to the Mine, so the critical issue is the 
weak relationships moving the International NGO.    
 
Figure 9-3 Good practice social licence settlement 
This represents the situation many mid and junior tier mine corporations find themselves 
in.  They have a growing concern, but they are inherently vulnerable to a collapse of the 
relationship between the mine and the community.  The pressure on that relationship, for 
example, through a pollution incident, might lead to a temporary breakdown of the relationship 
and there are only, in this case, weak stretched relationships between the State and institutional 
systems.  Brokering a resolution in this situation would be difficult and highly reliant on 
individual relationships within the mine and the community.  Anticipating this type of SLS 
failure may be why mine corporations behave as they do with regards to developing champions 
in the community.  The difficulty is that the mine corporations are then at the mercy of the 






between the mine and community will intensify pressure within the community as to whom is 
representative.  This in some jurisdictions can lead to cohesion and conflict within the 
community.  An example of this type of mining situation as represented by Costanza (2016) in 
Guatemala and lead her to recognise that, “findings suggest that the local state, especially 
institutions designed to encourage citizen participation in local governance, can play a crucial 
role in determining whether and how mining firms can operate”.    
The State plays a critical role, particularly as Costanza notes, in many developing 
countries where there is a devolved local or regionally orientated State apparatus.  “Regional 
Development Plans and Related Governance” as a container indicate the mechanism for 
influencing the SLS.  The strength of connection or level of engagement by both the State and 
the Community with that container is critical to an SLS as Costanza states, “the local state and 
invited participatory institutions warrant attention because it is through them that elites can 
frame debates over mining and development, mitigate opposition, and help secure an SLO”. 








Figure 9-4 Loss of a social licence settlement 
As some of the patterns emerge in the use of my SLS model, it is possible to view the 
importance and influence of certain actants.  We have focused on the previous example on the 
State, Community and Mine.  Whilst they are critical assemblages it is important to recognise 
that their relationship and influences are moderated by a range of other critical assemblages.   
In  Figure 9-4, a situation has arisen for whatever reason, and the model is value-neutral, 
where SLS must lead to a collapse of the SLO.  A weak relationship between the State and the 
Regional Development Plans and International Rights Framework, a State distant from the 
community and a good relationship between the community and access to international 
mechanisms has enabled the International NGO to support the collapse of the SLO, no SLS 
exists.  International NGOs by their presence and it need not be a physical presence, through 
having access to international expert knowledge and organisational capacity, have exerted a 
considerable pull on the Lender.  In a situation like this with potential reputational damage to 
the lender, for example, an international development bank, the Lender might leave, and an 
element of the capital might follow.  This represents many mid and junior tier, high risk-taking 
mining operations without long term strategic investment building capacity in Regional 
Development Plans and Related Governance and with a crisis breaking down relationships with 
the community.   
This inevitably forges stronger links with International NGOs who may be ideological 
driven by one or a range of concerns (environmental, climate change, Rights issues) and they 
will certainly be part of a network of such international advocates.  Paradoxically in the case 
of a State signing up to transnational agreements on Regional Development Plans and Related 
Governance- for example, Natura 2000, an EU framework for spatial environmental 
governance, the further the State moves away from the community and these forms of 
governance, the less power it possesses to influence this relationship as represented below.  
State capacity and their effective engagement in transnational environmental governance are 
critical to ensuring the forces contained within these new forms of governance are not used by 
International NGOs and the Community to remove mine development risks and stop all mines- 
rather than develop an SLS.    
9.4 The Critical Issue of the State.    
 
Figure 9-5 Critical issue of the State 
As can be seen in Figure 9-5 there is no SLO within this SLS because there is no state 
involvement.  All the relationships we would expect within a good social licence settlement 
are there, the mine has succeeded in getting the local community on board but for whatever 
reason, the State has refused permits and is not actively participating in Regional Development 
Plans and Related Governance.  Arguably if we ignored the process of how the Rosa Montana 
mine in Romania arrived at this situation, for International NGO’ played a significant role in 
bringing about the conditions, this SLS representation is largely correct.  Critically the State 
not being part of the SLS means there can be no social licence.  The State cannot grant a social 
licence and failure to participate means there cannot be one.  The common conflagration of 
social and community, in attempting to define SLO as social legitimacy within a binary 
relationship is what this demonstrates as flawed thinking.    
9.5 The Social licence Settlement Model. 
The first part of this chapter has dealt with the construct of Political Settlement in the 
context of an SLO and demonstrated that there is precedence within the academic literature for 
using it to try and explain SLO.  It details that a SLO settlement model is an attempt to represent 
an assemblage; a way to represent the dynamic change of continual social interaction in any 
given space, moving beyond tired theoretical binary propositions in representing social reality.  
Social licence arrangements, like the rest of social reality, are continuously evolving.  That has 
implications both for the construction of the Social Licence Settlement Model (SLSM) and in 
the management approach needed to address real-world social licence situations if this model 
is to be used to try and understand social reality and deliver management.  It then illustrates 
how ANT theory gives the author an opportunity through the fusion with a political settlement 
framework and beyond either a reductionist or binary approach in addressing social licence 
and represent this complex social reality.  The fusion of ANT and an established political 
settlement concept, move the new model beyond most models, most obviously, in that the State 
plays a pivotal role.  In scoping political settlement, the thesis refers to the seminal works of 
Mushtaq Khan on the definition of political settlement and the challenges to his ideas from 
Kelshall.  The challenges by Kelshall on the scope of the political term demonstrate, that within 
both the academic literature and political practice, there is precedence for local-level actors 
being central to a sub-national settlement defined as a political settlement.  That reflects the 
position taken herein.  The position taken in this thesis, is that the new social licence settlement 
model is set, as discussed earlier, at a meso level but that all actants have agency if heavily 
constrained in their choices.    
It is impossible to perfectly represent social reality in a manner and beyond reproach or 
challenge, given the width of the theoretical net needed to catch the totality of social realities.  
Kita’s (2019) work represents how communities, elites although critical to communities’ 
agency can take on a range of different forms of relationship with the wider body and this is 
used to support the theoretical “containers’ used in the model although they are, of course, 
contestable.  Given that, the model serves to represent, through structured relationships 
between containers how social reality around social licence can be portrayed as a balancing act 
of many actors with the state as pivotal.  This in turn provides an opportunity for these 
relationships to be challenged and explored.  From a theoretical perspective within the social 
licence literature, this represents a new starting point and one which has the potential to offer 
a range of new areas of investigation.  As a concept, social licence settlement model has also 
the potential to be taken out of its heavy theoretical heavy setting and applied by practitioners 
that offering utility to the mining industry.    
  
Chapter 10 Conclusions And Next Steps. 
10.1 Introduction.  
Applying my SLSM) as an analytical tool to both the desk-based research and the field-
based research highlighted the potential of the model to capture a change to civil society 
dynamism in relation to mining.  Furthermore, the SLSM demonstrated the totality of 
relationships surrounding a social licence in a real-world setting.   Interpreting social licence 
through the model can enable a new lexicon to develop, supporting non-social scientists within 
the industry to get to grips with the complexities of those relationships defining social licence.  
Asking questions of participants in Serbia, who clearly recognised some “non-mining industry” 
driven unstoppable process rolling towards that industry in Serbia from a neighbouring 
country, elicited both consternation and resignation from industry insiders.   
10.2 Applying the SLSM model in a European context. 
Through my research I have contended that actors/actants need to develop and support 
the creation of new forms of a collective agency if they want to ensure outcomes from the 
network that support their interests.  The SLSM has proven to be a mechanism for analysing 
social licence in this context.   
Within the SLSM there are two nexuses between the INGO, the Community and the State 
where such agency could develop.  There is the International Rights Framework assemblage, 
which represents the space for aspects of governance, detailing minimum standards for how 
the state treats citizens and protestors.  This might serve as a space for dialogue to occur 
between INGO, Community and State but it is unlikely to provide a space for creating much 
more than adherence to minimum international industry standards.  Secondly, there is Regional 
Development Plans + Related Governance, representing interlocking spatial environmental 
and social governance and a crucible for state/community engagement.   As an interface 
“space” between State and those who are most likely to want to challenge State awarded mining 
Licences, this “space” should be expanded, developed, and maintained if a balance that 
supports the space for the social licence is what is required.  The State must not only be 
involved but is likely to be the source or conduit for resources to make it a reality.  Resources 
are required to support this new or developing “institutional” capacity to prepare for movement 
within the current Social Licence Settlement Model.  This space should inform the creation of 
new legislation or reform of existing mining laws and create devices or platforms for bringing 
together interlocutors on environmental, economic, and social issues which will have to be 
resolved to maximise community benefit from mining activity.    
Specifically, in Serbia, given that the State has limited resources, there is a need to find 
ways to support their utilisation of available, EU assets such as the IPA and EU Leader+ funds 
to enable this type of activity.  This would be one way to, in referencing the SLSM, anchor or 
support the space for social licence.  To ensure the space for a social licence does not get 
crushed, it will be important that there are coherence and coordination between regional 
economic and social plans and that of the mining sector and most critically, that it engages with 
communities’ and supports their ability to engage.  There is a need to construct and organise a 
social architecture to enable Serbian communities to be heard before they need to shout.  This 
is something that requires not just economic resources alone, capacity within communities and 
the State but it also time and knowledge transfer from across the EU.  The evidence of the need 
for social licence development or indeed political consent from a community requiring time 
runs through all of the literature on social governance, ESG documentation, social licence, 
community development and conflict.  Given that, to ensure a more positive outcome than that 
predicted, it requires a range of well-resourced community and state development programmes 
with external support.   Finding such support may well entail the State and the mining sector 
engaging with some unusual bedfellows as the EU mining industry appears to have little 
internal capacity to understand the necessary practices and processes required.  MIREU was 
an EU funded Horizon 2020 research project aimed at building a mining network across 
Europe.  One of its objectives, as outlined in its website (MIREU), was to; "Develop EU level 
Social Licence to Operate (SLO) Guidelines and an accompanying Toolkit”. 
A “Joint civic statement on H2020 MIREU August 24, 2020' (JCS1.   2020) prepared by 
more than 30 NGO bodies with an interest in mining projects from across the Iberian Peninsula, 
Finland, UK, Slovakia, and Bosnia, criticised the MIREU project’s pejorative use of language 
toward those objecting to mining and described MIREU’s failure to engage in any meaningful 
way with those who had what might be described loosely as, anti-mining, totally discredited 
their approach to defining social licence or developing tools to support one.   They felt their 
concerns had been dismissed and that the intellectual framework being constructed by MIREU, 
to move the sector forward on conceptualising and securing a social licence, was inherently 
biased against local communities.  In the joint civic statement, they say, “We furthermore 
defend the right to comprehensively informed self-determination and decision power of local 
communities, confronted with the implementation of mining and metallurgy projects” (Ibid:6). 
This statement details how an articulate coordinated group of European INGOs, support 
informed local self-determination and decision making, although as of yet, no such legal 
“right” universally exists within the EU.  The type of rights demanded could only be delivered, 
in Serbia or elsewhere through activities that could be characterised as fitting into the Regional 
Development Plans + Related Governance component of the SLSM.   
10.3 Demonstrable value of the SLSM. 
Modelling potential SLO failure using the SLSM demonstrates that it is the totality of 
relationships and that their interrelatedness that is critical to understanding the forces in 
operational.  This non- binary relationship model is a shift from existing models of SLO which 
offer little in terms of the dynamic nature of social licence which focus predominantly on a 
binary relationship between Mine and Community or relies on normative devices such as Trust 
to explain post-event social licence collapse.  The SLSM is supporting an understanding of the 
range of relationships needed to create forms of shared spatial and resource governance.  
Identifying a critical role for the State and offering containers for actants involved in mining 
to be packaged into; Mine, Community Regional Development Plans + Related Governance, 
etc, SLSM offers an alternative approach to understanding what have traditionally been 
labelled stakeholders.  A political settlement framework for understanding a societal issue is 
more encompassing than a business, stakeholder-based model.  Business based stakeholder 
models only engage with relationships when they are regulatory or carry direct economic 
incentives or disincentives.  SLSM moves social licence beyond an economic analysis of the 
critical relationships needed for an SLO.  The political settlement-based model explains the 
interrelation aspect of power within a specific situation.  Power is not always financialised or 
commodifiable.  Once relationships are explicit, they can support analysis and a lexicon can 
develop around them.  SLSM offers a visual framework for investigating changing power 
relations which is likely to be accessible to those not concerned with underpinning theoretical 
perspectives such as Turner’s Synthetic Model of Conflict Processes (2013:41) or the uses of 
flat and tall ontologies.    
10.4 A new way to conceptualise social licence. 
Research finds that most business leaders suffer for lack of a way to make sense of the 
data they have, not necessarily for having too little data, attested to in K.  Sutcliffe and K.  
Weber, “The High Cost of Accuracy,” Harvard Business Review 81 (2003:74-82).  The 
relationships between actants in the SLSM represent a totality that demonstrates that forces 
push and pull in an ongoing dynamic set of relationships.  SLSM offers a lens for reflecting on 
data which can be linked to critical relationships.   This research and the SLSM model are 
currently being used as the theoretical underpinning of a social licence to operate index (SLOi 
2020) with a Horizon 2020 project.    
The index, (ibid) currently out for consultation, utilises the basis of SLSM and further 
work by the author and industry collaborators, to construct a series of questions concerning 
numerous aspects which affect a social licence.   These aspects relate to livelihoods, host 
communities economic and social relationship to the land, governance and conflict history and 
others, all that is represented with the SLSM.  The SLSM through defining relationships 
coupled with research from industry and experience from the field has enabled the SLOi to 
generates a metric for social licence and draws attention to aspects or factors affecting 
relationships which might give cause for concern.   SLSM provides the opportunity to look at 
relationships within the totality and provides a context for data.  It enables the posing of queries 
for example, what are the scenarios for an SLO given? For example, "the State appears not to 
have any strategic processes for engaging local people around our mine site?" Likewise, "our 
Lender is sensitive to political upheaval and the community appear unhappy- should we deal 
with it before they are engaged in an EU network of anti-mining NGOs?"   SLSM is not a 
predictive tool but rather an overarching framework to view the relationships inherent is a 
social licence.  Hence it is being used to provide the theoretical context for underpinning an 
approach to adding metrics to social licence.  By recognising that it is the totality of relationship 
in a changing temporality that is critical to keeping a social licence it focuses the industry on 
continually reviewing relationships and investing in mechanisms to enable relationships.  This 
is very different to mine developers focusing on a shared value notion with communities.  The 
mine developer should logically, if we accept this framework, commit to supporting the flow 
of resources to enabling State and community capacity to engage in the wider conversation 
about spatial development and a range of benefits co-defined.  Mine developers may not 
themselves have the capability or capacity to develop the architecture for the development of 
these new institutions.  Yet through understanding what these institutions might look like and 
their capacity to deliver a social licence for their operations, mine developers can choose to 
support the pulling of the lever in support of such local development with national and 
supranational State.  If no mining access to critical resources in Europe can be brought about 
by mine developers alone and if the resources are truly business-critical, new approaches will 
arise.   
The SLSM does not represent one particular business model, it is a model of the 
relationships that exist around a potential or actual mine site.  It may be to achieve the 
"balancing act" that is a social licence, new resources need to be added and new business 
models developed for the industry.  Proctor and MacCallum’s (2019) Canary in a Cage paper, 
points to how the extraction industry should be engaging with conflict and potential conflict, 
enabling dissenting voices at an early stage of project development, rather than trying to quell 
them.  Through the co-production of aspects contained in the Development Plans + Related 
Governance icon, this can be achieved.  The forces exerted from the icon can support the 
stability of the social licence settlement.  Failure to coproduce aspects of this icon with the 
other actants means that the opportunity for a stable settlement is likely reduced.  The research 
in Serbia illuminated that there already is a recognition that operating a mine successfully, 
given the scale of impact on local communities, requires operations to be endorsed within a 
wider political sphere.  As the political sphere is disrupted with new actors or systems, there 
will be associated impacts on relationships critical to social Licences for the mining sector, as 
shown from the Romanian example.  This disruption process may appear to involve a local 
community and a mine operator but there are many other relationships that will have a bearing 
on the precariousness or otherwise of the social Licences.  Failure to acknowledge the critical 
role of the state or lender or international rights framework in the shaping the relationships 
between the community and mine effectively disables one's ability to engage with finding 
methods of improving or securing a social licence.  The research and the SLSM model are 
currently being used to underpin the creation of a Social Licence to Operate index (SLOi) and 
included for further development in a new EU Horizon Europe research funding application.  
The index, currently out for consultation utilises the basis of SLSM and further work by the 
author and industry collaborators to construct a series of questions concerning numerous 
aspects which are likely, based on academic evidence and field experience, to affect the 
relationships in a social licence.  Interrogating indicators of agency, use of space, corporate 
governance, legal process and compliance, the basis for conflict and a range of other factors, 
the SLOi uses an algorithm to generate a metric for social licence and draws attention to aspects 
which might give cause for concern.   
10.5 Academic contribution.    
    This thesis builds on a rapidly expanding body of work relating to real work 
circumstance where mining companies meet objections from communities, that effectively stop 
their business activities.  The core of the thesis is the construction of a theoretical model which 
carefully builds on the academic literature of what social licence is and is not, how to achieve 
it and factors that mitigate against it.  The thesis undertakes to demonstrate the financial forces 
the drive short-termism within companies and that has driven the failed conceptualisation of 
social licence.  It also demonstrates that changes to civil society can not only cause public 
attitudes towards mining to change but can cause the consent to mine to be withdrawn.  Moving 
aspects from other models of social licence to operate identified herein, specifically, those that 
deal with defining relationships, into a meso level political settlement framework, builds on 
solid academic foundations.  Packaging up components of the new SLSM model using a variety 
of theories, for those concerned with social licence, draws attention to the need to observe the 
totality of relationships and not solely that between the Community and the Mine, or in 
MacCallum (2017) case, the State as well.  Recognising that the relationships between the 
community and International NGOs are potentially as important to the social licence as the 
relationship between the mine and the state, is new within conceptual models of social licence, 
similarly, acknowledging explicitly a temporal aspect to social licence in the theoretical 
framework may be obvious but it is new.   
That the model is ambitious in trying to contain and portray all aspects of the societal 
relationships and business influences that underlie a social licence and its failure, cannot be 
disputed.  That through the utilisation of a range of theoretical approaches the author has 
managed to construct a model that is being used to support the development of metrics around 
social licence and mining in Europe, is also not disputable (INFACT SLOi).  The theoretical 
aspects of the model are by necessity eclectic as they deal with a range of aspects critical to 
understanding what causes or ends a social licence for a mining company.  Agency, space, 
corporate governance, legal process and compliance, conflict and a range of other factors have 
been considered.  Understanding that any model for SLO that does not give provision for a 
range of relationships which are not solely spatially adjacent to the mine site, is likely to offer 
very little in terms of support for the practitioner.   This thesis defines a framework for the 
construction of a theoretical model for social licence to operate within the mining industry.  
The SLSM is predicated on political settlement theory and that social licence is always a 
settlement or temporary arrangement which balances the interests and power mediated through 
relationships.  SLSM is underpinned by Turner's conflict theory and a range of other theories 
around the construction of knowledge, concepts of time and space.  The model also reflects 
extensive field experience with both communities in conflict and the mining sector.  The 
research undertaken in South-Eastern Europe demonstrates that changes to environmental 
governance can affect civil society which in term can impact significantly on the processes 
needed to secure a social licence.  Moving beyond existing models of social licence, 
recognising the term has become largely debated and used as a virtue-signalling device by 
industry, the new model recognises that the problems persist for the industry.  The SLSM draws 
attention to the totality of relationships and offers a framework to support the interpretation of 
where stressors are likely to develop and what areas are needed to be investigated to anticipate 
problems.   
The thesis argues that the construction of knowledge necessary to interpret the warning 
signs of a failing social licence at a mine and design successful mitigation approaches is 
unlikely to be resolved.  This is due to structural factors within the industry which have largely 
developed social management strategies constrained by short term financial accountability and 
failing to recognise the legitimacy of local challenges until it is too late.   As such the SLSM is 
being used to frame a range of metrics which can be applied to social licence to operate, which 
can support the reduction of conflict within the mining sector.  Building a place for theoretical 
social science within the mining sector has not been without its challenges and SLSM has been 
designed as a device for enabling those not conversant with social science, to conceptualise the 
manifold relationships at play.   
10.6 Next Steps. 
The nature of agency, space, corporate governance, communities, mining legal processes 
and compliance, conflict and a range of other factors utilised herein, will continue to attract the 
attention of academics as rich and complex fields in their own right.  Similarly, the use of a 
range of combined social science methodology to investigate industrial failure is a path that 
has attracted a range of interests, notably in this research proponent of Actor-Network Theory.  
Specifically, with regards to social licence and the SLSM, there are avenues to investigate the 
relative importance of that which happens within the container labelled Development Plans + 
Related Governance, to other relationships.  The changing nature of the business model for 
mining companies operating or wanting to operate in the EU and how that will be driven by 
transnational environmental governance processes is an area which is likely to attract 
considerable academic attention, as the EU grapples with how to secure conflict-free essential 
minerals to support decarbonisation if its economy.  The failure of the EU to design a taxonomy 
or framework to enshrine or monetarise social licence processes is hopefully a temporary one. 
I intend to continue my discussions within the industry and lobby the EC directly and indirectly 
to support them in understanding that a social licence in a political settlement and they have a 
major role to play within Europe in changing the mining business model to enable both mining 
and the communities right to say no to mining.  
My involvement with the EU and those who seek to understand the challenges of 
accessing those Critical Raw Materials, has led to my inclusion in a number of fora, the latest 
being the European Forum for Earth Observation. A social licence model underpinning an 
inclusive approach to solving the problem of social licence as a societal issue rather than a 
narrow business issue, open the door for numerous sectors to bring their expertise to the table. 
It raises the challenges of having to create metrics on social aspects related to, in this case 
various visual representation of the earth from data that has utilised a variety of visible and non 
-visible spectra. The very clever drawing representing the discussions at this conference over 
the two days, defines social licence and the problems around it, within the context of remote 
sensing deployed by geologist.  
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